For readers following the details of China’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development (2026-2030), I’ll also be sharing my reflections once the full set of proposals is released.

Lastly, in response to the recent reader survey — most of you said you’d like me to continue covering Luo Yonghao’s podcast show. I’ve been keeping up with every episode (each running three to five hours), but the latest ones are deeply rooted in local Chinese context, packed with cultural and linguistic nuances that might be challenging for international audiences to fully grasp. For that reason, I haven’t produced a new newsletter on them yet — but rest assured, I’m keeping a close eye on what’s next.

Opinion | Shatter the mirror

The concept of the Thucydides Trap, predicting conflict between China and the US, projects the West’s conquest-driven history onto Chinese civilisation

Weijian Shan

In the shadow of escalating tensions between the United States and China, Graham Allison’s concept of the Thucydides Trap has become a staple of geopolitical discourse. Coined by the Harvard scholar, the term evokes the ancient Greek historian Thucydides’ observation that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable”.

Allison’s study of 16 historical cases, where a rising power challenged a ruling one, found war in 12 instances. He warns that China’s ascent threatens American hegemony, potentially dooming both to conflict unless deliberate efforts are made to avert it.

Yet, this framework is itself a conceptual trap for the West. By drawing from the histories of the West and Japan, Allison projects onto China a narrative of inevitable aggression. This is like gazing into a mirror: the West sees only its own reflection of historical conquest and rivalry – from European empires to Japanese imperialism – concluding that China, as it gains strength, will behave similarly.

But China’s 5,000-year history tells a different story. Its cultural DNA is profoundly landbound, shaped by geography and ecology. For much of history, Chinese civilisation has thrived within the 400-millimetre annual rainfall isohyet, the climatic threshold separating fertile agricultural heartlands from arid steppes.

This line, roughly aligning with the path of China’s Great Wall, demarcates zones where rainfall exceeds 400 mm per year, sufficient for stable crop yields, and the drier northern regions, suited largely for nomadic herding. South of this boundary, wheat fields and rice paddies sustained vast populations, fostering a society incentivised to defend its productive core rather than venture into marginal lands.

Northern steppe peoples roamed the grasslands, chasing scarce water and forage. Their survival depended on mobility and raiding, inevitably leading to clashes with other nomadic tribes. The Xiongnu, Mongols and other steppe peoples repeatedly made southward incursions, prompting a defensive response from China in the form of fortification and counter-attacks.

Farmers work in a paddy field in Danzhai county, Guizhou province, on June 6, 2023. Photo: Xinhua

Indeed, China’s territory reached its maximum historical extent not through outward expansion but via inward foreign invasion and occupation. The Mongols established the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368), bringing their vast steppe domains into Chinese maps. The Manchus founded the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), incorporating new territories. Over time, these invaders were assimilated into Han culture, adopting Confucian bureaucracy and sinicising their rule.

This contrasts sharply with the cultures of the nomadic and sea peoples that gave rise to European civilisations, which blended herding with subsistence agriculture across fragmented polities. Sea peoples like the Vikings and Japanese raiders, driven by scarce resources and mobility, developed cultures of raiding and conquest, clashing with rivals to secure survival.

To protect its agricultural heartland, China’s strategy relied on fortifications like the Great Wall, built from at least the Qin dynasty (221-207 BC) onwards, which shielded the northern frontier from nomadic invaders. Coastal defences, like those during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing dynasties that relocated populations inland, restricted maritime activity and blocked threats from pirates, but also severely hindered trade, a major reason the country had resisted opening up its ports for trade until after the Opium Wars.

Moreover, China’s maritime ventures, such as those under Zheng He, were not for conquest or colonisation; his Treasure Fleet, the most advanced in the world with over 300 ships and 27,000 men, sailed to East Africa, carrying treasure as gifts to foster relations with the countries along the Indo-Pacific coasts.

A painting by Shen Du dated 1414 shows a giraffe acquired in Africa for the Ming emperor during one of Zheng’s naval expeditions. Photo: Taipei Museum.

In stark contrast, Western history, shaped by nomadic Indo-Europeans and seafaring powers like the Vikings and Portuguese, was driven by scarcity and mobility, fuelling aggressive expansion from Rome’s legions to Britain’s global empire.

Small European states, which struggled to buffer against famines due to fragmented lands, turned to international trade, expansion and colonisation, a pattern echoed by sea peoples like the Japanese, whose 16th century invasions of Korea and the piracy along the Chinese coasts, 19th century annexation of Okinawa and Taiwan by force, early 20th century colonisation of Korea and the 20th century imperialism reflect a maritime-driven conquest ethos, especially after Westernising itself after the Meiji Restoration in 1868.

Allison’s cases – such as Anglo-German rivalry and the Napoleonic Wars – stem from this volatile mix of semi-nomadism and agricultural fragility, not universal laws of power transitions. The United States, whose culture, tradition and expansionist impulse originated in Europe, was engaged in imperial expansion once it became powerful, taking territories from Mexico, Hawaii and Spain.

Archaeology illuminates this divide. The Sanxingdui archaeological site in Sichuan province, which dates back thousands of years, yields bronze artefacts that are overwhelmingly ritualistic: masks, treelike altars and eye-like motifs symbolising cosmic order. It symbolised a culture focused on maintaining the existing social hierarchy characteristic of an inward-looking society.

As pointed out to me by Dr Ruiliang Liu, curator of the early China collection at the British Museum, Chinese burial objects were predominantly used for hierarchical rituals, with bronze carriages for elites and pottery for commoners, which suggests a stable agrarian society.

Objects unearthed from thousands of tombs dating back millennia confirm the social status of the buried, as there were strict rules on the number and kind of objects each social station was allowed to use. Buried in sacrificial pits, these ritual objects evoke ceremonies binding communities to ancestors and land, not mobile warbands.

By contrast, European burials like the 7th century Sutton Hoo ship burial in England, laden with helmets and swords, reflect a warrior culture geared for mobility and conquest. European Neolithic finds brim with utilitarian arms: flint axes and spearheads from Corded Ware cultures, signalling a world in perpetual motion. Celtic and Roman sites, similarly rich in weapons and trade goods, underscore this expansionist impulse.

To the Western eye, Sanxingdui’s esoterica might seem alien, but they underscore China’s focus on enduring order amid agrarian plenty. This land-bound tradition persisted in later centuries and is deeply embedded in Chinese culture. Early Chinese diaspora communities lacked dedicated cemeteries; Chinese immigrants still prefer to repatriate remains to ancestral soil as they believe “leaves [must] fall to their roots.”

People walk in and out of Wuhou Shrine. The site is dedicated to military and political leader Zhuge Liang, among other figures depicted in the epic Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Photo: Handout

This practice views the homeland as the sole repository for eternal rest. As US justice Stephen Field wrote in a decision of the US Supreme Court related to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, “[Chinese immigrants’] dying wish is that their bodies may be taken to China for burial”.

This ritual stems not from clannishness but cultural psyche: the belief that spirits are tethered to the homeland, not foreign wanderings. This homeland-bound identity historically diverged from the mobile traditions of ancient nomadic and seafaring peoples.

Chinese history cycled through wars and peace. Overpopulation and famine often precipitated internal conflicts, leading to fragmentation into warring states, as epitomised in the 14th century epic Romance of the Three Kingdoms: “The country, if divided for long, inevitably unifies; if unified for long, inevitably fractures”.

Yet the pull towards unity, driven by a shared culture, language and unitary governance since the Qin dynasty, was irresistible. The political unity of the land enabled grain reallocation from abundant regions to those hit by crop failures in any given year, a necessity for an agrarian society. These factors explain why China is one of the longest enduring civilisations in the world without much history of foreign conquest.

Spectators take selfies as flag-guarding helicopters fly over Tiananmen Square in Beijing, on September 3. Photo: Xinhua

China never developed a universal religion like those in other civilisations. Instead, its belief system, centred on ancestor worship, reflects an identity bound to the ancestral homeland and familial ties. Its syncretic pluralism absorbed foreign faiths like Buddhism, Islam and Christianity without exporting dogma.

Europe wielded faith as a crusader’s sword with proselytism justifying centuries of wars in God’s name and imperial expansion. In contrast, China’s non-proselytising culture avoided such aggression, reinforcing its defensive character.

Allison’s Thucydides Trap risks a self-fulfilling prophecy. Allison himself urges escape via diplomacy, yet his Eurocentric assumptions blind the West to China’s defensive history. To avert war, the West must shatter its mirror, recognising that a rising China seeks security and territorial integrity based on historical claims, not the seas of empire. Only then can mutual understanding replace reflexive fears.

Weijian Shan, Executive Chairman of PAG, a private equity firm, is the book author of Out of the Gobi, Money Games, and Money Machine.

Subscribe now

1. Suspend cooperation on fentanyl

2. Further restrict U.S. exports of soybeans, sorghum, and other products to China

3. Restrict U.S. poultry exports to China

4. Impose countermeasures in the services trade

5. Reduce or ban U.S. film exports to China

6. Investigate U.S. companies’ intellectual property (IP) gains in China

(Zichen Wang covered Chairman Rabbit’s piece on Pekingnology, while Fred Gao shared Liu’s analysis on Inside China.)

So far, at least one of the six measures has been implemented -- China on Thursday announced the plan to moderately reduce the number of U.S. films imported, according to Xinhua News Agency:

A spokesperson for the China Film Administration said that the adjustment follows market principles and reflects audience preferences, as the United States' recent hikes in tariffs on Chinese imports are bound to impact Chinese audiences' interest in U.S. movies.

As the second-largest film market in the world, China has always pursued a high level of opening-up, and will introduce more excellent films from other countries to meet market demand, said the spokesperson.

On Sunday, Chairman Rabbit posted a follow-up analysis on Trump administration’s tariff retreat regarding Chinese electronics—the Chinese version on his WeChat blog and the English version on his X (Twitter) account.

With his permission, I’ve republished his piece in today’s newsletter.

On Saturday, the U.S. government suddenly announced the exemption of 20 categories of electronic and tech products—including semiconductors, computers, tablets, and Apple Watches—from "reciprocal tariffs." These goods, largely imported from China (amounting to roughly $100 billion annually), account for about a quarter of China’s total annual exports to the U.S. This move effectively excludes a significant portion (and the highest-value portion) of tariffs on Chinese goods. Recently, China and the U.S. have been engaged in an intense trade war, and Trump’s policy reversal amounts to a public slap in his own face, putting himself in a politically vulnerable position and limiting the White House’s future policy options.

Given the frequent and chaotic shifts in the Trump administration’s tariff policies recently, it’s useful to take a moment to sort through the timeline.

(or skip to Part II: Analysis and Commentary)

Part I. A Recap of Trump administration’s Trade War (and Tariff Policies Targeting China):

1. In late February, the Trump administration first imposed a 20% "punitive" tariff on China, citing "fentanyl" as the reason.

2. On April 2, the Trump administration announced a new round of tariffs set to take effect on April 9, including:

• A 10% universal tariff on all countries and regions.

• "Reciprocal tariffs" on about 60 countries and regions, with varying rates. China’s rate was set at 34%.

3. China retaliated (also imposing 34%), prompting Trump to escalate further, leading to a spiral of tit-for-tat measures.

4. The final outcome was a 125% "reciprocal tariff" imposed by the U.S. on China, on top of the earlier 20% fentanyl tariff—totaling 145%. China retaliated with a 125% tariff.

5. (Note: This does not include the roughly 20% weighted average tariffs imposed during Trump’s first term, which the Biden administration largely retained.)

6. During this period, the U.S. experienced a simultaneous stock and bond market downturn. On April 9, Trump announced a 90-day suspension of "reciprocal tariffs" on other countries and regions while keeping the 10% universal tariff—and maintaining all tariffs on China, singling it out as the primary target.

7. On April 12, Trump announced an exemption for all electronic products from "reciprocal tariffs"—meaning Chinese electronics would still face the 20% base tariff but not the additional 125% "reciprocal tariff."

8. According to U.S. data, the exempted tech products account for about $100 billion of U.S. imports from China in 2024, or roughly 23% of total imports from China. Among these, smartphones and computer monitors are particularly dependent on Chinese imports, with shares as high as 81% and 78%, respectively. (See the data chart below for details.) The U.S. remains highly reliant on China for electronics, with no short-term alternatives available.

9. Every policy announcement by Trump has been highly provisional. For example, when announcing the suspension of "reciprocal tariffs," Trade Representative Jamie Greer was still explaining the tariff logic to bipartisan lawmakers in Congress—completely caught off guard. Before the weekend exemption for electronics/tech products was announced, senior cabinet members were still aggressively promoting the tariff policy’s "reshoring" narrative. Commerce Secretary Lutnick, in a CBS News interview just last Sunday, claimed: "great American workers" would soon be employed in new factories built and operated in the U.S., declaring, " army of millions and millions of human beings screwing in little screws to make iPhones, that kind of thing, is going to come to America" As recently as Saturday, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said: "The President has made it clear—America cannot rely on China to manufacture critical technologies such as semiconductors, chips, smartphones, and laptops", and "Companies are hustling to onshore their manufacturing in the United States as soon as possible. "The policy reversal is a resounding self-inflicted slap in the face. And make no mistake—the whole world is watching and listening: That loud slap? You delivered it to yourselves.

10. These policy reversals have been abrupt and theatrical, leaving not just the outside world struggling to keep up—even Trump’s own team can’t stay synchronized. On one hand, they must continue toeing the line, lavishing praise on Trump ("Trump is always right," "a masterclass in the art of the deal"). On the other, they’re forced to publicly defend the indefensible, spinning defeats as victories and praising the "emperor’s new clothes." Meanwhile, behind the scenes, they’re scrambling to clean up the mess. It’s a chaotic, humiliating tightrope act.

11. Trump’s exemption for electronics marks a critical collapse in his trade war against China. To borrow his own words against himself: "you don’t have the cards". He can keep performing the "emperor’s new clothes" routine, declaring "historic wins," but the market sees right through it. His team can only curse privately while groveling publicly, desperately brainstorming: How do they salvage their own reputations within this clown show? How do they minimize the damage while still keeping Trump—their unhinged boss—happy?

And if you doubted whether this Trump administration truly is a clown show, they’re doing everything possible to prove it.

Below is some further analysis and commentary.

Part II. Analysis and Commentary

1. The First Retreat on "Reciprocal Tariffs": Trump administration’s Concession to Wall Street: On April 9, Trump suspended "reciprocal tariffs" on other countries and regions because the U.S. market was experiencing a simultaneous stock and bond sell-off—particularly when investors began dumping U.S. Treasuries, driving yields up sharply. Frightened, Trump had no choice but to back down. That retreat was a concession to the bond market, capital markets, and Wall Street.

2. This Retreat on Chinese Electronics: Trump administration’s Concession to Main Street: This time, Trump’s exemption for Chinese electronics is a concession to ordinary Americans—since the U.S. remains highly dependent on China for these products, with no short-term alternatives. Imposing tariffs would only pass costs onto U.S. consumers, fueling inflation and creating a political disaster for Trump and the GOP. Remember, Trump campaigned on "taming inflation." Yet since taking office, he has done nothing to lower prices, instead relentlessly hiking tariffs, which has only worsened inflation expectations and pushed the U.S. toward stagflation.

3. A Boon for Big Tech and Big Corporate: Apple and other tech firms as well as retailers are the direct beneficiaries of this exemption. They can breathe a sigh of relief: They can continue manufacturing electronics in China for now, without immediately needing to restructure supply chains (assuming restructuring is even feasible). But as long as companies hold off on reshoring investments, the U.S. won’t regain these industries.

4. China’s "Two Models". Looking at the industries, if we crudely categorize China’s major exports to the U.S. by their position in the value chain, we see two broad types:

1)Yiwu Model: Lower-value-added goods like toys, plastic products, apparel, and furniture.

2)Big Tech Model: Higher-value-added electronics/tech products—from Apple, HP, Microsoft, Samsung, Sony to Hisense, TCL, Lenovo, and Foxconn, spanning both B2B and B2C sectors, including both branded and contract manufacturers. These goods involve complex processes and higher margins. (Of course, this is an oversimplification—Yiwu also produces some high-value goods, and mid-sized firms make electronics. Reality is a spectrum where products occupy varying positions along the value chain.)

5. What Trump administration Really Wants: High-End Manufacturing (Where Tariffs Might Help):

Trump’s original vision for tariffs included some long-term thinking—reshoring manufacturing to ensure supply chain security and create high-quality jobs. But industries and products differ. Today‘s U.S. lacks the capability, conditions, or will to bring back low-value-added sectors like toys, apparel, or plastics. Notice how Trump officials, when promoting reshoring, only ever mention high-value industries like autos, semiconductors, and electronics—never toys or clothing (which makes their tariffs on these goods utterly devoid of industrial logic).

Most would agree that tariffs, while not sufficient alone, may be a “necessary” condition for reshoring. Without steep tariffs on electronics, those industries won’t return. But even with tariffs, success is far from guaranteed.

6. What Kind of Tariffs Would Actually Support U.S. Industry?

This leads to the most critical point: From an industrial logic perspective, if the U.S. government wants to use tariffs to steer (or force) corporate behavior, those tariffs must be *long-term and predictable*. The necessary conditions are as follows:

1. Targeted, not blanket: Tariffs should support specific industries as part of a deliberate industrial policy, not indiscriminately applied to all countries, regions, or products.

2. Universal, but not country/jurisdiction-specific: To reshore industries, tariffs must apply equally to ALL trading partners. If only one jurisdiction (e.g., Mainland China) is targeted long-term, supply chains will simply shift elsewhere—not return to the U.S.

3. Permanent, not temporary: Sector-wide tariffs must be established as long-term national policy, integrated into a broader industrial strategy.

4. Bipartisan consensus: There must be clear, durable, and public agreement across parties and institutions, ensuring tariffs outlast any single administration.

5. Legislative, not executive: Tariffs should be codified by Congress, not implemented via executive order (which can be reversed, challenged in court, or scrapped by the next president).

6. Time horizon aligned with investment cycles: Factories and supply chains take years—easily beyond a 4-year presidential term—to build. For tariffs to work, firms must trust they’ll remain for 10–15 years with near certainty. Only then will they act.

7. Tariffs alone are insufficient: They’re necessary but not sufficient condition. Complementary policies—regulatory reforms, workforce training, infrastructure, and anti-addiction measures (U.S. manufacturers complain they can’t find workers sober from 9 AM to 5 PM due to rampant substance abuse or lack of work ethics)—are critical.

8. Shared Sacrifice: Reshoring inflicts short-term pain: scarcity, inflation, lower living standards, corporate losses, market volatility. Society must unite behind a "weather the storm" mentality to endure transition. If every market dip triggers panic, lobbying, partisan fighting, and policy reversals, long-term industrial revival is impossible.

The Verdict: America’s political system—its polarization, policy whiplash, and institutional design—proves it lacks the foundation for long-term industrial policy. Its governance was not designed and built for this.

7. The Inevitable Outcome of Policy Volatility and Short-Termism: Corporate Wait-and-See

If there were ever a leader least suited to implementing long-term policies, it would be Trump. If there were ever an administration least capable of executing a long-term industrial strategy, it would be Trump’s. Today, U.S. tariff policy flip-flops erratically—imposed one day, suspended the next; raised abruptly, then slashed; universally applied, then selectively exempted; declared "permanent," only to become "negotiable." The objectives, strategy, tactics, and messaging are utterly incoherent, offering no predictability or certainty to businesses.

For companies, the dumbest move would be to hastily comply with Trump’s whims—say, relocating supply chains from Country A to Country B—only for the U.S. to suddenly strike a trade deal with Country A, dropping tariffs, or to impose new tariffs on Country B after it becomes the latest trade deficit villain. Such whiplash could render their supply chain investments worthless overnight.

Under these conditions, no rational firm will commit to major decisions. Instead, they’ll wait and watch. Building a factory takes 4–5 years; the safest bet is to endure the remaining 3.5 years of Trump’s term and see if the primary source of uncertainty—Trump himself—can be removed. But this corporate paralysis also suppresses investment, further denting the economy.

8. Projecting the Industrial Outcomes of Trump administration’s Tariffs

Now let’s assess the likely results of Trump’s tariff policies:

1. Low-value industries Yiwu Mode—"External Cycle"

For sectors like toys, plastics, apparel, and footwear, reshoring to the U.S. is impossible unless America imposes PERMANENT high tariffs—and absorbs massive short-to-medium-term economic pain. Otherwise, outsourcing firms will merely optimize around country-specific tariffs (e.g., China), shifting supply chains between foreign nations rather than returning to the U.S. The outcome would be, whatever country inherits production will see its trade surplus with the U.S. surge (as happened with Vietnam and Mexico post-2018), but America’s TOTAL trade deficit will remain largely the same.

At this point, Trump’s tariffs have lose all its economic rationale, retaining only a political one: "de-risking" by reducing reliance on any single country. But this is self-defeating—if security is the goal, shouldn’t the focus be on high-value tech, instead of T-shirts? Meanwhile, the best lesson that every nation (including China) has learnt by now is to prioritize reducing dependence on the U.S. market.

2. High-value industries—Status quo dependence on China

Given China’s dominance in electronics/tech, Trump—constrained by economic and political realities—has already exempted these products from "reciprocal tariffs." Most supply chains will stay in China, dashing any reshoring hopes.

This failure isn’t just economic; it’s strategic. If tariffs were truly about "security," why spare iPhones and semiconductors while hammering sneakers? The contradiction exposes the policy as hollow theatrics.

Bottom line: Trump’s tariffs are NOT going to revive U.S. manufacturing. They’ll just shuffle deck chairs on the global trade Titanic—while convincing the world to build lifeboats away from America.

9. The Real Damage of Trump administration’s Tariff Policies

As the above analysis shows, Trump’s tariffs fail to address any problem—whether judged by economic/industrial logic or political rationale. Instead, they create massive new ones. Rolled out recklessly and then reversed 180° under pressure, these policies have turned into a farce. Trade wars have no winners, and while we need not frame this as a zero-sum "U.S. loses, China wins" dynamic, the undeniable reality is that the Trump administration (and by extension, the U.S. government) emerges as the biggest loser: It has shattered market confidence, demolished trust in its governance competence, strained alliances, and forced businesses and consumers to bear the costs. This represents a comprehensive U.S. defeat—politically, economically, institutionally, and ideologically. The only valid lesson here is that all nations (including U.S. allies) must systematically reduce dependence on America—whether in security, technology, or trade.

10. After Repeated Defeats, Trump administration Has No Path to Recovery

It’s critical to recognize that Trump and his team DID harbor a long-term instinct to reshore industries through tariffs. But policymaking isn’t a game—it’s a complex interplay with markets, industries, political forces, and the public. Flip-flopping equals political suicide. Since March, Trump has U-turned on multiple tariff policies, retreating each time under market and media backlash. Battle after battle, he has lost.

Now, no one believes he’ll really reinstate "reciprocal tariffs" after 90 days, because U.S. Treasuries would crash again, cornering him in the exact same position. The same dynamic will replay for tariffs on China and others: Businesses, markets, politicians, and the press will force another retreat. Through “repeated games”, the market has learnt to exploit Trump’s weaknesses and confirmed that resistance works.

With each prior defeat, Trump’s chances of a comeback dwindle further. He has already overdrawn his political capital and exposed his vulnerabilities—irreversibly.

11. Three further takeaways:

1. For businesses, the safest approach is to stay put—wait and watch. Trump has less than 4 years left (from now till effectively election in Nov 2028) , which will pass in a blink. The best strategy is to maintain flexibility and adapt as needed.

2. The riskiest move is to make hasty investment decisions based solely on Trump’s rhetoric, which could leave companies exposed. Instead, firms should base long-term strategic choices on broader U.S. socioeconomic and political trends—focusing on potential bipartisan consensus rather than Trump’s unpredictable actions.

3. The smartest play is to "buy the dip."** Whenever Trump rolls out an aggressive policy and markets teeter near collapse, that’s the time to invest—because history shows he’ll likely back down under pressure and declare victory. Take his social media posts literally when he says, "Now is the time to buy." He and his inner circle may well have already positioned themselves accordingly.

12. America's Real Problem: Domestic Inequality.

The root issue in the U.S. is domestic wealth disparity, with its core contradiction being internal class conflict. Its actions are merely an attempt to externalize these domestic tensions.

As a nation and as an economy, the U.S. has benefited immensely from globalization. One critical figure highlights this: the sales revenue of U.S. companies in China—largely generated by American firms manufacturing goods or providing services locally. In 2022, U.S. corporate sales in China reached US$490.52bn(~500bn). In 2024, China’s exports to the U.S. totaled 524.66bn(also ~500 billion), a significant portion of which consisted of products made in China by U.S. companies and shipped back home.

Who reaps the lion’s share? U.S. multinational corporations and financial capital.

America as a whole has gained from globalization—but all the benefits have been captured by its corporations and capital elites. By offshoring production, capitalists abandoned American workers, leaving them with little to show for globalization’s gains. At its core, this is a “class struggle” between U.S. capitalists and workers—a domestic issue of economic distribution, unrelated to third-party nations.

Any one who is familiar with theories of left-wing political economy would understand: when imperialist nations fail to resolve internal class contradictions, they export their conflicts abroad. A century ago, this meant war and colonization; today, it takes the form of trade wars. The tactics change, but the essence remains.

We can take this analysis further: The American bourgeoisie’s strategy is to redirect domestic class conflict into nationalistic tensions between the U.S. and other countries, scapegoating external actors for their own political failures.

13. Only Socialism Can Save America

Thus, what America needs is not to disrupt global trade but to make the right political choice: reforming its domestic wealth distribution system. In fact, addressing inequality through political means may be easier than rebuilding industries.

Why? Because redistribution is primarily a political decision, whereas reviving manufacturing requires aligning policies, infrastructure, labor markets, and corporate participation. Moreover, in the age of technological revolution, industrial revival ≠ job creation. Even with perfect policy, America’s next industrial wave would be automation and AI-driven, generating few jobs. "Offshoring" would simply become "robot-outsourcing," deepening class strife between unemployed workers and tech-reliant corporations.

So, the conclusion remains: Only Socialism Can Save America. By “Socialism” we mean social democracy or democratic socialism. The label does not matter, the essence does.

Yet this solution is politically unattainable—because the American society still largely rejects socialism.

Result? The U.S. will not be able to resolve its domestic problems, and will keep externalizing the conflicts and destabilizing the world—especially China.

For China and the rest of the world, the task is clear: see through America’s logic, abandon illusions, and focus on our own path.

Subscribe now

For deeper insights, you can access the full-text version of the paper by downloading the journal’s digital edition below.

About China Taiwan Studies

Launched by the Taiwan Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in December 2023, China Taiwan Studies is Chinese mainland’s first English-language academic journal dedicated to Taiwan-related research for an international audience.

With the kind permission of the Taiwan Research Institute of the CASS, I am able to share digital editions of China Taiwan Studies online, such as a paper titled “30 Years of the 1992 Consensus in Retrospect” from China Taiwan Studies (Volume 1, Issue 1, 2023)

Currently, the following volumes are available for download and sharing via Google Drive:

Volume 1, Issue 1 (2023)

Volume 2, Issue 2 (2024)

Volume 2, Issue 3 (2024)

Feel free to explore these resources and share them with fellow researchers and readers interested in cross-strait developments.

Reunification Between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Straits: a Human Geography Perspective (II)

About the authors:

Zhu Lei, researcher at the Center for Taiwan Studies of Xiamen University

Xia Jiahui, research assistant at the Institute for Taiwan Studies of Tsinghua University

Cai Lihui, lecturer at the Institute of Economic and Social Development, Party School of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Chongqing Municipal Committee

Below are passages of the paper selected by me -- Jiang Jiang.

VII. Economically, Cross-Straits Reunification Facilitates Pareto Improvement

The criterion for evaluating whether a policy is good or bad should be its positive or negative impact on people’s lives. Promoting reunification through integrated development benefits the economies of both sides by achieving Pareto improvement – where at least one party improves without worsening the conditions of the other party. In fact, the economic integration of both sides is a mutually beneficial policy that allows Chinese people on both sides of the Straits, especially those in the business sector, to reap shared benefits.

After cross-Straits reunification, the trade and investment environment on both sides will improve significantly. Tariffs on commodity transactions will be exempted, trade in services will be opened up, and restrictions on two-way investment will be lifted. The free flow of logistics and personnel between the two sides will give rise to new forms of cooperation, and the deep cooperation between the two sides’ respective competitive industries will bring about integration of emerging industrial chains. Complete openness in economic and trade relations is beneficial for achieving economic integration and building a common market for both sides, enhancing the economic vitality and competitiveness of the Chinese nation.

After cross-Straits reunification, the fiscal and financial conditions on both sides will improve considerably. Both sides can substantially relax regulations on financial activities, optimize resources allocation, and promote the movement of production factors. Taiwan businesses will enjoy a broader market on the mainland, greater development space, a more stable and smooth supply chain, and more vigorous innovation. Taiwan’s fiscal revenue will then be used for improving people’s livelihoods, rather than paying for military expenditures. In times of crisis or disaster, the Central Government of China will provide timely response and assistance.

After cross-Straits reunification, the connectivity of infrastructure on both sides will significantly improve. Both sides will strengthen infrastructure connectivity, energy resource exchange, common industry standards, cultural and educational cooperation, healthcare collaboration, social security and public resource sharing, and basic public services. This will increase convenience and inclusiveness, so that the two sides will complement each other’s economic advantages, and Taiwan will enjoy broader development space.

After cross-Straits reunification, the economy and people’s livelihood of the two sides will be greatly enhanced. The mechanisms and systems for economic cooperation between the two sides will be further improved. Many challenges that have long plagued Taiwan’s economic development and livelihood improvements can be addressed through cross-Straits cooperation and the implementation of all necessary measures. Reunification will ensure people on both sides have more choices and more freedom in terms of employment, tourism, education and business. The private properties, religious beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of the people in Taiwan will be fully protected. Taiwan’s social system and its way of life will be fully respected. All Taiwan compatriots who support reunification of the country and rejuvenation of the nation will be the masters of the region, contributing to and benefiting from China’s development.

After cross-Straits reunification, the security and stability on both sides will improve. Not only will the economic stability of both sides be significantly enhanced, but also economic security and public security will be better ensured. Cross-Straits reunification will not harm the legitimate interests of any country, including their economic interests in Taiwan; it will only bring more development opportunities to all countries and regions across the world. After reunification, Taiwan will be able to participate more effectively in international economic cooperation, which will contribute to making relevant international industrial chains and supply chains steadier and smoother, bringing more business opportunities to international economic cooperation, creating more positive momentum for prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world, as well as contributing more to building a community of a shared future for mankind, and promoting world peace, development, and human progress.

......

X. The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation Necessitates Complete National Reunification

A review of the past 500 years of world history reveals that national unification has been a necessary precondition for the rise and prosperity of a nation or region. In 1479, after the merger of Castile and Aragon, Spain rose to prominence. In 1707, following the unification of England and Scotland, Britain emerged as a powerful nation. In 1871, after Prussia achieved national unification, Germany rose to power. Following the end of the American Civil War in 1865, the United States emerged as a significant force. In 1922, the unification of Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and the Transcaucasian Federation formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, followed by its rise.

The Chinese nation has a civilization history spanning over 5,000 years, marked by advanced culture that once led the world and indelible contributions to human civilization. After the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese nation faced unprecedented calamity. The Chinese people, including those in Taiwan, have never succumbed; they have shown a tenacious will to resist oppression and strive for self-improvement on the path to survival and revival. Since then, the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has become the greatest dream of all Chinese people. Currently, China is closer than ever to achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The economic strength, technological prowess, and comprehensive national power of the Chinese mainland have reached new heights, making it the world’s second-largest economy, the largest industrial nation, the largest trading nation, and the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. The GDP has surpassed RMB100 trillion yuan, with per-capita GDP exceeding 10,000 U.S. dollars. Notably, the building of a moderately prosperous society has historically eliminated absolute poverty, leading the Chinese nation to a tremendous leap from standing up to becoming wealthy and strong. China is now confidently marching toward great national rejuvenation. By the centenary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049, China aims to build a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful. In this process of Chinese-style modernization, the Taiwan question must be resolved.

China’s national reunification will greatly enhance its people’s confidence and elevate international prestige of the country. After reunification, China will have greater international influence and appeal, and the Chinese people’s self esteem, self-confidence, and sense of pride will increase further. All people on the mainland and in Taiwan will share the dignity and triumph of a united China and be proud of being Chinese. Together, they will contribute even more to building a community of a shared future for mankind, promoting world peace, development, and human progress.

To get to the root of the issue, the core of resolving the Taiwan question lies in how to end the political opposition that has persisted since the mid1940s, a legacy of the civil war in China. When the evolution of this political opposition is examined within the broader context of historical development, the journey from the emergence of the Taiwan question to the eventual peaceful reunification of the nation can generally be divided into three stages.

The first stage: struggle for reunification. Under the interference of external forces, this phase witnessed a status quo based on a balance of power between the two sides. During this time, both the CPC and the KMT aimed for national reunification, competing for the dominant position to unify the other side, either through peaceful or non-peaceful means. The mainstream public opinion in Taiwan clearly leaned toward national reunification; however, due to the specific international environment, the positions and strengths of both sides differed, making it impossible to eliminate the political opposition immediately.

The second stage: struggle between reunification and “independence.” In this phase, the overall strength of the mainland has been growing continuously, which gradually widens the gap with Taiwan, shifting the original balanced status quo of confrontation to an unbalanced one. However, there are still insufficient conditions for the mainland to achieve peaceful reunification. The goals of both sides evolve: The mainland continues to strive for national reunification, while the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces, facing hopelessness in subjugating the mainland, begin to seek “independence.” At this time, public opinions in Taiwan increasingly favor maintaining the status quo while leaning toward “independence.” Currently, the two sides find themselves in this stage, with the mainland insisting on reducing opposition, resolving differences, and achieving reunification through the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. However, the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces openly abandon the goal of national reunification, laying the groundwork for “independence.”

The third stage: putting reunification on the table. Possessing overwhelming advantages over Taiwan in both hard and soft power, the mainland will have sufficient influence to deter external forces from making military intervention in the Taiwan question. The cross-Straits standoff will be ultimately broken. Taiwan will recognize that the realization of national reunification is an inevitable requirement for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and that peaceful reunification is beneficial for the development of both sides. As a result, a cooperative situation for negotiation will be re-established. At that point, the proportion of Taiwan residents favoring reunification will surpass that advocating for “independence.” Under public pressure, the Taiwan authorities will engage in reunification negotiations with the mainland, seeking more favorable political conditions after national reunification.

The first stage began in 1949, at the onset of the Taiwan question, and lasted roughly until 1999, when the Taiwan authorities first publicly proposed the “special state-to-state relations” viewpoint. Over the 50-year course, although the Taiwan authorities shifted from policies of “counter-offensive against the mainland” to “peaceful evolution,” the overall policy aimed at striving for national reunification. The proportion of the public in Taiwan supporting the status quo while leaning toward reunification was consistently higher than those supporting the status quo while leaning toward “independence.” However, the gap narrowed significantly in the later years, with the two proportions almost equal by 1999.

After 1999, the cross-Straits relations entered the second stage, characterized by the struggle between reunification and “independence.” The Taiwan authorities began to publicly abandon the goal of national reunification. From Lee Teng-hui’s proposal of the “special state-to-state relations” to Chen Shuibian’s “one country on each side” viewpoint, Ma Ying-jeou’s proposal of “no unification, no independence,” and Tsai Ing-wen’s “maintaining the status quo” viewpoint, national reunification was no longer set as a policy objective by the Taiwan authorities. Although different ruling parties of Taiwan had inconsistent attitudes toward the 1992 Consensus, which centers on One China, the official policy orientation of each Taiwan regime shifted to achieving “independence.” Correspondingly, public opinions in the island, after several years of fluctuation since 1999, saw the proportion supporting maintaining the status quo while leaning toward “independence” rapidly exceed that supporting maintaining the status quo while leaning toward reunification, with the gap widening further.

The current cross-Straits situation is in the second stage of the development of the Taiwan question. In this stage, the emergence of political parties favoring “independence” in power, the introduction of “independence” policies, the increasing proportion of the population inclining toward “independence,” and the anxiety and fear among the people in Taiwan regarding national reunification are all normal phenomena. The internal driving force for the transition from the second to the third stage is the rapid economic and social development on the mainland, along with its policies promoting economic and social integration with Taiwan. With its strength growing increasingly, the mainland will further enhance care for Taiwan compatriots. Therefore, public opinions in the island will undergo subtle changes. It is foreseeable that the proportion leaning toward “independence” will first rise and then decline.

The ideas that “development trends should be followed” will guide the development of cross-Straits relations in the future. In the historical process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the Taiwan question will inevitably be resolved, and this trend will influence the mainstream public opinion in Taiwan. The complete reunification of the nation is an essential requirement for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and Taiwan compatriots should not be absent from this process. Taiwan’s economic development cannot be separated from human and material resources from the mainland, while the mainland’s modernization cannot be achieved without funding and technology from Taiwan. Cross-Straits mutual assistance and win-win cooperation truly reflect the building of a community of a shared future. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is currently underway, and the historical task of complete national reunification will surely be accomplished. This is a reality that all parties must recognize. Enditem

Subscribe now

China Central Television: Could you talk us through what China’s head-of-state diplomacy has achieved in the past year? What highlights can we expect in the year ahead?

Wang Yi: Head-of-state diplomacy is the highest form of China’s diplomacy. In the past year, President Xi Jinping personally planned and conducted head-of-state diplomacy, and many fruitful results were achieved. Many wonderful moments are still fresh in our memory. The three monumental events that China hosted last year, i.e., the conference marking the 70th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, set a new benchmark of the Global South joining hands for common progress. The four overseas visits by President Xi to Europe, Central Asia, BRICS and Latin America generated new dynamism for global solidarity and cooperation. President Xi also hosted many leaders and friends from foreign countries in more than 130 diplomatic engagements, adding a new, beautiful page to the annals of China’s friendship with the world.

President Xi Jinping, as the leader of a major country and a big political party, has shown a global vision and shouldered the responsibility of our times, and led China’s diplomacy in upholding fundamental principles, breaking new ground, and making steady progress. China’s relations with the world have thus undergone positive and profound changes. First, China’s foreign policies, especially those important concepts and initiatives proposed by President Xi, are increasingly welcomed and supported by the international community. Second, China’s positive role in addressing global challenges and resolving burning and tough issues is more and more expected and commended by countries across the world. Third, the success of the Chinese path to modernization and the inspiration it offers are increasingly recognized and emulated by more and more countries.

The year 2025 is important for both China and the world. There will be new highlights in China’s head-of-state diplomacy. Last month, President Xi attended the opening ceremony of the Asian Winter Games, marking the beginning of the diplomatic events that China will host this year. We will solemnly commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and hold a series of major events including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. President Xi is expected to make a number of overseas visits. Head-of-state diplomacy will write a new chapter of closer cooperation and shared success between China and the world.

ITAR-TASS: There have been frequent interactions between the leaders of China and Russia since last year, and China-Russia relations have enjoyed sound development. At the same time, some are wondering whether recent Russia-U.S. talks would affect China-Russia strategic coordination. What is your take on China-Russia relations?

Wang Yi: I have been asked about China-Russia relations every year, although from different perspectives each time. What I want to emphasize is that no matter how the international landscape evolves, the historical logic of China-Russia friendship will not change and its internal driving force will not diminish.

Based on deep reflections on historical experience, China and Russia have decided to forge everlasting good-neighborliness and friendship, conduct comprehensive strategic coordination, and pursue mutual benefit, cooperation and win-win, because this best serves the fundamental interests of the two peoples and conforms to the trend of our times. The two countries have found a path of “non-alliance, non-confrontation and not targeting any third party” in developing their relations. It is a pioneering effort in forging a new model of major-country relations, and has set a fine example for relations between neighboring countries. A mature, resilient and stable China-Russia relationship will not be swayed by any turn of events, let alone be subject to interference by any third party. It is a constant in a turbulent world rather than a variable in geopolitical games.

Last year marked the 75th anniversary of China-Russia diplomatic relations. President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin had three face-to-face meetings, jointly steering the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era into a new historical stage.

This year will be the 80th anniversary of the victory in WWII. Back then, China and Russia fought valiantly in the main theaters of Asia and Europe respectively. The two nations made immense sacrifice for and major, historic contributions to the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. The two sides will take the opportunity of joint commemoration of this important historical milestone to advocate the correct historical view of WWII, defend its victorious outcomes, uphold the U.N.-centered international system, and promote a more just and equitable international order.

Xinhua News Agency: You said that China’s diplomacy brought much-needed stability to a turbulent world in 2024. As more transformation and chaos are expected in 2025, what role will China play in the world on the diplomatic front?

[Note: This question was raised by your Ginger River]

Wang Yi: As you said, we are living in a changing and turbulent world, where certainty is becoming a scarce resource. The choices made by countries, especially major countries, will determine the trajectory of our times and shape the future of the world. China’s diplomacy will stand firm on the right side of history and on the side of human progress. We will provide certainty to this uncertain world.

We will be a staunch force defending our national interests. The Chinese people have a glorious tradition of relentlessly seeking self-renewal. We never provoke, and we are not intimidated by provocations. No maximum pressure, threat or blackmail can undermine the unity of the 1.4 billion Chinese people or stop our historic strides toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

We will be a just and righteous force for world peace and stability. We will continue to expand our global partnerships featuring equality, openness and cooperation, actively use the Chinese approach in resolving hot-spot issues, and write a new chapter of the Global South seeking strength through unity. We will prove with facts that the path of peaceful development is bright and can ensure stable and sustainable progress, and that it should be the choice of all countries.

We will be a progressive force for international fairness and justice. We will uphold true multilateralism, and bear in mind the future of humanity and the well-being of the people. We will promote global governance that is based on extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefit. We will observe the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, and build more consensus for an equal and orderly multipolar world.

We will be a constructive force for common development of the world. We will continue to expand high-standard opening up, and share the vast opportunities of Chinese modernization with all countries. We will safeguard the multilateral free trade system, foster an open, inclusive and non-discriminatory environment for international cooperation, and advance a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization.

CNN: President Trump has adopted an “America First” policy after his return to the White House. He has spoken about withdrawing from international organizations and treaties including the U.N. Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization. Does this provide a strategic opportunity for China to reshape the global landscape through international engagement?

Wang Yi: There are more than 190 countries in the world. Should everyone stress “my country first” and obsess over a position of strength, the law of the jungle would reign the world again. Smaller and weaker countries would bear the brunt first, and international norms and order would take a body blow.

At the Paris Peace Conference over 100 years ago, the Chinese asked a question resonating across the ages: Does right prevail over might, or does might make right? New China stands firm on the side of international justice, and resolutely opposes power politics and hegemony. History should move forward, not backward. A big country should honor its international obligations and fulfill its due responsibilities. It should not put selfish interests before principles, still less wield its power to bully the weak. A saying in the West goes, “There are no eternal friends, only permanent interests.” But we in China believe that friends should be permanent and we should pursue common interests.

With a keen understanding of the trend of history and our times, President Xi Jinping has proposed building a community with a shared future for mankind, and called on all countries to transcend disagreements and differences, jointly protect our only planet, and develop together the global village as our common home. This great vision reflects not only the fine tradition of Chinese civilization that the world belongs to all, but also the internationalist commitment of Chinese Communists. It enables us to see the well-being of the entire humanity, just like having a bird’s-eye view of all the mountains that would look small when we stand on a peak, as described in an ancient Chinese poem.

We are pleased to see that more and more countries have joined the cause of building a community with a shared future, over 100 countries support China’s Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative, and that more than three quarters of countries across the world have joined the family of Belt and Road cooperation. History will prove that a real winner is the one that keeps in mind the interests of all, and that a community with a shared future for mankind will ensure that the world belongs to every country, and that everyone will have a bright future.

Radio Republik Indonesia: In a more turbulent and uncertain world, developing countries and small and medium-sized countries are more likely than others to lose out. What do you think members of the Global South can do to protect their interests in today’s world?

Wang Yi: The world today is marked by sweeping winds and surging clouds. The dynamism of these changes originates from the South. The hallmark of our era is the prominent, growing strength of the Global South. Accounting for over 40 percent of global GDP and contributing as high as 80 percent of global growth, the Global South is a key force for maintaining world peace, driving world development, and improving global governance.

As the world is undergoing great transformation unseen in a century, historic changes are taking place in the East-West and South-North dynamics. The Global South holds the key to bringing stability to the world and making it a better place.

The Global South should strengthen themselves. Since the beginning of the year, Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS, and nine partner countries have joined the BRICS family. BRICS is emerging as a backbone of cooperation and an engine of growth in the Global South. The greater BRICS should be made bigger and stronger to give more momentum to the development of the Global South.

The Global South should stand together in unity. This year, China will host the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Brazil the BRICS summit, and South Africa the G20 summit. We should speak in one voice to the world, safeguard our common interests, and steadily increase our representation and voice in global governance.

The Global South should strive for development. Last November, President Xi Jinping announced eight actions China would take in support of global development, generating new energy for faster Global South development. We should keep development as a central international agenda item, build up the momentum, enhance our capacity, and advance hand in hand toward modernization.

China is naturally a member of the Global South, because we have fought colonialism and hegemonism together in history and we are committed to the common goal of development and revitalization. No matter how the world changes, our heart will always be with the Global South, and our root will grow deeper in the Global South. China will work with all Global South countries to add a new chapter to the annals of the history of the world.

Bloomberg: Direct talks have started between the U.S. and Russia on ending the war in Ukraine. President Trump has said he would welcome China’s help in the process. What role does China think it should play in this context?

Wang Yi: China has been calling for political settlement through dialogue and negotiation since the first day of the crisis, and has been actively working for peace and pushing for talks. Shortly after the eruption of the crisis, President Xi Jinping put forth four points on what must be done, an important proposition pointing out the way for our efforts. Hence, China released its position paper on the crisis, sent its special representative for shuttle diplomacy, and initiated the Group of Friends for Peace at the United Nations together with Brazil and other Global South countries. Our stance has always been objective and impartial, our voice has always been calm and balanced and our purpose is to create conditions and build consensus for resolving the crisis.

China welcomes and supports all efforts for peace. At the same time, it is also important to see the complexity of the causes of the crisis. As a Chinese proverb puts it, it takes more than one cold day to freeze three feet of ice. Likewise, melting that thick ice cannot be done overnight. No one wins in a conflict, but everyone gains in peace. The negotiating table is where the conflict ends and peace starts. Although the relevant parties have not had their positions fully aligned, they all hope to have a fair and durable peace deal that is binding and accepted by all the parties concerned. And that is a valuable common point, and all the parties should jointly strive for it. China is ready to work with the international community, in light of the wills of the parties to the conflict, to continue to play its constructive role in resolving the crisis and realizing lasting peace.

One last point on this question. The Ukraine crisis has been dragging on for over three years. In hindsight, the tragedy could have been avoided. All parties should learn something from the crisis. Among many others, security should be mutual and equal, and no country should build its security on the insecurity of another. We should advocate and act on the new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and that is the way to truly realize lasting peace and security on the Eurasian continent and across the world.

CGTN: The impressive emergence of DeepSeek showcases China’s innovation capability in artificial intelligence. Some say that the U.S. finds it unacceptable to let China get ahead in science and technology. What is your view on China-U.S. competition in science and technology?

Wang Yi: Recently, China’s scientific and technological innovation has more than once defied people’s imagination. From breakthroughs in atomic bombs, missiles and satellites decades ago to the Shenzhou space missions and the Chang’e lunar exploration program, to 5G, quantum computing and DeepSeek, generations of the Chinese people have never stopped in their endeavor for innovation. And we are witnessing an ever-expanding horizon for China to become a science and technology powerhouse.

Admittedly, this journey has not been smooth. Be it space science or chip making, unjustified external suppression has never stopped. But where there is blockade, there is breakthrough; where there is suppression, there is innovation; where there is the fiercest storm, there is the platform launching China’s science and technology skyward like the Chinese mythological hero Nezha soaring into the heavens. As well put by an ancient Chinese verse, “No mountains can stop the surging flow of a mighty river.” Likewise, “small yard, high fence” cannot suppress the spirit of innovation, and decoupling and supply chains disruption will only lead to self-isolation.

Science and technology should not be used to put up an iron curtain. It should be the wealth that benefits all and is shared by all. To promote common development of humanity, China has taken real measures to implement the Global AI Governance Initiative put forth by President Xi Jinping, and released the AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All. We have also proposed the Initiative on International Cooperation in Open Science together with Brazil, South Africa and the African Union, calling on all to give priority to scientific and technological capacity-building of the Global South so that no country is left behind. We are ready to share the fruits of our innovation with more countries and jointly explore the mysteries of the stars and oceans.

Reuters: Right after Trump returned to the White House, he imposed fresh tariffs on China over fentanyl. But at the same time, he is offering to build a good relationship with China. How differently will China engage with the Trump administration over the next four years compared to his previous term?

Wang Yi: Mutual respect is a basic norm governing state-to-state relations. It is also an important prerequisite for China-U.S. relations. No country should fantasize that it can suppress China and maintain good relations with China at the same time. Such two-faced acts are not good for the stability of bilateral relations, or for building mutual trust.

On fentanyl, it must be made clear at the outset that China always takes resolute measures against drug trafficking and manufacturing, and China has put in place the toughest and most comprehensive counternarcotics policies in today’s world. As early as in 2019, upon the request of the U.S. side, China scheduled all fentanyl-related substances, the first country to do so. But the abuse of fentanyl in the United States is a problem that must be confronted and resolved by the United States itself. China has been assisting the United States in various ways on humanitarian grounds. The United States should not return good with evil, or even impose arbitrary tariffs. No responsible major country should do that.

As the Chinese saying goes, “If one’s action fails, look for the reason within oneself.” The United States should go over what has actually happened: What has it achieved from tariff and trade wars these years? Has its trade deficit widened or narrowed? Has its manufacturing become more competitive or less competitive? Has U.S. inflation gone up or down? Has the life of its people got better or worse? China-U.S. business relations are based on two-way and reciprocal interactions. Cooperation will bring about mutual benefit and win-win, and China will definitely take countermeasures in response to arbitrary pressure.

As the world’s largest developing and developed countries respectively, China and the United States will stay on this planet for a long time. They must therefore seek peaceful coexistence. As President Xi Jinping noted in his telephone call with President Donald J. Trump earlier this year, confrontation and conflict should not be an option. Given the extensive common interests and broad space for cooperation, it is possible for China and the United States to become partners helping each other succeed and prosper together.

China will stay committed to the three principles proposed by President Xi Jinping—mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation—in promoting steady, sound and sustainable development of China-U.S. relations. At the same time, we hope that the U.S. side will listen to the calls of the two peoples, see clearly the trend of the times, take an objective and rational view of China’s development, engage proactively with China in practical exchanges, and work together with China to pursue the right way of getting along with each other to the benefit of the two countries and the whole world.

People’s Daily: How does China see the current role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)? What proposals will China put forward during its presidency? What topics will be discussed at the upcoming SCO summit in China?

Wang Yi: This year is the SCO’s “China Year.” The SCO was born in China and named after Shanghai. This means something special to us. We are very pleased to welcome it home.

It is even more heartening that the SCO has grown through the past 24 years from a six-member organization to a big family consisting of 26 countries. It has become a regional cooperation organization with the largest geographical area and population.

The key to the SCO’s growth lies in its commitment to the Shanghai Spirit, in its adherence to the founding principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diversity of civilizations and pursuit of common development, and in its success in charting a new path for regional cooperation.

As the rotating president, China is putting together more than 100 events in political, security, economic and people-to-people fields under the slogan of “Upholding the Shanghai Spirit: SCO on the Move.” We will take real actions to carry forward the Shanghai Spirit and promote SCO development.

I would like to let you know that China will host the SCO summit in Tianjin this autumn. Leaders will get together by the Haihe River to reflect on the SCO’s accomplishments, plan the future, and build consensus for cooperation. It will help the SCO embark on a new journey from China and make the organization a more close-knit community with a shared future.

Global Times: Some believe that the international order is at the most dangerous moment since WWII, and that the authority and role of the United Nations are being undermined. How can this be avoided and what role will China play?

Wang Yi: This year marks the 80th anniversary of the U.N. Around the end of WWII, the most important decision the international community made was to establish the U.N. and make it the primary platform for maintaining world peace and promoting global governance. Facts have shown that the U.N. has withstood tests and has been instrumental.

Today there have been fundamental changes in the world situation. Unilateralism is on the rise, and power politics runs rampant. Some countries have voiced scepticism of one kind or another about the U.N. But China believes that the more complex the problems, the greater the need to accentuate the important status of the U.N.; the more pressing the challenges, the greater the need to uphold the due authority of the U.N.

All countries want to prevent the world from returning to the law of the jungle. To this end, the first thing to do is to cement the cornerstone of sovereign equality. All countries, regardless of their size and strength, should be recognized as equal members of the international community. Those with stronger arms and bigger fists should not be allowed to call the shots. Second, the principle of fairness and justice must be upheld. International affairs must not be monopolized by a small number of countries. Greater attention should be given to the voice of the Global South. The legitimate rights and interests of all countries should be fully protected. Third, multilateralism must be observed. Countries should stay committed to the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefit, replace bloc confrontation with inclusive collaboration, and shatter small circles with greater solidarity. Fourth, the authority of the international rule of law must be strengthened. Major countries in particular should take the lead in upholding integrity, embracing the rule of law, and opposing double standard and selective application. Still less should they resort to bullying, monopoly, trickery or extortion.

China is a founder and beneficiary of the post-WWII international order. Naturally, we are an advocate and builder of it as well. We have no intention to start all over again, nor do we support any country’s attempt to overturn the current order. China is well aware of its international responsibility as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. It will firmly safeguard the central role of the U.N., come forward to be a pillar of the multilateral system, and speak up for justice for the Global South. Last month, at the U.N. Security Council, China chaired the high-level meeting on “Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance.” More than 100 countries signed up to attend, kicking off the commemorations of the U.N.’s 80th anniversary. China is ready to work with all sides to reflect on the founding vision of the U.N., observe the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, and build a more just and equitable global governance system.

Anadolu Agency: The U.S. has announced plans to “take over” and “own” Gaza and resettle Palestinians living there to neighboring countries. How does China view this U.S. plan and the future development of Gaza? What role will China play for peace and stability in the Middle East?

Wang Yi: Gaza belongs to the Palestinian people. It is an inseparable part of the Palestinian territory. Changing its status by forceful means will not bring about peace, but only new chaos. We support the plan for restoring peace in Gaza initiated by Egypt and other Arab countries. The will of the people must not be defied, and the principle of justice must not be abandoned. If some major country truly cares about the people in Gaza, it should promote comprehensive and lasting ceasefire, ramp up humanitarian assistance, observe the principle of Palestinians governing Palestine, and contribute to the reconstruction in Gaza.

Without peace in the Middle East, the world will not be stable. The Palestinian question has always been at the heart of the Middle East issue. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict takes place again and again simply because the two-State solution is only half achieved: The State of Israel has long been a reality, but the State of Palestine is still far beyond reach. Going forward, the international community should focus more on the two-State solution and give more support to independent statehood for Palestine. Only then could Palestine and Israel truly coexist in peace, and the Arab and Jewish peoples live side by side in enduring amity. To this end, first, all Palestinian factions need to deliver on the Beijing Declaration to achieve unity and self-strengthening, all parties in the Middle East need to rise above differences to support Palestinian statehood, and the international community need to build consensus and promote peace between Palestine and Israel.

China is a strategic partner of Middle East countries and a sincere friend of our Arab brothers. We will continue to strive resolutely for justice, peace and development for the Middle East people, and support countries in the region in taking their future in their own hands, independently exploring their development paths, and realizing the dream of peace and revitalization at an early date.

News Agency of Nigeria: China successfully held a summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing last year, and your first overseas visit this year was to Africa. How does China plan to implement the outcomes of the FOCAC Beijing Summit? How will China help Africa in achieving development and revitalization?

Wang Yi: China and Africa are always good friends, good partners and good brothers with a shared future. Under the guidance of President Xi Jinping and African leaders, China-Africa relationship is now at its best in history. China has established strategic partnership with all African countries having diplomatic ties with it. The China-Africa community with a shared future has been elevated to an “all-weather” level.

This year marks the 25th anniversary of FOCAC. Over the past 25 years, China has helped Africa build or upgrade nearly 100,000 kilometers of roads, and more than 10,000 kilometers of railways. In the past three years alone, Chinese enterprises created more than 1.1 million new jobs in Africa. China has remained Africa’s largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years. To African brothers and sisters, China-Africa cooperation is visible, tangible and truly beneficial. Last year, a Gambian farmer sent a bag of rice he grew all the way to Hunan Province in China to show respect to Yuan Longping, the father of hybrid rice. It is China’s hybrid rice that has helped end hunger and bring hope to them. Stories like these are happening in Africa every day.

Africa is a fertile land of hope of the 21st century. There will be no global modernization without African modernization. The stability and development of Africa is vital to the future of humanity, and the world must listen to Africa and heed its concerns. Africa is going through a new awakening, and countries should support Africa in exploring a new development path of self-reliance and self-strengthening.

This years marks the beginning of implementing the outcomes of the FOCAC Beijing Summit. China stands ready to deliver on the ten partnership actions for China and Africa to jointly advance modernization, including supporting Africa in accelerating its industrialization and agricultural modernization, implementing zero-tariff treatment for 100 percent tariff lines, fostering new growth drivers like digital, green and AI industries, promoting 1,000 “small and beautiful” livelihood projects, enhancing governance experience sharing and raising the representation and voice of Africa in international affairs. This year, the G20 summit will be held on the African continent for the first time. China firmly supports South Africa in carrying out its duty as G20 president, and in leaving a distinctively African mark in global governance.

Phoenix TV: For some time, there has been a narrative in a few Western countries that Resolution 2758 of the U.N. General Assembly is not equivalent to the one-China principle, does not make clear of the sovereignty over Taiwan, and does not prevent Taiwan from participating in international organizations. What is your response to that?

Wang Yi: Such a narrative is a blatant challenge to the authority of the U.N. and the post-WWII international order. It is extremely absurd and dangerous. Those who spread it could use some help to improve their common sense.

Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. This is the history and the reality. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the recovery of Taiwan. Eight decades ago, the victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression put Taiwan back under China’s sovereign jurisdiction. Both the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, issued by major victorious nations of WWII, stated in explicit terms that Taiwan is a territory that Japan had stolen from the Chinese, and shall be restored to China. Japan also accepted the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation and announced its unconditional surrender. All these have confirmed China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, and formed an important part of the post-WWII international order.

Resolution 2758 was later adopted in 1971 by the U.N. General Assembly with an overwhelming majority. It decides to restore all the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China at the U.N. and expel forthwith the representatives of the Taiwan authorities from the U.N. and all the organizations related to it. Once and for all, this resolution resolved the issue of the representation of the whole of China, including Taiwan, in the U.N., and precluded any possibility of creating “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” The only reference to the Taiwan region in the U.N. is “Taiwan, Province of China.” Taiwan is never a country, not in the past, and never in the future. To clamor for “Taiwan independence” is to split the country, to support “Taiwan independence” is to interfere in China’s internal affairs, and to connive at “Taiwan independence” is to undermine the stability of the Taiwan Strait.

The principle of sovereignty is the cornerstone of the U.N. Charter. No country or individual should adopt any kind of double standard. Respect for all countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity should mean support for China’s complete reunification, and commitment to one-China should mean opposition to any form of “Taiwan independence.” Realizing China’s complete reunification is a shared aspiration of the Chinese nation. It is an inevitable trend, and it is what the greater national interests entail. Seeking “Taiwan independence” is doomed to backfire, and using Taiwan to contain China will be nothing but a futile attempt. China will realize reunification, and this is unstoppable.

Associated Press of Pakistan: China attaches great importance to its relations with neighboring countries. However, the U.S. deployment of mid-range capability missile system in the region has caused tensions. How does China see the situation in its neighborhood? Any new considerations for China’s foreign policy toward this region?

Wang Yi: Since the beginning of this century, Asia has maintained rapid growth, and become a leading force for global development and a shining example of peace and stability. This has not come easily, and should be cherished with great care. Asia is where China calls home and builds its future. It is also the common home for China and fellow Asian countries. Following the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness on neighborhood diplomacy put forward by President Xi Jinping, China has opened up new prospects in developing friendship and cooperation with its neighbors. To date, China has reached common understanding on building a community with a shared future with 17 neighboring countries, and formed “two clusters” in the Indochina Peninsula and Central Asia. In our neighborhood, we have signed Belt and Road cooperation agreements with 25 countries, and remained the largest trading partner of 18 countries. Today’s China is an anchor of stability, engine of economic development, and pillar of regional security in Asia.

That said, it is common for neighbors to not agree on everything. Issues left from the past and conflict of immediate interests should both be properly handled. But we believe that harmony is key to a prosperous family in all endeavors. As long as we remain committed to the vision of a common home, stick to the goal of building a community with a shared future, and follow the principles of equal-footed consultation, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, we will surely be able to resolve differences, work with one another, and achieve win-win results. In the meantime, China will continue to open wider to neighboring countries, including through unilateral initiatives, and share more development benefits with its neighbors.

You mentioned U.S. deployment of mid-range capability missile system in the region. China is firmly opposed to such an attempt, and it is not welcomed by regional countries either. Years have passed since the United States released its “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” but what has it done for regional countries? Nothing, except for stirring up troubles and creating disputes. It has proved to be more of a disruptive factor than a constructive contributor.

Asia is not an arena for big power rivalry. It should become a demonstration field for international cooperation. We believe that it is important to practice open regionalism and share in Asia’s development opportunities based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

AFP: China and the European Union are in the middle of long-running commercial tensions, involving investigations over the renewables and electric vehicle sectors in particular. How does the Foreign Ministry see relations with the bloc evolving despite those tensions?

Wang Yi: This year marks the 50th anniversary of the China-EU diplomatic ties. In this half-century-long relationship, the most valuable asset is mutual respect, the most powerful impetus is mutual benefit, the greatest unifying consensus is multilateralism, and the most accurate characterization is cooperation partner.

Over the past five decades, China-EU cooperation has come a long way. Bilateral trade has expanded from US$2.4 billion to US$780 billion. Investment has increased from almost zero to close to US$260 billion. The China-Europe Railway Express has run more than 100,000 trips and become a golden passage connecting Asia and Europe.

Fifty years on, China and the EU jointly make up over one-third of the world economy, and the cooperation between the two has a greater strategic value and global influence. A healthy and stable relationship will lift up both sides and make for a brighter world.

In his phone call with President of the European Council António Costa earlier this year, President Xi Jinping noted that when the world becomes more challenging and complex, China and the EU have more reason to renew their purpose in establishing diplomatic relations, strengthen strategic communication, enhance strategic mutual trust and maintain this partnership relationship. China remains confident in Europe and believes Europe can be our trustworthy partner. The two sides have the capacity and wisdom to properly resolve pending issues through friendly consultation and jointly usher in another promising 50 years. 

China Daily: Surveys showed that Southeast Asian people’s favorability toward China has risen significantly. Compared with European countries and the U.S., the Global South countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America hold more positive views of China. What do you make of the survey results and the divergent attitudes toward China?

Wang Yi: Friendship between the people is the foundation for bilateral relations and motivation for peace. As China sustains socio-economic development and expands high-standard opening up, we have seen more frequent exchanges and closer ties between the Chinese people and people of other countries.

You mentioned that people in the Global South view China positively. That is indeed the case. China has always engaged with other developing countries with sincerity and good faith. Our people share a natural affinity and empathy with each other. Meanwhile, I also notice that among people from developed countries, discovering and embracing China has become a trend. By traveling to China, or through social media interactions, more people have seen a China that is safe, open and modern, and got to know the friendly, open-minded and witty Chinese people. A young man from America said he had received profound positivity from the Chinese people.

The people have come to their conclusion and it is like sunshine that dispels the mist of prejudice; heart-to-heart communication has the power to break down all barriers. It is time to get rid of the information cocoon and take off the tinted glasses. People of all countries are welcome to see with their own eyes a real and vivid China and feel with their heart the dynamism and drive of the 1.4 billion Chinese people.

Kyodo News: Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Peru last November. China-Japan ties are warming, but issues remain. How would you comment on the current China-Japan relations? Does China have plans to respond favorably to Japan’s concerns and expectations on issues regarding aquatic imports and China’s business environment for Japanese companies?

Wang Yi: Last November, leaders of the two countries reached important common understandings on following the four political documents between China and Japan, comprehensively advancing the strategic relationship of mutual benefit, and building a constructive and stable China-Japan relationship fit for the new era. With concerted efforts, bilateral relations have demonstrated a momentum of improvement and growth. We welcome enhanced exchanges, deeper mutually beneficial cooperation, and stronger goodwill between all sectors of our societies. All these are in the long-term interests of both sides. As for the specific concerns of the Japanese side in your question, China will handle them responsibly and properly in accordance with laws and regulations.

Let me highlight another point. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Remembering history, one can better shape the future. Forgetting history, one may lose his direction going forward. The Japanese militarists committed heinous crimes to the people in China and all over Asia. They brought immense suffering for the Japanese people as well. Guarding against the revival of militarism is a duty Japan must carry out without a moment’s relaxation. This is also the firm resolve of the Chinese and Asian people that is not to be challenged. In this test of conscience and integrity, the right choice for Japan is to abide by the principles enshrined in its pacifist constitution and keep to the path of peaceful development.

The one-China principle is the political foundation for China-Japan relations. Eighty years have passed since Taiwan returned to China. Yet some unrepentant individuals in Japan are still working in the shadows with the so-called “Taiwan independence” forces. Here is our message for them: Stop the propaganda that “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency.” The truth is, to provoke trouble in the name of Taiwan is to invite trouble for Japan.

There is a long history of ties between China and Japan. Japan knows best that China is a peace-loving country and a trustworthy neighbor with good intentions. For more than a thousand years, China has meant opportunities, not threats, for Japan. What is the right way of being neighbors and what is the trend of history? Faced with historical transformations, the bright minds in Japan need to think carefully about these questions and follow good advice.

Folha de Sao Paulo: The American Secretary of State made his first trip to Latin America last month, and threatened to take measures if it didn’t distance itself from China. What will China do to counter this pressure? Will this be a topic at the upcoming China-CELAC Forum?

Wang Yi: China’s cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries is South-South cooperation. There is only mutual support in this cooperation, no geopolitical calculations. In its engagement with LAC countries, China follows the principles of equality and mutual benefit, and never seeks sphere of influence or targets any party.

What people in LAC countries want is to build their own home, not to become someone’s backyard; what they aspire to is independence and self-decision, not the Monroe Doctrine. Cooperation between China and LAC countries has won popular support because it respects the will of the people, meets the needs of regional countries, and provides reliable options and broad prospects for the revitalization of the region.

In the new era, under the guidance of President Xi Jinping and the leaders of LAC countries, and boosted by the China-CELAC Forum, we have produced fruitful outcomes in building the China-LAC community with a shared future and delivered benefits to all our people.

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the formal launch of the China-CELAC Forum. China will host the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Forum in the first half of this year. Taking this as an opportunity, the two sides will come together, over the mountains and the oceans, and regardless of all disturbances, to take China-LAC cooperation to a higher level.

For more information about the press conference, check it on the website of the foreign ministry.

During my travels in the United States in February, I learned that Professor Da was also visiting, but due to a tight schedule, I was unable to meet him. I eventually caught up with him at a seminar on China-U.S. Relations at the 11th Beijing Xiangshan Forum last month. I am eager to share his insights on China-U.S. relations and other topics, as I believe they are of great value.

In August, at the historic Tsinghua University campus in Beijing, Professor Da Wei discussed the current state of global affairs, the dynamics of U.S.-China relations, and the role of education in shaping future leaders. This conversation took place in a sit-down 42-minute interview with James Chau, host of China-US Focus. Prof. Da recounts his experiences growing up in an “urban island” within rural China during the country's reform era and discusses his current role in educating the next generation of global thinkers.

You can also access the text version of this interview in the September edition of the China-US Focus Digest magazine and on the WeChat blog of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. CISS is a research institution that analyzes international security and strategy issues, including diplomacy and international relations, global security governance and artificial intelligence.

James Chau: Da Wei, thank you for being with us here and for having us here on the campus of Tsinghua University. It's really special.

Prof. Da Wei: Thank you, James. And first of all, welcome to Tsinghua.

James Chau: Da Wei, you recently spoke about the world and you described it in terms of being very difficult. There are multiple stress points that the world is trying to navigate or trying to survive. But what are those stress points for you when you think about the world and its complexities? What comes to mind? And what does that mean?

Prof. Da Wei: I think there are several things that I really have some very heavy, very big concerns about. First, I think is a tendency that we maybe will experience every day that this word is splitting into different camps. I don't know how many, maybe two camps or different camps. So the economy become, you know, decouple to each other.

Of course, everybody says, I just want to derisk, I don't want to decouple, but I think because the lack of the trust and because of the complexity of the most advanced technology, it's really hard to limit the scope of this derisking. And it's very easy to expand into the decoupling. And then the standard of new technology, then the way you run the different countries and regions, then the global governance institutions. I think we are facing a very real challenge that this world is splitting into different camps.

If so, if that happened, if it become more, you know, serious in the coming years, I think what we have experienced since 1990s, those old good days will passed. I mean, oh, everyone will suffered from. Yeah, I say everyone will suffer. I'm not saying we are going to die, but I mean, the quality of life will decrease. We will squander. We will waste a lot of potential that the human being should have to make everyone have a better life. I think we are facing the difficult, we are facing the danger that probably because of this split, because of this block politics, we may have problems.

James Chau: You're using words like bloc and camps. And it makes me think also of the social fabric. Because around the world, of course, there is an emergence of tribalism as well in society. One example being was referred to as the work culture. In a sense, that has value because people are awakened to past injustices. And how do you redress those as well? Is there a link between that kind of block and camp to the bloc camps that you described just now?

Prof. Da Wei: What I described is mainly about, you can say, tribalism among the countries or between the different countries. And you discribe what you mentioned, like a woke culture, I think it's mainly a separation in one society or in one country. For example, in the West, I mean, different people have different identity problems now. But that kind of in place, I think, it's not so serious in terms of its economic and social technological consequences. It's more or less a social split. But what I am describing, this international split, I think it will, for example, it will reduce the economic efficiency. When we were in the globalization period, everyone, all the countries, different companies, they are interconnect to each other. But now they're split. And in the future, maybe when you come to China, you need to use another cell phone, because maybe your cell phone in other countries cannot be used here. So everybody need two or three cell phones. When you go to other country, you want to drive a car, but you found the automatic system is totally different. So that will make us suffer a lot. And in this split, in this bloc politics, different country and different people will have strong tension and probably it will also lead to conflict and war. So that's I think very serious.

James Chau: When we have this conversation, I think about my 6-year-old nephew and I'm sure you think about your 15-year-old teenager. So when we think about the people who are important in our lives, amongst them your many students here at Tsinghua University. Are you confident that we have the experience, the incentive, the willingness and the skill set to address the very difficult world that you see?

Prof. Da Wei: I'm not so confident, to be honest. I think now we as adults, I think all of us are talking about maintaining the peace, avoiding a war, or maybe reinforce globalization, these kinds of things everybody talks about. But can we, particularly the policy makers and those, you know, who can have impact on this can really do something, for example, to correct the mistake that we, I mean, different country or made by ourself? Are you willing to admit to recognize that “I'm sorry, I messed it up. This is something, you know, I've done mistakenly.” And maybe China needs to do this, the U.S. needs to do that, Russia needs to do that, and different other countries. I mean, to say that we need a peaceful world is one thing. How to make it happen, I think it's another thing. It's very costly. I don't think we can do that.

James Chau: And not only peace, but lasting peace. Is a very different version of peace. You bring up the United States and China, and I think about 45 years of normalization of diplomatic ties, which is now 2024. We should be using the verbs celebrate. So we should be saying we are celebrating 45 years of U.S.-China relations in its modern era, but instead we use words like “honor” or “mark” as a more neutral approach to it. Where did that trust disappear to? And was there real trust to begin with? When you reflect on almost a half-century relations?

Prof. Da Wei: I think that trust actually grew, I think has grown in those 45 years. I'm not very confident because I was too young at that time. I was 5 years old when the two countries set up the diplomatic relations. I don't know exactly. I or in person know the mood at that time in 1979.

I was too young to remember, but my hunch is at that time, of course, we have some strategic consensus, like we need to balance the Soviet Union together. We may have that consensus. But for ordinary people, for a lot of decision makers, I think at that time we still had very strong suspicion to each other. For example, China believe we are socialist country. the U.S. is a capitalist country. Can I really rely on or trust them?

But I think in those 45 years, you know, as both countries, China and the U.S., got benefit from that process. The Cold War concluded peacefully, right? And then the two countries' economic economies grew very dramatically after the end of the Cold War. So in that process, I think because the two people benefit from that process that trust has grown, I think dramatically.

While having said that in maybe 8 to 10 years, I think this trust declined dramatically. I think for different reasons. But to be in short, I think the U.S. believe China take advantage, utilize it. It's not fair. It's not in the U.S. interest. Well, China think the U.S. policy to China is so harmful in past eight years. So this trust has been damaged dramatically. So this is a quite complicated process, I will say.

James Chau: Let's look at the Middle East today, and Russia, Ukraine and what's happening over in Yemen and other parts of Africa are really concerning. And they're not separate to the U.S. and China, both in the joint ability to meet the moment of these challenges, but also to understand that the world is not separated into regions. What one does has an impact on the other, on our neighbors, whether our neighbors be the person living next door or the person on the other side of the world in the next continent.

You said recently that what's happening in the Middle East in terms of the decision making around international policy is still being determined by a few major powers rather than by the collective multilateral systems that were establish and design to do that very thing, to provide a representative voice and inclusive voice. But we're not really seeing that with just seeing a few countries trying to moderate or intervene even. How do you change that so the world moves on from a post war architecture that was very relevant in 1945? We're not in 1945 now.

Prof. Da Wei: I think now obviously we're saying farewell to that old order of 1945 or even post-Cold War structure. I think we are gradually departing from that. How to transform it to a more, you know, more effective way to govern today's global challenges and also reflects today's international politics.

I think this is a huge challenge. Ideally major countries like China, U.S., Russia and other countries, we need to sit down together to discuss it. But obviously it won't happen. So I think we are facing a possibility that this real global governance mechanism like what we have seen after 1945, the UN system or later like WTO system, I think we're facing a danger that those global platform or mechanism work collapse, or maybe they will be there but not actually not work. I think this is a big challenge we are facing.

James Chau: I'll touch on the UN in just a moment, but before that, some Americans, including one of the speakers at your conference, say that the United States is aware that this system is beginning to withdraw, but that Americans are not ready to let go of that yet. What's your take?

Prof. Da Wei: I think there is a strong mood in the United States that asks, why should the U.S. take the responsibility to take care of that system? Why should the U.S. pay the price, the cost for that?

I think in the U.S. there is a sense, a sentiment of this isolationism. It's rising in the United States. I think ordinary people don't want to spend money on that or don't want their soldier die for that. So the U.S. is, I think, the reason of this global governance mechanism, the reason of its collapse partly can be attribute to the U.S. unwillingness to maintain it. I respect that sentiments, that mood because this is a choice of American people. And if the U.S. dominate everything other countries don't like, but I mean, as the U.S. is withdrawing from that, who can fill that vacuum? I don't think any country can fill that vacuum.

James Chau: I'm going to be a little provocative over here and ask you: Should we not have empathy and gratitude for the United States given what [Japanese] Prime Minister Kashida said of Washington a few weeks ago, where he said America is taken on this burden. Now, some people will say that was a choice. That was a volunteered choice to take on that burden. But should we also thank the United States for ultimately taking on something which exerts a lot of pressure on itself with its own voters?

Prof. Da Wei: Of course, to be honest, I think we should thank the U.S. In the world there has to be some country playing a bigger role to maintain the system. I think the U.S. played that role and pay the price. And actually, in that order, I think a lot of country benefit, like including China, probably has been the biggest beneficiary from that system, particularly after end of the Cold War. So the U.S. played a basically a constructive role to maintain that order. But of course, at the same time, we have also need to admit that U.S. made many mistakes when the U.S. try to maintain that responsibility. These are two separate things.

James Chau: With Americans then feel that China has benefited, even exhausted the benefits of that system. So it's now convenient for China to move on and construct a new system that will then ensure that it continues to benefit going forward in other ways.

Prof. Da Wei: I think what China want is not constructing a totally brand new system. Actually, I think China has been for a very long time argue that we want to maintain current system. We want to maybe make more contributions to this system. And China also want to, of course, reform some element of that. But the problem is for different reasons, like the U.S. believe China is a illiberal country. It asks are you really qualified to make a bigger contribution to this system or to reform while only liberal countries can play that role in this liberal international order. So I think both China and the U.S. maybe miss some opportunity to all, I would say maybe the U.S. miss some opportunity to work with China to together, you know, try to share the burden and also make the system better. But the U.S. more or less view China as a revisionist when China says, I want to make some contribution or reform, then the U.S. believe that China want to overturn the whole order, the whole system. I think that's wrong. That's a misperception but that's so widely accepted perception in the west. It's very unfortunate I think.

James Chau: Let's apply some of these discussions to the United Nations. China has contributed richly to that system, to that existing system, being in the form of the largest contributor, peacekeeping forces, and also as a major thunder to the outcomes or the Sustainable Development Goals, so that countries in the Global South have a shot or a better shot at achieving those goals nationally.

The UN reform discussion has continued for some time. A number of countries really want to get on to that Security Council, whose gatekeepers, in effect have been five countries and possibly in some discussions for six, being the P5 plus one, Germany. These are largely the P5, the victors of the Second World War. You've got Germany as a sixth in some ways, as a major global economy, I think No. 4 in the world. But I have a concern that you reform and bring on more voices, which I'm in favor of. But that it doesn't become a checklist for affirmative action, that it needs to be set up with the guarantees, so that those new members, those new countries that will benefit from reforms, will also be allowed to take part in the decision making process and have their imprints on the results that come out of those decision making processes. What's your take on reform?

Prof. Da Wei: I think that's a too difficult topic to address the reform the UN. The UN is a product of the World War II. So at that time, it's relatively easy to create a new like organization like UN and decide who should be the P5. Because those P5 are what the countries won the World War II. So it's quite easy. And the war decided the outcome.

But now fortunately, we are in a peaceful transitional period of the order. Then we want to reform something peacefully. I think that's then that mean it's very difficult. Like you are eating your lunch and suddenly I said I need to reform the food in your plate and give some food to others and add some food to your plate. So everybody have very complicated calculation here.

I agree with you that I think the UN, particularly the Security Council, need a better representation of other countries. But where is the boundary? Which country is more qualified than others? Last week I was in Europe, we also touch upon these questions and then one of the participants asked the other European participants, Do you think we can reduce our representation in UN to one vote as Europe? And the other interlocutor immediately said no, because now they have France and UK in the council. So then you bring in Germany, then you have three votes. I think that's very difficult. And bringing in new members also means maybe lower efficiency.

I think this is already a problem of UN and other multilateral organization. So I don't know that's too difficult. I think we need a very long process. We need to be very patient. But most importantly here, I think the China, U.S., Russia, Europe, those players need some consensus first. We cannot do anything without the consensus among those major players. Because those country's relations now are so bad, they don't talk to each other and they use sometimes un become arena for great powers to compete. I think that under that circumstances, how can we expect them to work together to reform it? I'm very pessimistic about that.

James Chau: You know, I've moderated and shared many discussions at the United Nations, both in New York and in Geneva in my UN role. And you find all these representatives of member states coming to the table and reading their set pieces that were passed to them by their capitals. And it's frustrating in the sense that you use the opportunity of being in the same room together to simply come with what you were told to come with, but not reflecting what you're hearing in the room and finding common cross points that could actually build to consensus.

Let's leave the UN as you said, it's a complex subject and one that would require a much longer exploration in the future. I want to ask you: You're about 5 years old in 1979, so probably not too many memories of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and President Jimmy Carter, up on the White House lawn. But what was your first exposure to the United States, your first memory of the idea of America?

Prof. Da Wei: The first time of the U.S., I think I watched a TV advertisement on TV at that time. My parents bought a TV set. So black-and-white one, Hitachi, a Japanese one. There was a Procter & Gamble ad on TV. That was the first TV ad I'd seen. I think that's a very interesting ad. I will say it's basically it was at a US American house. Very nice house, and the housewife was washing dishes in the kitchen. And then the camera turn away to the tool alone and a kid, a Chinese kid playing the baseball there. And then there is a song said Xiao Hua, the Chinese name, went to the U.S. and learn to play baseball. And his mother now love to use product of PNG. So that's the first America image in my memory. So it's a kind of typical American Dream thing.

James Chau: So the mother and son in that commercial were Chinese ethnicity?

Prof. Da Wei: The ethnic Chinese. Obviously they move to the U.S. maybe immigrated into the U.S., so it's a kind of blue sky, green lawn, beautiful house and nice house utility. So basically that's the image of the U.S. in the early 1980s.

James Chau: Did it shock you that, you know, you were living in China, which was still mired in the problems of poverty in the 1980s? Were you shocked by what you saw on screen that people could have houses and gardens? And you know, the son would have time to go and play basketball, did that shock you?

Prof. Da Wei: Of course. At that time, I think there was a big gap between the living standard of the two countries. So for at that time, you know, you cannot imagine some people live in the such a beautiful single house. At that time, we don't have that in China. So it's a totally different lifestyle. So that's in the early 1980s, so 40 years ago.

James Chau: I mean, your parents were really better off. They were professionals. They were educated at university. But also you could afford a television set that was made in Japan. It's funny how when you talk about Chinese people of the 80s or even 70s, it always comes down to television sets.

In a conversation with Ambassador Cui Tiankai who of course serve eight years as China's top diplomatic envoy in Washington, he said in 1979, his memory as a graduate student in Shanghai was seeing the two leaders waving from the balcony of the White House over the lawn, and he watched it on a neighbor's television set. There was like one family that had a small television set in a compound, and everybody crowd around it and watched it. Your story is as much as it speaks to the idea the American dream was also the idea of globalization. Watching an American consumer commercial in 1980s on a Japanese made and design television set, it seems sweet and innocent and a lovely era to go back to.

Tell me about your childhood. You were born in Xi'an, historic city, a former ancient capital, the home to the terror Cotter warriors. What was life like? And tell me a bit about how you were raised and what the experiences were at home, in school.

Prof. Da Wei: I grew up there because my parents work there. Both my parents work for the defense industry in China. They were from Shanghai, actually eastern part of China, but they had opportunity to went to college in early 1960s. And after graduation, before the Cultural Revolution at that time, China's external environment was already very serious. At that time, China had a very bad relations with both Soviet Union and the United States at that time. So China moved a lot of factories and research institutes into the inner land. So as I said, my father work for the defense industry. So their institutes, actually their institutes was moved to Xi'an and inner out of the inner land northwest of China in 1950s. So after graduation, my father went there. It's quite hard to imagine now because for my father, he's from Shanghai, the most modern city in China. He grew up there. So actually when he went to Xi'an, he told me the living standard there was really low at that time. So because he was from Shanghai, for example, they have rice every day, but when you go to the northern part of China, they don't have rice. So they had mantou, actually, the steamed buns. So for them, that's very hard. My mother work in the factory. When she went there, nothing there. It's just a ground. So they started to construct the factory. That was a hard life in 1960s.

I was born in early 1970s, so I almost have no memory of the Culture Revolution. But when I have memory, I still remember those hard time. At that time, I mean my parents, they are the middle class at that time, but the middle class still not very comparing with today. You know, the life is very hard. But of course, I'm very fortunate that they can bring me very good education because I grew up in that institute. It's a big institute. It's a island in the rural area because I said I grew up in Xi'an, but actually that's a suburb Xi'an, because it's in the defense industry institution. So we were an island in that sea of rural area. So thousands of the colleagues of my parents were the graduates from different universities in China in 1960s and 70s. So all of us, when I was a kid, I don't speak the local dialect because everybody speaks Mandarin. And at that time, I even thought everybody should have a college degree because all my parents's colleagues have the college degree.

But when I grew up later, I found it's something quite unique. I grew up in that urban island, speaking Mandarin, good education. But that's a good time because China already starts reform and repeat reopening up. I start my career, my education in 1979, the year that the two countries set up the diplomatic relations and China started its reform and opening up. So basically, I'm the kid, I think I'm a representative. I can represent that generation that grew up and in the era of the opening up and reform. So we've got benefits from that.

James Chau: What does that rural area look like today? Is it still that urban island that you describe or?

Prof. Da Wei: It's disappeared. I mean, now it's part of the city. So the village disappeared. Some of my classmates at that time, they were from the rural area. So there is a village outside our outside our island. When I return to my parent's home now there's no village at all. It's a city, part of the city. So the village disappeared, demolished.

James Chau: Including the factory that your mother helped to build and envision?

Prof. Da Wei: Yes, the factory now is bankrupt. And I brought my mother back. My mother worked there till 1979. She worked in the factory for 10 years then she moved to the institute that my father works. About five or six years ago, I drove my parents back to the factory that my mother worked. It's bankrupt. Some businessmen maybe from Guangdong, from southern China purchased. It's privatized and all the old workers laid off. So it's kind of like a corner lag behind the booming China. I feel very sad about that.

James Chau: Is life in China good today?

Prof. Da Wei: I think so, particularly for people like me. Of course, different people have different story, but for me, I think I have the life, but I have never expected when I was in the 1980s. When I was a kid, I still remember in Xi'an, in the city that I live, we have the first five star hotel run by a Hong Kong businessman. So some of teenagers in our island found a job there. So at that time in 1980s, they could earn 200 yuan per month. At that time, I thought, wow, that's a wonderful job.

James Chau: 200 yuan, which is about 30 U.S. dollars a month?

Prof. Da Wei: Yeah, I mean, 200 yuan at that time is already much higher than my parent's salary of about 100 yuan at that time.

James Chau: And what could you buy with 200 yuan?

Prof. Da Wei: You don't have much to buy at that time. The problem is we didn't have a car to buy at that time. I mean 200 is quite high income at that time. My parents both college educated, each of them can earn maybe 120 at that time.

James Chau: Is the hotel still there?

Prof. Da Wei: I think so. But obviously it's not a very good hotel now. But I mean, at that time, I thought, if one day when I grow up, if I can work in that hotel, that will be my dream life.

James Chau: So working in that hotel with a salary almost double that of your parents who were professional, highly qualified figures in defense and engineering, the hotel itself was what you were aiming for at the time. I want to finish with where we are and in some ways, circle back to where we began in this conversation. We're on the extraordinary grounds of Tsinghua University, a world leading university which was established in 1911 at a moment of absolute transformation here in China, which went from many dynasties of imperial rule to republic and to the People's Republic to follow that. This here in itself is the site of a former imperial garden. This university was set up with some reference to United States and China, the relationship to follow. But what are your students being taught and what are they learning? And to go back to our first question, is that sufficient to meet the needs of a world that is in constant flux?

Prof. Da Wei: I think Tsinghua University and Peking University are regarded in China as a two top universities. So probably this is one of the best university in China and or maybe in Asia. The students here, particularly the undergraduate students, they went through the extremely competitive "gaokao" system which is the entrance examination for the university in China, very competitive. So they are all very talented top university students here. So what they have been teaching here, I think the basically just like American University or European students, basically the same. For example, I teach in the department of International Relations. So my students, they learn like the courses like international relations theory, research methodology, mathematics, and yeah, they learn of course foreign languages and they also learn a lot of courses like China-U.S. relations, history, this kind of thing.

I think it's quite good. We have quite good education here and students working very hard. And I think, for example, the theory they are learning here basically the same as the American universities. The reading material we gave them, I think most of them are also English. So some courses are taught in English. So basically what they are providing here, I think is quite similar to what you can imagine in American university. But to your question, is that adequate? Is that good enough? I don't think so. I think beyond what you can learn from the classroom, I think there are still a lot of thing to do.

I think the students today here, particularly in those so called elite universities, the task of them is not only to learn some knowledge, but to be the future leadership of a country or maybe world, global leadership or industry or company, a society, community. So they need to understand the this changing, dramatically changing globe as we discussed early. I think the students here still, I always encourage them to pay more attention to what is happening in the world. For example, in the Middle East, I always want them to debate the pros and cons of the two sides, I mean, the Palestinian people and Israeli people. What is wrong? What is correct? As a Chinese student, what is your position? Or you can have a debate like Russia and Ukraine issue, right? What are the rationale behind the two sides? Why Russian did that? Why Ukrainian do that? I think the students need to pay more attention to what is happening now or like a new technology, AI, this kind of thing. They need to understand what is happening now.

Secondly, they need to think about why those people, like Palestinian people , are really different. People have different rationale for why they have different values, Why they have different policies? I mean, the logic behind that, I want them to step further.

So in that regard, I think our students still have a long way to go. I think our university need to provide them more opportunity to think about, to reflect. That's the reason every summer vacation, I always bring my students to the United States to talk to American government official, university professors, and of course their peers, the university students in the U.S., to understand why these two country, why these two great nations have such different policies and also we have so many this tension now. So I want them to understand this. And then when they return to the country, they can know the world better. So I think this is a task that the university need to provide to the students need to achieve, accomplished in the university and the university need to provide them more opportunity to understand the world.

James Chau: Unfortunately, I'm not your students. I wish I were. But we did start off the year in America in three different points, in Atlanta and then Stanford and Palo Alto and of course in Washington DC, so it means so much to me that as we reach the midpoint of this year, we're finally speaking at your home in Tsinghua here in Beijing.

Prof. Da Wei: Thank you, James, for coming to Tsinghua. And I hope you can visit more often and we can continue this discussion, no matter in Beijing, Hong Kong or somewhere in the U.S.. Thank you so much.

Subscribe now

On Saturday afternoon, the Global Times tweeted a brief message revealing that they had learned from industry insiders about Chinese sectors preparing evidence to request an anti-dumping investigation into certain pork imports from the EU.

The tweet didn't provide further details, and a check on the Global Times' English website showed no related news articles. Was it too soon to post, or did the relevant officials wish to manage the impact of this news so they chose intentionally to "leak" the news on the weekend? It's unclear, but you might recall that just a week ago, on another Saturday, Yu Yuan Tan Tian 玉渊谭天, a social media channel with a presence in China’s social media and known to be run by China Media Group, also released a similar "leak."

Pekingnology

Beijing signals retaliation if Brussels furhter escalates anti-subsidy investigation on China

Yu Yuan Tan Tian 玉渊谭天, a social media channel with a presence in China’s social media and known to be run by China Media Group, China’s state broadcaster, on Saturday, May 18 warned the European Union against further anti-subsidy investigations into Chinese companies by citing anonymous, “informed” sources saying China would retaliate with “a series of …

Read more

2 years ago · 13 likes · Zichen Wang

You may recall that I referenced Yu Yuan Tan Tian's warning when discussing an exclusive interview published by the Global Times on Tuesday. In the interview, Liu Bin, the chief expert at China Automotive Technology & Research Center (CATARC) and deputy director of China Automotive Strategy and Policy Research Center, advocated for increasing the temporary tariff rate on imported cars with large engines. The Global Times noted that Liu has been involved in drafting policies for China's automotive industry.

I'd like to summarize the three cases of "leaking" by Chinese media.

• The first was in Chinese and was through the "Yuyuan Tan Tian" known to be run by the China Media Group on domestic social media Sina Weibo, China's version of “X” on May 18 (Saturday).

• The second case involved the Global Times publishing an exclusive interview on May 21 (Tuesday), emphasizing that the interviewed expert participating in drafting policies for China's auto industry.

• The third piece, releasing today (May 25, Saturday), saw the Global Times post solely on Twitter.

These releases varied in format and language used, and both the first and third instances were on a Saturday. Therefore, those not closely following Chinese media channels might not connect these three events. However, based on my personal assessment, the fact that China's major media outlets released three consecutive “leaks” related to trade measures within about a week is no coincidence and warrants close attention from stakeholders.

According to a report by POLITICO earlier this month, the European Commission’s investigation into Chinese subsidies for electric vehicles is “advancing,” trade chief Valdis Dombrovskis told POLITICO's Brussels Playbook — and he hinted Brussels could impose tariffs “before the summer break.”

Given the recent leaks from Chinese media, it's hard to believe that China won't retaliate if EU imposes provisional duties on imports of new battery-powered vehicles from China.

Additionally, I believe that EU has placed significant importance on agricultural exports, especially pork, to China. Below is an excerpt from an interview with EU Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski by Chinese media in April, which I have translated for clarity:

From 21 to 26 April, EU Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski visited China to facilitate European agricultural food and beverage exports to China and expand their presence on this market. He was accompanied by a business delegation of senior representatives from the EU agri-food sector. During his visit to China, Commissioner Wojciechowski attended events and meetings in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing.

In an exclusive interview with Yicai, he said that a major purpose of the visit was to increase EU agricultural exports to China, while also hoping that agricultural trade between the two sides would not be disrupted by other factors.

Wojciechowski told Yicai that strengthening EU-China trade relations is of great significance, as China is a very important partner for the EU. Open food trade is very important for both the EU and China, and the signals released by both sides in reducing trade barriers are positive. He said that pork exports are very important for EU agriculture, but not all EU countries can currently export pork to China.

Spain and Germany are among the top tier of EU pork producers. The EU is now the world's second-largest pork producer after China and is the largest exporter of pork and pork products. The EU is China's largest source market for pork imports, and China is the EU's largest target market for pork exports, with the pork industries in both regions being highly complementary.

Besides pork, Wojciechowski believes that the EU's share of beef exports to China is small, and the EU can also provide high-quality poultry to the Chinese market. Additionally, there is room for improvement in EU exports of dairy products, wine, and olive oil to China.

On the morning of May 16, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a restrictive meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is in China on a state visit, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

The heads of state first held small-scale talks.

As President Putin has been sworn in as the President of Russia for the fifth term, Xi extended heartfelt congratulations to Putin and welcomed his state visit to China once again.

Xi noted that this year marks the 75th anniversary of the China-Russia diplomatic ties. Over these 75 years, the China-Russia relationship has withstood the test of international changes and set an example of mutual respect, sincerity, peaceful coexistence, and mutual benefit between major countries and neighboring countries. The stable development of China-Russia relations serves the fundamental interests of both nations and their peoples and contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region and the world. China is ready to work with Russia to stay each other's good neighbor, good friend and good partner that trust each other, continue to consolidate the lasting friendship between the two peoples, and jointly pursue respective national development and revitalization and uphold fairness and justice in the world.

Xi emphasized that the most important conclusion from the 75-year history of China-Russia relations is that two neighboring major countries must always promote the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respect each other, trust each other equally, care for each other's concerns, and truly support each other's development and revitalization. This is not only the correct way for China and Russia to interact, but also the direction that major country relations in the 21st century should strive towards. China-Russia relations have a profound historical basis and solid public support. Both sides should closely coordinate strategically and cooperate for mutual benefit, firmly follow their own development paths, and firmly uphold international fairness and justice.

Putin expressed that he was pleased to visit China again after his inauguration as the new president of Russia. In March last year, Xi also made a state visit to Russia shortly after his reelection. This reflects the friendly tradition between our two countries and underscores the high importance both sides place on strengthening comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in the new era. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and China, which we should celebrate together. The development of Russia-China relations is not a temporary expedient and is not targeted at any third party. It benefits international strategic stability. Russia is willing to continuously expand bilateral cooperation, closely communicate and cooperate within the frameworks of the United Nations, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and promote the establishment of a more just and reasonable international order.

The heads of state then presided over extensive talks.

They listened to reports from the chairs of various intergovernmental cooperation committees between the two countries on cooperation in investment, energy, trade, "Northeast-Far East", humanities, and international fields. Both leaders expressed satisfaction with the progress made and affirmed the suggestions for future cooperation.

Xi pointed out that this year is an important milestone year in the history of China-Russia relations. Over the past 75 years, China and Russia together have found a new path for major countries and neighboring countries to treat each other with respect and pursue amity and mutually beneficial cooperation. With the concerted efforts of the two sides, China-Russia relations have been moving forward steadily, with enhanced comprehensive strategic coordination and further cooperation on economy and trade, investment, energy, people-to-people exchanges, at the subnational level and in other fields. This has made positive contributions to maintaining global strategic stability and promoting greater democracy in international relations. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. China is advancing Chinese modernization on all fronts and moving faster to foster new quality productive forces through high-quality development, which will add new drivers to global economic growth. Both China and Russia are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and major emerging markets. It is the shared strategic choice of both countries to deepen strategic coordination, expand mutually beneficial cooperation and follow the general historical trend of multipolarity in the world and economic globalization. The two sides should take the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations as a new starting point, further synergize development strategies, and continue to enrich the bilateral cooperation, to bring greater benefits to the two countries and peoples, and contribute more positive energy to world prosperity and stability. Both sides should further optimize the structure of bilateral cooperation, consolidate the good momentum of cooperation in traditional fields such as economy and trade, create more highlights in people-to-people exchanges, jointly host the China-Russia Years of Culture strengthen local cooperation, and continuously strengthen the bond of popular sentiment. They should enhance communication and coordination in international multilateral platforms such as the UN, BRICS, the SCO, and regional affairs, demonstrate international responsibilities, and promote the establishment of a fair and equitable global governance system.

Putin said that the intergovernmental cooperation mechanism between Russia and China is functioning well, and cooperation in various fields such as economy, trade, agriculture, industry, energy, and connectivity between the two countries is steadily developing. The establishment and development of Russia-China relations are based on principles of good neighborliness, friendship, mutual respect, and mutual assistance in national development, and have withstood various tests. Today, the two sides have signed a series of cooperation documents, indicating their determination to further deepen and expand mutually beneficial cooperation. Russia is willing to work with China to implement Pre-2030 Development Plan on Priorities in China-Russia Economic Cooperation, host the Russia-China Years of Culture well in the coming years, and strengthen the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative. Next year, the 80th anniversary of the victory in the World Anti-Fascist War will be commemorated, with Russia and China organizing commemorative events. Russia appreciates China's objective and just stance in major international and regional affairs, and is committed to maintaining strategic cooperation, mutual support, and advancing the global trend toward multipolarity and the democratization of international relations. Furthermore, Russia seeks to enhance the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.

After the talks, the two heads of state signed and issued a joint statement on deepening China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era and witnessed the signing of many bilateral cooperation documents spanning various sectors including economy and trade, environmental conservation, inspection and quarantine, media, etc.

The two heads of state also jointly met with journalists.

Before the talks, Xi held a grand welcome ceremony for Putin at the east gate square of the Great Hall of the People.

When Putin arrived, the Guard of Honor of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) saluted. The two heads of state ascended the reviewing stand, and the military bands played the national anthems of China and Russia. Twenty-one cannon salutes were fired at Tiananmen Square. Putin, accompanied by Xi, reviewed the Guard of Honor of the PLA and watched the parade. Children from China and Russia held bouquets and the flags of both countries, cheering and greeting the heads of state of both countries.

At noon that day, Xi hosted a welcoming banquet for Putin in the Golden Hall of the Great Hall of the People.

Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Wang Yi, He Lifeng, Zhang Guoqing, Shen Yiqin, and others attended the above-mentioned activities.

From Thursday to Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin will pay a state visit to China, which that has garnered much attention. Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden is ramping up tariffs on Chinese-made electric cars, solar panels, steel and other goods. China's commerce ministry said on Tuesday said China firmly opposes U.S. tariff hike on Chinese goods, and will take resolute measures to safeguard its own rights and interests.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen discussed U.S.'s tariffs policy on China today in an interview, and I fear her remarks might quickly overshadow some positive reception she gained during her "culinary diplomacy" in China — a term coined by some China watchers, not officially confirmed.

The situation in the South China Sea remains concerning. About 100 Filipino activists and fishermen, along with journalists, sailed Wednesday to a shoal in the South China Sea, according to AP.

I'm unsure if I can cover all these significant issues in my upcoming newsletters due to time constraints. In today's piece, I will share a translation of two chapters related to the South China Sea issue from the book 看世界2: 百年变局下的挑战和抉择 Seeing the World 2 by Fu Ying, Vice-Chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China's 13th National People's Congress and previously Vice Foreign Minister and Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Philippines. I believe her perspective is worth noting, even if it may differ from some Western readers' views.

As some of you might have observed, about a month ago, a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers introduced legislation to establish a research center “dedicated to producing publicly accessible, accurate English translations” of open-source materials from China. Given the surge in translation projects involving publicly available information from China, challenges with accuracy are not uncommon, especially from some overseas translation projects. Today’s piece strives to offer overseas observers of China accurate information.

Moreover, a recent interview conducted by Xinhuanet with Anthony Carty, a British scholar on international law, concerning the South China Sea, is also worth noting. You can also learn about this interview by listening to a podcast episode.

Lastly, some GRR readers recently pointed out that the term "the West" often used in Chinese discourse to refer to many countries, including those in Europe, doesn't always reflect the diverse viewpoints of individual nations. I'm considering alternatives to this term and welcome your suggestions.

Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea Issue[1] (from Page 358 to 360)

The Hague tribunal will issue a final verdict on 12 July 2016 regarding the much-discussed South China Sea arbitration case, between China and the Philippines. Many Western countries have already started urging China to accept the ruling, seemingly they already know the result: China will lose. But Beijing's position is clear: no acceptance, no participation, no recognition and no implementation. There is a solid international legal basis for China to oppose this case. As in doing so, China is not only safeguarding its national interests but is also protecting the integrity and legitimacy of the international maritime order.

Why does China refuse to accept or participate in the proceedings of this tribunal, being held at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague? Because as a sovereign state, China is entitled to choose its means of dispute resolution: a legitimate right under international law. Moreover, the Philippines' case is inherently illegal and flawed, as it is not only an abuse of the dispute settlement procedures, but also a distortion of concepts, with deliberate concealment of the real nature of the disputes.

The Philippines' arbitration relates to the dispute over sovereignty of islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and to maritime delimitation. But these territorial issues are not regulated at the Hague, as they are beyond the scope of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 2006, China declared it would exclude "disputes concerning maritime delimitation" from compulsory arbitration, under Article 298 of UNCLOS. Furthermore, the Philippines failed to meet UNCLOS preconditions when it unilaterally initiated the compulsory arbitration process.

UNCLOS clearly stipulates "no arbitration without the existence of a dispute," a principle that requires the existence of a real dispute between the parties. Additionally, discussions or at least exchanges must have taken place between the two countries, before arbitration is requested. In fact, neither precondition was met. China has never presented specific claims relating to individual islands, as it has always treated them as part of its Zhongsha Islands and Nansha Island groups. The Philippines and China did not have discussions or exchanges on this matter. So the assertions of an "impasse" with China in "the bilateral exchanges" and "the great many subsequent exchanges," were untrue. In fact, China had tried in vain to engage the Philippines in meaningful discussions.

The Philippines' unilateral initiation of arbitration fell short of meeting UNCLOS's conditions, and in doing so, it violated an earlier agreement with China. Both countries had previously stated their commitment to bilateral negotiations and consultations as the means of settling disputes.

Why does China find it impossible to recognize and implement the tribunal's upcoming decision? Although Article 288(4) of UNCLOS stipulates that the tribunal should decide whether it has jurisdiction and the application of this provision is not unconditional. Indeed, there is no such thing as absolute power in international law. This tribunal, whose authority and powers are conferred by its member states, is an international dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS. If the tribunal abuses its power, China or any other member of the international community has the right to reject its decisions. And in this case, the tribunal has acted recklessly. In violating the basic principles of the international law, the faith China and other nations had in UNCLOS has been undermined.

Although we do not yet know the outcome, we do know that the tribunal failed to fully understand or investigate the real dispute between China and the Philippines. It disregarded the essence and purpose of the Filipino claims and deliberately regarded it merely as an issue of the interpretation and application of UNCLOS. But in fact, the handling of the submissions went far beyond this scope. There is a deep concern in China that the tribunal is failing to consider the specific geographical framework and situation in the South China Sea, where the maritime claims of the two countries potentially overlap.

Given the above, it is not hard to understand why China has decided not to recognize and implement the tribunal's decision. More than 60 countries have voiced their support for China's position of resolving the issue through negotiations and consultations. China, as a signatory to UNCLOS, supports and respects the treaty's principles and spirit. What China opposes is not UNCLOS and compulsory arbitration, but the tribunal's abuse of power in handling this case.

Today, most disputes are resolved through negotiations directly between the countries concerned. The prerequisite for such negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, is the consensus of or an agreement reached by all concerned. China's claim and position in this case are consistent not only with the spirit of international law but also with recognized practices in international relations.

This arbitration cannot resolve the disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, but will increase tensions and undermine peace and stability in the region. If the coastal countries around the South China Sea do not intend to heighten tensions, they need to return to the path of seeking resolution through negotiation. China and the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have agreed to handle issues through a dual-track approach and resolve disputes through peaceful negotiations. Consultations on the code of conduct in the South China Sea region are making progress, and this momentum should not be interrupted.

As President Xi Jinping said, China is committed to upholding international justice and is opposed to forcing one's will upon others. The handling of the South China Sea issue has a bearing on justice, as well as peace and stability. Countries in the region need to work together to build rules-based cooperation. The international community should support the efforts made by China and other coastal states to manage and resolve disputes in a peaceful manner, respect China's choice of resorting to negotiations as the means to settle disputes, and protect the legitimacy and fairness of international mechanisms, especially UNCLOS.

Got to This Stage[2] (from Page 371 to 376)

The second decade of the 21st century has seen the South China Sea issue turning into the most important and difficult topic in the China-US dialogues. The rhetoric is heating up on both sides and tense atmosphere is also rising between the militaries of the two countries. This issue is turning into a platform of rivalry and confrontation between China and the US, which leads to the two sides to reassess each other's intentions from a strategic perspective.

In the year 2016, the debate is about who is militarizing the South China Sea and freedom of navigation operations. Voices in favor of military confrontation are emerging in both countries. The friction over the South China Sea issue further reveals the lack of strategic trust between China and the US. David M. Lampton, an American scholar, has warned the two countries by stating that "a tipping point in US-China relations is upon us". The South China Sea issue, if not a major contributor to the current turbulent China-US relations, is at least an important catalyst.

The two countries have different opinions about what has led to the current situation. In China, it is widely believed that it is the US' Asia-Pacific Rebalance strategy, its taking sides on disputes in the South China Sea, and its direct intervention in the disputes that have escalated tensions and made the South China Sea issue more complicated. In the US, the concern is that China is trying to drive the US out of the South China Sea with a salami-slicing strategy and will try to eventually turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake.

History shows that the core issue in the South China Sea is disputes between China and some Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines. All the incidents and events that have unfolded over the years have been about sovereignty and rights over the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters. Such disputes are not uncommon, as throughout the world history, especially in the Cold War after World War Two when seeds of disputes were sown for many African and Asian countries.

However, the disputes in the South China Sea have long been kept under control thanks to the joint efforts of China and the other coastal countries. A good proof was the "golden era" of the China-ASEAN relations from 1991 to the end of 2010, during which bilateral cooperation flourished and trade ballooned nearly 37 times, from no more than $8 billion to $300 billion. During this period, China's GDP rose rapidly, and most Southeast Asian economies expanded more than five-fold.

Tensions started to build up in 2009 and have further escalated since 2012. It is worth the effort to examine the incidents and the behavior of countries concerned, the reactions they triggered, and the consequences incurred, in the leading up to the current state of affairs. This paper provides an overview of the chain of events contributing to the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea, as well as their context and possible connections.

It is hoped that this paper will help those interested in the issue see the bigger picture and get to the heart of why things have happened the way they have. It is also hoped to be a reminder of the danger of deepening misunderstanding and spiraling of tensions.

The Japanese and other foreign invasion of Nansha islands and reefs

The South China Sea is the largest marginal sea in the West Pacific region, covering an area of 3.5 million kilometers. It is located south of China and the island of Chinese Taiwan, west of the Philippines, north of Kalimantan and Sumatra, and east of the Malay and Indo-China peninsulas. It connects the Pacific through the Bashi and Balintang channels in the northeast, and the joining the Sulu sea through Mindoro and Balabas straits in the southeast; joins the Java Sea through the Karimata and Gaspar straits in the south, and is linked with the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca in the southwest. Rich in fishery resources and oil and gas reserves, the sea plays an important role in the economic development of the coastal countries.

since 2012. It is worth the effort to examine the incidents and the behavior of countries concerned, the reactions they triggered, and the consequences incurred, in the leading up to the current state of affairs. This paper provides an overview of the chain of events contributing to the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea, as well as their context and possible connections.

It is hoped that this paper will help those interested in the issue see the bigger picture and get to the heart of why things have happened the way they have. It is also hoped to be a reminder of the danger of deepening misunderstanding and spiraling of tensions.

The Japanese and other foreign invasion of Nansha islands and reefs

The South China Sea is the largest marginal sea in the West Pacific region, covering an area of 3.5 million kilometers. It is located south of China and the island of Chinese Taiwan, west of the Philippines, north of Kalimantan and Sumatra, and east of the Malay and Indo-China peninsulas. It connects the Pacific through the Bashi and Balintang channels in the northeast, and the joining the Sulu sea through Mindoro and Balabas straits in the southeast; joins the Java Sea through the Karimata and Gaspar straits in the south, and is linked with the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca in the southwest. Rich in fishery resources and oil and gas reserves, the sea plays an important role in the economic development of the coastal countries.

China has sovereignty over all the four archipelagos in the South China Sea, namely, the Xisha, Nansha, Zhongsha and Dongsha Islands, which are indicated by the 9-dotted lines (originally 11-dotted lines) on the map drawn in 1947 by the Chiang Kai-shek clique which was an ally to the US. The Nansha Islands (coordinates: 3°40'-11°55' N; 109°33'-117°50' E) comprise over 230 islands, islets, sandbanks, rocks and shoals that are scattered along a 1,000-kilometer span from the southeast to the northwest of the Sea. China was the first to discover, name the Nansha Islands (meaning south-sand islands) and the first to exercise sovereignty over them. That exercise has been ongoing[3]. Before the 1930s, there was no dispute over China's ownership of the Nansha Islands and China's ownership was reflected in many maps and encyclopedias published around the world.

At the beginning of the 20th century, western colonial powers, including the UK, Germany, France and Japan, kept coveting the Nansha Islands as they were colonizing Southeast Asia and invading China. But most of their territorial ambitions ended in failure due to strong resistance from China's late Qing dynasty and later Chiang Kai shek clique as well as the general public. In the 1930s, France provoked the "Nine Isles Incident" in the South China Sea and tried to take over some of the isles and was again strongly opposed by the Chiang Kai-skek clique. During World War Two, Japan seized the Nansha Islands in 1939, as part of its effort to control Southeast Asia and in preparations for invasion of Australia.[4]

The Cairo Declaration of November 1943, signed by the heads of the Republic of China(1912-1949), the United States and the United Kingdom, proclaimed that "...Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of WWI in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Presentday Taiwan, China), and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."[5] The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 also stipulated in its eighth article that "the Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine, as had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943.[6]

In December 1946, a year after the defeat of Japan, the government of the Republic of China organized patrols by warships and to reclaim to the Nansha Islands including Taiping and Zhongye. During that trip monuments were erected on Taiping Island (a pronunciation based on the Chinese dialect in the island) and Zhongye Island. Also in 1947, on Taiping Island, administration was established by Chiang Kai-shek clique.

In 1947, it organized the compilation of Nan Hai Zhu Dao Di Li Zhi Lüe (A Brief Account of the Geography of the South China Sea Islands), and on the basis of geographic survey, renamed some of the islands in South China Sea historically under China's jurisdiction, including their components such as islands, reefs sandbanks and shoals, which accounted a total of 172 collective and individual geographic names. Among them, 102 belonged to the Nansha Islands.

Its officials, together with experts made a trip to South China Sea in 1947 and accomplished the ceremonies of recovery of sovereignty over Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands. They also made survey of the two groups of islands, and drew the Nan Hai Zhu Dao Wei Zhi Tu (A Location Map of the Islands in the South China Sea) on which the 11-dotted line was marked. They completed the work with the US help. This map was officially published and made known to the world in February 1948.

Given the American presence in the regionduring World War Two and in the postwar Asia and its alignment relationship with the Chiang Kai-shek, and then the Taiwan region, there is every reason to believe that the US government was aware of and supported China's recovery of sovereignty over Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands. It should also be in the know of the postwar publication of map and geographic names, and the status quo in the South China Sea. The US had made no objection after the publication of the map. Chiang Kai-shek and his clique fled to the island of Taiwan and continued to enjoy American support. This development started to subtly change the US attitude. In the face of China's division on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and the outbreak of the Cold War, the US opted for a more pragmatic approach regarding the ownership of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea. This was reflected in the Peace Treaty of San Francisco between Japan and some of the Allied Powers. Signed on 8 September 1951 and entering into force on 28 April 1952, the document served to end the allied postwar occupation of Japan and establish Japan's territory and role in the international arena after its defeat in World War Two. Japan officially renounced its rights to Korea, Taiwan and Penghu, Kurile Islands, sakhalin Island, Ckuye Island, the Nansha Islands and the Xisha Islands. Article 2(6) provided that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Nansha Islands and to the Xisha Islands." But the document failed to specify the ownership of these islands.[7] Though China was one of the biggest victims of and one of the four largest victors over the Japanese militarism, the People's Republic of China was not invited to the treaty talks held in San Francisco. As the talks were going on, the central government of the PRC issued a Declaration in the name of the then Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on 15 August 1951, over the Draft Peace Treaty with Japan by the US and the UK and on the San Francisco Conference. The Declaration affirmed China's consistent sovereignty over the archipelagos in the South China Sea, including the Nansha Islands, and protested about the absence of any provision in the draft on China's taking over of the South China Sea islands following Japan's renouncement of all rights, title and claim to them. It reiterated that "the Chinese Government of the day had taken over those islands" as referred above after the surrender of Japan and that "the People's Republic of China's rightful sovereignty shall remain intact, whatever the outcome of the conference may be."[8]

Following the San Francisco Talks, the US, in its effort to reconcile the relations between Japan and the Taiwan authorities for the sake of serving its strategic interest in the Asia Pacific, presided over the signing of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Taiwan authorities in April 1952. Article 2 of the document provided that "It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Peace Treaty with Japan by the US and the UK signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan and Penghy (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands(China's Nansha Islands) and the Paracel Islands(China's Xisha Islands)." Indeed, the United States at that time still deemed the Taiwan authorities as China's legitimate government and there is no doubt that the Treaty means for the Taiwan authorities to have reclaimed, on behalf of China, the territories in the South China Sea forcibly seized by Japan.

Contending parties during the Cold War

Starting from the mid 1950s, the Philippines and the South Vietnam (then the Republic of Vietnam) started to move onto some of the islands and shoals in the South China Sea. Growing occupation activities by other claimants in the later years give rise to territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.

In 1956, Tomas Cloma, a Filipino adventurer, announced his discovery of a group of islands in the Nansha waters, and regarded them "free land".[9] The Philippine government then claimed that they were entitled to those islands. But being aware of the Taiwan authority's position on the sovereignty over these Islands, Manila once intended to send a delegation to Taiwan to discuss the matter.[10]

After Vietnam was divided into the North part and South part by the Geneva Treaty of 1954,[11] a fierce civil war erupted in the country. The two sides took different positions regarding this issue. North Vietnam, held a clear position supporting China's sovereign rights in the South China Sea. South Vietnam started in 1962 to occupy some islands and shoals in South China Sea, including Nanzi Islands, Dungian Cay, Hongxiu Island, Jinghong Island, Nanwei Island, and Anho Cay. Such actions provoked strong voice of protest on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

During the period between 1970 to 1980, a bigger wave of occupation took place. It was mainly prompted by the discovery of oil and gas resources in the islands and waters off the Nansha Islands. Multiple survey published by the US and UN disclosed that the continental shelf of the South China Sea was rich in oil and gas resources. The negotiations and completion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also influenced the development. According to UNCLOS, a state has jurisdiction over 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (about 370 kilometers) from its territorial sea baseline, one of utmost system innovations in UNCLOS.

The new rules concerning the maritime rights have further complicated the South China Sea issue given to the reality that the ownership of the islands shoals is in disputes and the delimitation of maritime right are without proper base. However, lured by precious resources, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia sped up infringing upon China's legitimate rights in the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters.

Vietnam's position went through a change as affected by the domestic development. Up to 1974, the government of North Vietnam had consistently acknowledged that the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands were integral part of Chinese territory. However, as the North was winning the war and was about to unite with the South, it began to reverse their stance. In 1975, North Vietnam, on the pretext of "liberation," occupied six islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands which were formerly seized by South Vietnam.

In 1979, China fought a self-defense war with Vietnam in land border areas and the relationship became colder. In 1988 China started setting up marine observation station in Nansha Islands area in the project coordinated by the Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO. Vietnam tried to prevent it, and on 14 March 1988, it sent combat ships and fired at Chinese personnel working on the Chigua Reef. Later Chinese military fired back. So the two sides exchanged fires, claiming heavy casualties. After this incident, to make sure that the project safely implemented and also to prevent further occupation of islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands, China decided to deploy forces on longshu Reef, Huayang Reef, Dongmen Reef, Nanxun Reef, Zhubi Reef, Chigua Reef.

Other claimants have also become more aggressive in their stance on the Nansha Islands. By formulating their national laws of the sea or issuing political statements, they officially asserted sovereignty claims over the Nansha Islands and rights claims over waters off the Nansha Island. Towards the end of 1980s, the Philippines had already occupied eight islands and reefs, including Feixin Island and Zhongye Island included. Malaysia had seized Danwan Reef, Nanhai Reef and Guangxingzai Reef.

During this period, the US remained committed to acknowledging China's sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. This is clearly indicated in the form of diplomatic inquiries, measurement requests, and flight plan notifications. The Taiwan authorities received visits by American military officials on Taiping Island of Nansha which it occupied. Regarding issues on islands occupation by countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, the US government did not reveal its stance in public, but it did make enquiries to the Taiwan authorities multiple times relating to the Nansha sovereignty issue.[12] Take for example, from 1957 to February 1961, the US Government made application requests to "the Taiwan authorities" for allowing the US Air Force based in the Philippines to conduct nautical chart measurement and meteorological surveys in the vicinity of Huangyan Island and the Nansha Islands.

For a long period after World War Two, the acknowledgement of China's sovereignty over the islands and shoals in the South China Sea was also indicated in a variety of maps and books published in the US, such as Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World (1961), Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (1963), and Constitutions of the Countries of the World (1971), to name a few.

A policy dilemma for the US was that on the ground of international laws and moral principles, it should have supported China's sovereignty over these territories.However, for its anti-communism stance and its strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region, the US was unwilling to let the PRC to have control over them. Furthermore, it was also unwilling to hurt relations with its allies like the Philippines.

Road to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China

In the early 1990s, as the Cold War came to an end and economic integration accelerated in the Asia Pacific region, China and Southeast Asian countries and the Association of Southeart Asian Nations (ASEAN). switched to a fast track toward establishing rapport. In 1990 it resumed diplomatic ties with Indonesia and established diplomatic relations with Singapore. In 1992, it became ASEAN's dialogue partner.

Since then, China has embarked on a path of confidence-building and all-round cooperation with ASEAN, guided by its foreign policy of building and maintaining stability in the neighborhood. In China's dialogues with its Southeast Asian neighbors, the Nansha issue was the most frequently debated problem. China, based on its ancestrally inherited ownership of the islands in the South China Sea with historical and legal evidence, had consistently defended its indisputable sovereignty as it did in the past. However, in order to stabilize the newly established ties, China resorted to the approach it used for addressing the disputes over the Diaoyy Islands in the East China Sea: Setting aside the disputes while pursuing joint development of resources without abandoning territorial sovereignty.

In 1994, China normalized its diplomatic relations with Vietnam. In 1995, ASEAN expanded to 10 countries with the admission of Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. In 1996, China became ASEAN's full dialogue partner. When a serious financial crisis hit Asia in 1997, China stood firm and offered strong support to the region, living up to being a responsible partner, winning wide praise and greater trust from ASEAN countries. In 1997, the first ASEAN-China (10+1) Informal Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at which the 11 countries announced the establishment of "a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust."

During this period, the rapid development of the China-ASEAN relations largely masked undulating contention in the South China Sea; nevertheless, disputes surfaced from time to time.

A major development was a new wave of unilateral occupation of the Nansha Islands and the drilling for oil and gas in the surrounding waters. In the 1990s, Vietnam took 5 more reefs and shoals, bringing a total of 29 islands and reefs under its occupation. By March 1994, Vietnam had licensed out 120 oil blocks for bidding in the Nansha and Xisha waters. Malaysia also seized Yuya Shoal and Boji Reef in 1999, and it accounted for over half of the oil rigs erected by all claimant countries. Its maritime law enforcement forced also registered the largest number of expulsions and arrests of Chinese fishermen in the 1990s.

Another source of tension was caused by a series of provocations from the Philippines concerning Meiji Reef, Huangyan Island and Renai Shoal.

In 1994, to better provide for Chinese fishermep, China built shelter facilities on Meiji Reef. The Philippines reacted strongly by taking a series of actions. In late March 1995, its navy force blew up survey markers that China had installed on Wufang Atoll, Xian'e Reef, Xinyi Shoal, Banyue Shoal and Ren'ai Shoal. Its patrol ships, with the support by its air force, attacked 4 Chinese fishing vessels berthed near Banyue Shoal and 62 Chinese fishermen on these vessels were brought into custody. On May 13, the Philippine military escalated the tension and send out fleets in an attempt to land on Meiji Reef by force to hamper the construction, only to end up in an 8 hour standoff against China's fishery administration ship "Yuzheng 34". Chinese side managed to finish its construction work on Meiji Reef.

Huangyan Island is part of China's Zhongsha Islands, east of the Manila Trench and facing the Philippine Islands. No later than in Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), China had already discovered and exercised jurisdiction over Huangyan Island. Both the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) Party and the PRC have declared China's sovereignty over Huangyan Island on multiples occasions. The Philippine official document and maps made no indication of differences regarding this fact and the Huangyan Island has always been marked as outside of Philippine territorial water on its national maps. It was only from 1990s that the Philippine government started making disputes regarding this island. In fact, before 1997, the Philippines had never staked a claim over Huangyan Island.

It is recognized that, the Philippines' territory was defined mainly in the 1898 Treaty of Paris, between the US and Spain, the 1900 Treaty of Washington between the US and Spain as well as the 1930 Convention between the US and Great Britain. All three treaties contain explicit clauses defining the territory of the Philippines as being east of the 118th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich. Huangyan Island is located clearly to the west of that line and has never belonged to the Philippines. The Philippine government had not included Huangyan Island into its scope of territory or sovereignty, and its own officially published maps of 1967, 1981 and 1984 clearly marked Huangyan Island is outside of the dotted Philippine boundary.

In a letter responding to a German radio amateur's enquiry in February 1992, the then Philippine Ambassador to Germany clearly stated that the Huangyan Island did not fall within the territorial sovereignty of the Philippines.[13] Even as recently as on 18 October 1994, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority of the Philippines (NAMRIA) confirmed that the territorial boundaries and sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines were established in Article III of the Treaty of Paris signed on 10 December 1898. Huangyan Island clearly lies outside those limits.[14]

In late April of 1997, a Philippine Naval ship came to the Huangyan Island, blew up the territory monument that China had erected, and planted the national flag of the Philippines. Chinese marine surveillance ships arrived on the scene and the two sides went into a stand-off for some time and ended without serious incident. In the following years, the Philippine navy continued to expel, arrest and even shoot at Chinese fisherman who passed the Huangyan Island.

In May of 1999, when I was serving as Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, a fishery dispute occurred near Huangyan Island. I was invited to speak to the International Press Club in Manila the next day. On my way to the club, I stopped over at a newspaper stand on the street and bought a map of the Philippines published by the NAMRIA. As I was speaking to both the local and international journalists, I showed the map to them see that the Huangyan Island was clearly marked outside of the Philippine territory.

On 9 May 1999, the Philippine military sailed the Landing Ship Tank the Sierra Madre (No 57) into the Ren'ai Reef and refused to move away on the excuse of a leakage at the bottom of cabin. It has stayed there ever since and the servicemen on the retired military vessel have been rotated from time to time. Chinese side made repeated diplomatic representations requesting them to leave but with no success. On 3 November 1999, the Philippines played the same trick again and this time at the Huangyan Island. It claimed another retired military vessel was "stranded" on the northern side of the Southeastern mouth of the Huangyan Island lagoon. Then Chinese side brought compelling diplomatic pressure on the Philippines. Under the then Philippine President Estrada's order, the Philippine military towed the ship back to pier on 29 November, 1999.

Chinese government, with a view to containing the disputes and stabilizing the situation for the sake of preserving the sound China-ASEAN partnership, stepped up diplomatic efforts to communicate with the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. In particular, China held multiple rounds of negotiation and consultation with the Philippines, to ease the situation. In March 1999, the first round of China-Philippines Experts Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures took place in Manila. More consultations were subsequently held, and the two sides agreed to exercise restraint and "not to take actions that might escalate the situation".

The other ASEAN countries were watching the South China Sea issue closely, and held multiple rounds of consultations with China too. Earlier in the 1990s, there were also Track 1.5 meetings, a series of semi-official and semi-academic closed-door dialogues. They were all aimed at in-depth discussion on territorial disputes and territorial water delimitations. Both China and Chinese Taiwan region participated in these dialogues. One important consensus was that the Nansha disputes were complicated and difficult to solve, nevertheless, they should be settled through peaceful negotiations, and the proposition of "shelving the disputes" which China put forward was the most viable option in the process. It was also generally acknowledged by the parties that before any resolution of the disputes was achieved, persisting in one's territorial claim would only escalate the conflict. Therefore, it was wise to shelve the disputes and start joint developments. Those discussions laid foundations for further consensus between China and the ASEAN countries later. In 1998, with an aim to enhance regional integration, the ASEAN Summit adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action, proposing that efforts should be made to "establish a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea among the parties directly concerned." [15] Working for building mutual confidence and friendly relations with the neighbors, China in principle agreed to join consultation about "the code of conduct."[16]

On 15 March 2000 an informal consultation was held between China and ASEAN countries in Thailand, and "the code of conduct" documents drafted by China and the ASEAN countries respectively were exchanged and discussed. However, due to disagreements on how binding the code of conduct should be and also different opinions between China and Vietnam on the range of disputes the code should cover, the re was little progress in the code of conduct" and subsequent meetings did not bring significant headways neither.

At the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei in July 2002, Malaysia, with a view diffusing the standoff, proposed to replace the code of conduct with a compromising and non-binding "declaration". The motion was approved by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, and a joint statement was published after the meeting, stating that ASEAN and China would work closely together to make the Declaration a reality.[17]

Several months later, a consultation on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was held. Since then, China and the ASEAN members were engaged in many rounds of difficult negotiations. At the 8th ASEAN Summit convened in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on 4 November 2002, Mr. Wang Yi, then China's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Ministers of the ten ASEAN Member States jointly signed the DOC.

In the DOC, which contains ten provisions, the parties recognize the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea; undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea; undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner; and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of the document's objective.[18] The focus throughout the negotiations was on the disputes over the sovereignty of the Nansha islands and reefs. Much attention was directed to preventing escalation of disputes and the main purpose of the DOC was to prevent further act of occupying and controlling islands.

It is worth noting that, right before the final signing of the DOC, opinions were divided about what name to use referring to the disputed areas. Most ASEAN member states agreed to use the expression of "Spratly Islands," while having no objection to China using the Chinese name "Nansha Islands." However, Vietnam insisted using "the Hoang Sa Islands" and "the Truong Sa Islands" (respectively referring to the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands) as a way to assert its stance. And this went beyond China's bottom line, as China had never admitted there is any dispute in the Xisha Islands, nor had the consultations touched upon those islands. Chinese side can't accept such unreasonable request. Eventually, in the hope of breaking the long deadlock and maximizing common interests, China agreed to use a more ambiguous expression -- "Parties in the South China Sea," "the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea" and "code of conduct in the South China Sea." Description about islands disputes were also vaguely rendered as "refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features." without specific mention to the Nansha Islands. The DOC played a vital role in diffusing disputes in the Nansha Islands and maintaining regional stability. But the ambiguity on the specific area in dispute made the local territorial disputes look like a more generalized maritime issue.The mixing up of the concepts of "disputes over islands" and "maritime disputes" is confusing.Gradually, disputes over portions of the Nansha Islands and delimitation of their surrounding waters are more often refered to as South China Sea issue.

In the period immediately after the Cold War, the US remained committed to its policy of not taking sides on the legitimacy of territorial claims in South China Sea, emphasizing that the disputes should be peacefully resolved, and that the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea be maintained. Relatively speaking, Asia was not on the radar of American global security concerns as its relationship with China was improving and the tense relations across the Taiwan straits were eased. Occasional frictions in the South China Sea region did not change the US policy of not taking sides. It only emphasized that the territorial dispute should be peacefully resolved.[19]

Under the peace mask, a decade of undercurrent of tension

In nearly ten years after the introduction of the DOC, China faithfully observed the principles and spirit of the document, refraining from taking any action that might escalate the disputes in the South China Sea. China also consistently promoted peaceful cooperation and joint development of resources in disputed waters. However, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines appeared to be half-hearted about full implementation of the DOC. They kept on transforming and expanding occupied islands and reefs, reinforcing its control, and accelerated the development of oil and gas in surrounding waters. They also occasionally arrested Chinese fishermen operating in these waters. One common purpose of these claimant countries is to solidify their illegal occupation and deny the existence of any disputes, let alone shelving them. Such development continuously enraged Chinese public and media, eliciting sustained attention on the Nansha disputes.

Vietnam was particularly active. In April 2003, it held a commemoration to celebrate the 28th anniversary of the "Liberation of the Nansha Islands." In June, it signed a secret pact with Indonesia on the delimitation of continental shelf under the South China Sea. In April 2004, it organized the first commercial tour to the Nansha Islands. In early 2005, it published a revised map of Vietnam, which included China's Xisha and Nansha Islands into its Danang city and Khanh Hoa Province respectively. In early 2006, Vietnam and Malaysia set up a navy hot-line to coordinate the resource development and settlement of sovereignty disputes over the islands and reefs. In April, it started another round of bidding for oil blocks in the surrounding waters, and announced cooperation with foreign corporation on building natural gas transmission pipelines in the Nansha Islands. In May 2007, it conducted an extensive geological survey in surrounding waters using a charted Russian surveying ship; a month later, it held elections of "National Assembly representatives" on some of the occupied Nansha shoals.

In April 2003, Malaysia sent four flotillas one after another totaling 11 surveying vessels to the waters around Nantong Reef ("Louisa Reef") to conduct prospecting operations; in May, it organized an international maritime challenge in waters around Danwap Reef and approved for the first time commercial tourism to Yuya Shoal by travel companies. In November 2004, it published stamps showing a Malaysian map which included Nansha islands. In August 2008, Malaysia's then Minister of Defense landed on Danwap Reef with some 80 journalists in a high-profile visit.

The Philippines made a lot of moves too. In April 2003, it celebrated the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Kalayaan Municipality in Zhongye Island and in June 2006, it started to renovate and upgrade the air strip and other facilities on that island. In March 2008, it set up satellite communication facilities on some of the occupied islands and reefs.

It should be noticed that before 2009, despite constant frictions, the situations in the South China Sea area was generally manageable. Greater complexity was brought by a series of events that happened in 2009. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) set 13 May 2009 as the deadline for the submission of claims defining extended continental shelf limits. This served as a stimulus, but the bigger factor was the readjustment of the US' Asia-Pacific policy.

In January 2009, Barack Obama was sworn in as the US president.

Shortly after taking office, the new president signaled that he would correct the Bush administration's misplaced foreign policy by shifting the US strategic priority to the Asia-Pacific region. This seemed had boosted some of the claimants' confidence in wrestling with China on the South China Sea disputes.

Between January and February 2009, the Philippine House of Representatives and Senate adopted the Territorial Sea Baselines Bill, which claims China's Huangyan Island and some islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands as Philippine territory. On May 6, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the South China Sea. They did so with no regard for the outstanding territorial and maritime delimitation disputes in these waters. On May 7, Vietnam separately submitted to the CLCS information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, claiming sovereignty over China's Xisha and Nansha Islands. In face of such a situation China decided to present a note verbale to the UN, providing its own position and the preliminary information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, to prevent further infringements on Chinese interests.

China and the US meanwhile started to experience frictions in South China Sea as reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance activities intensified. In 2009 alone, there were at least 5 incidents, of which the one about USNS Impeccable was the best known.

The year of 2010 witnessed a new turn in the US policy and it began to show an inclination to play a role on the issue. On July 23, at the Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Hanoi, Vietnam, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton openly spoke on the South China Sea issue. She said the United States "has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea." She also emphasized that claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the Convention, and that the US opposed the use or threat of force by any claimant. Hillary revealed in her memoir: "That was a carefully chosen phrase, answering the earlier Chinese assertion that its expansive territorial claims in the area constituted a 'core interest'."[20] Later, on multiple occasions, Hillary spoke on the Asia-Pacific policy of the Obama administration and on the South China Sea issue. In the meantime, the US military had increased its presence in areas in and around the South China Sea, including an increase of military drills.

China, with the aim of maintaining the general stability in the South China Sea and easing the tense atmosphere among the ASEAN countries, made consistent diplomatic efforts and achieved some progress. At the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting (10+1) held in Bali, Indonesia in July 2011, the Guidelines to Implement the DOC was adopted by China and ASEAN countries. China also obtained some bilateral understandings with the Philippines and Vietnam. However, China's diplomatic efforts failed to offset the impact brought by the American Asia-Pacific strategic adjustment, nor did Vietnam and the Philippines show restraint.

The change in the posture of the US side has made some ASEAN countries more restive. The Philippines and Vietnam step up reclamation activities on the features they occupied and frequently conducted military exercise with the US in the South China Sea. At the same time some ASEAN countries showed the tendency to group up against China, taking continued provocative activities in disregard of China's concern. In March 2011, the Philippine government disclosed plans to invest 230 million dollars in the renovation of the barracks and the airstrips on the features in the South China Sea. From June to July, a number of sensitive military exercises were held by the Philippines, Vietnam and some forces from outside of the region in the South China Sea which it has occupied. Aquino III, the President of the Philippines, ordered the official use of the "West Philippine Sea" to replace the standard name of South China Sea, with the hope of strengthening the Philippine territorial and maritime claims. What is more alarming is that such an irresponsible behavior of altering geographical names on the world map gained some kind of support by senior US officials, such as the Secretary of the State who used the term when visiting the Philippines. In March 2012, the Philippines and Vietnam made known that they agreed to make joint military exercises and maritime border patrols in the South China Sea. In April, Vietnam even dispatched some monks to settle in temples on some of the South China Sea islands.

The provocative actions of the US and some ASEAN countries gave rise to strong repercussions in China, inflaming public discontent. Chinese government has been exercising restraint on the issue, but it now is confronted with growing pressure from the public and has to reconsider how to explain and carry on the policy.

Behind the spiraling tension in South China Sea

To observe the rising temperature in the South China Sea, the Huangyan Island incident in April 2012 was like the last straw on the camel's back which touched upon the bottom line of Chinese policy and patience.

On 10 April 2012, Philippine warships launched a surprise raid on twelve Chinese fishing boats operating in the Huangyan Island lagoon, disturbing and harassing their fishing activities, and even forcibly boarded some of the boats and detained the fishermen. Photos of the Chinese fishermen being stripped to the waist and exposed to the scorching sun on the deck of the Philippine ship made media headlines in China and triggered off an outcry among Chinese public. Such a provocative action by the Philippine navy stimulated heated public debate in China which compelled, and consequently Chinese government take immediate counter measures. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made successive representations with the Charged'Affaires of the Philippine Embassy in Beijing without getting any clear response.

On 14 April 2012 China decided to requested all the Chinese fishing boats to leave temporarily from those waters, to prevent escalation of tensions. They returned about 9th of May and continued their licensed fishing operations. In the meantime, China send Marine Surveillance and Fishery Law Enforcement Command patrol ships to the waters around Huangyan Island.

Between April 15 and the middle of May 2012, Chinese government had more than once presented its position and the historic background of Huangyan Island to the international community through the media and Chinese Embassies overseas. I was the Vice Foreign Minister of China in charge of Asian affairs at that time, and tried many times to communicate with the Charged'Affaires ad interim at the Philippine Embassy in Beijing, questioning the Philippine behavior and its violation of the memorandum of understanding with China. But the Embassy gave no response. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on April 25th stating that "China thinks that the Philippines does not abide by agreements, and yet the Philippines thinks that there has never been any agreement between the two sides"[21]

Sadly, the provocations did not stop. Philippine coastguard ships once again forced their way into the lagoon and they went in and out in turns to maintain a constant presence. Some Chinese fishermen observed that there were armed personnel on board. This was a source of grave concern as there was the danger of clashes. Chinese side urged through diplomatic channels that the Philippines withdraw their armed vessels from the lagoon, but these requests were ignored. The Philippine DFA also refused any request for dialogue from the Chinese Ambassador in Manila.

This difficult situation continued for over two weeks, and by the end of May, China decided to send its own law enforcement patrol boats into the lagoon to protect the fishing boats. There was also a re-enforcement of the guarding ships outside the lagoon.

Throughout the time when these events were going on, the US, on many diplomatic occasions, reaffirmed the effectiveness of the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, and also strengthened diplomatic and military interaction with the Philippines. And yet, its approach regarding the incident was measured, refusing to respond to any hypothetical questions about possible conflict, and the US emphasized that its military maneuvers like the Balikatan war games were not targeted at China. The senior US officials such as the then Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also indicated that the US did not take any position on issues of the disputes, and had no intention of getting involved in the Huangyan Island issue.[22] Such attitudes obviously fell short of what the Philippines had expected.[23] On April 30 2012, the Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario admitted at the press conference after the US-Philippine "2+2" meeting that "the US has been clear that it does not get involved in territorial disputes like the one over Huangyan Island".[24]

The US' relative neutrality and its' distant position led the Philippines to waver about continuing to engage in provocations and prolonged confrontation with China. It realized that confrontation was not a sustainable strategy, as China was determined to strengthen control over Huangyan Island by sending surveillance ships to conduct routine patrols in waters off the coast of the Hunagyan Island. In addition, the Filipino Patrol forces, limited by the size of their ships, was overstretched during the month's standoff. Therefore, in late May, they were about to shift their position.

Meanwhile, China had been proactively seeking diplomatic solutions to ease the tension, talking to all the parties concerned.

In early June 2012, after the Philippine armed vessels left the lagoon, China started also to bring its law enforcement boats out of the lagoon. On 5 June the Philippine DFA publicly confirmed that the government vessels and boats from both sides had come out of the lagoon. Then, as the fishing season in the South China Sea was coming to an end, a routine fishing moratorium period (May 16 - August 1) was imposed in the area by China. The Chinese fishing boats, which extended their operation because of the disruption, gradually left Huangyan Island lagoon. From then on, China kept only 1-2 law enforcement ships in the nearby waters of Huangyan Island to make sure peace prevails and the situation had finally calmed down.

The facts are clear: the Philippines never owned Huangyan Island, let alone losing it. In dealing with these sudden provocations, China exercised great restraint and acted in goodwill. The focus of negotiation was how to cease the intense situation in the lagoon. China's main emphasis throughout the incident was to make sure that the fishing activities in the lagoon be left in peace. To clarify some of the stories about China not honoring an agreement about withdrawing its ships, China had never promised to leave completely from the area since the Philippines could not be trusted to refrain from making further moves. China's intention is to safeguard its territorial right of Huangyan Island by keeping a vigilant guard around its waters. However, during the incident, to manage risks and prevent conflicts,especially to make sure the Filipino armed vessels be brought out of the lagoon, China underwent negotiations through other parties including the US. That was a key step which finally allowed tranquility return to the area. But to say China deceived the US was untrue. The South China Sea disputes does not concern the US which is not a disputant.

Heating up tensions in the South China Sea, Vietnam made new moves too by adopting the law of the Sea of Vietnam on 21 June 2012. Such a "legislative move" made by Vietnam was meant to further thwart China's legitimate rights there, and draw more international attention to the disputes.[25] On the day of its adoption, China's then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhijun summoned the Vietnamese Ambassador to China Nguyen Van Tho to protest against this move. On the same day, China's Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that the State Council had approved Chinese long-planned establishment of Sansha city at prefecture level on Yongxing Island in the Xisha Islands, the place of the Administration Office for the Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha Islands. In the following months, a series of administrative, judicial and military measures were implemented to put Sansha city into function.

On 22 January 2013, the Philippines submitted to the UN the Law of the Sea tribunal a Notification and Statement of Claim in order to initiate compulsory arbitration proceedings. To this, China's Foreign Ministry stated: "The Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have abused relevant procedures and forced ahead with the arbitration, disregarding the fact that the subject matter of the arbitration involves territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation and related matters, evading the declaration on optional exceptions made by China in 2006 under Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." China therefore, decided not to acknowledge nor participate in the arbitration.

The Philippines applied for arbitration on account that its consultations and negotiations with China reached an impasse. But the truth is that ever since the Huangyan Island Incident, the Philippines refused to have any serious dialogue with China, let alone negotiations, nor did it consult the other DOC parties. As far as arbitration is concerned, China already made a declaration on optional exceptions in 2006 under Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since the Arbitration Court jurisdiction concerns sovereignty, historic rights and entitlement, China is exempted from the arbitration. Whatever the arbitration result is, it is not legally binding upon China.

Later, the standoff at Ren'ai Reef and Zhongjiannan Incident (Platform 981 Standoff) aggravated the situation. The Philippines aground a landing craft at Ren'ai Reef in 1999 on the excuse of needing repair and had never left. Now it had long become broken beyond repair, and the Philippine tried to start piling work on Ren'ai Reef in an attempt to actually occupy the reef. China certainly cannot accept that and therefore remained alert on the situation. In March 2014, China's Maritime Safety Administration intercepted the Philippine warships that were sailing towards Ren'ai Reef carrying construction supplies. A standoff followed. The Philippine encouraged media to cover the story, drawing international attention with the hope that the US would get involved. It later gave up the attempt.

In May 2014, China started Zhongjiannan drilling operation in Xisha area. This HYSY 981 rig project was completed inside the contiguous zone of China's Xisha Islands. Two drilling were performed 17 nautical miles from the south of Zhongjian Island of China's Xisha Islands from May 2 to August 15. The operation was harassed by hundreds of Vietnamese vessels. So the China Coast Guard flotilla chased and even collided with the Vietnamese vessels and the situation was intense at moments until the drilling was ended.

Under such situation in the area, Chinese side felt the need to update the infrastructure to safeguard sovereignty, enforce defense, and improve the living conditions there. From the end of 2013, China launched reclamation projects on the stationed Nansha islands and shoals. Since those features are away from international sealane, the reclamation project would not in any way affect freedom of navigation. Yet, the US and the Philippines reacted strongly by initiating a media hype and pointing fingers at China. In view of the concerns about China's reclamation efforts, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying made a detailed explanation at a press conference on 9 April 2015: Chinese government has been carrying out maintenance and construction work on some of the garrisoned Nansha islands and reefs with the main purpose of optimizing their functions, improving the living and working conditions of personnel stationed there, better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as well as better performing China's international responsibility and obligation in maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine science and research, meteorological observation, environmental protection, navigation safety, fishery production service and other areas. The relevant construction, which is reasonable, justified and lawful, is well within China's sovereignty. It does not impact or target any country.[26] Later on a number of construction projects that can provide service to the international community are being constructed, including lighthouses, automatic weather station, ocean surveillance center, marine scientific research facilities. 5 lighthouses that can facilitate navigating safety are constructed.

China's actions did not gain full understandings from its neighboring countries, and voices of concerns were emerging. Meanwhile, the US increased its involvement and used rhetoric like "too big and too fast" and "islands militarization" to pile pressure on China. It even sent out military fleet to sail close to Xisha and Nansha Islands, seen by China as serious provocations.

To many Chinese people, the US is behind the intense situation in the South China Sea. For a start, since the US launched its Pivot to Asia which was later changed into rebalance to the Asia Pacific, it has increasingly viewed China as its main rival and therefor the target. In 2013, the US military proposed a "two 60%" deployment target, which is: by 2020, the US would have deployed 60% of its warships and 60% of its overseas air force to the Asia-Pacific. Apart from this, the US also took every possible opportunity to highlight the potential challenges posed by China, dubbing it as "Anti Access/ Area Denial", and it was actively working on the Air-Sea Battle model targeting China. This heavy-handed military posture of rebalancing forces by the US has undoubtedly made the disputes and situation in the Nansha Islands and surrounding waters more complicated. Some Chinese scholars wrote about their concern that the imaginary threats and crises in the Asia-Pacific region, based on which the US is trying to adjust its strategies, might turn into a self- fulfilling prophecy.

Since 2014, the American statements regarding issues concerning China's neighborhood revealed that it was taking a posture of more open and direct intervention in the region and clearer favoritism for its allies.

On 5 February 2014, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel said at a congressional hearing that China's establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea was "a step in the wrong direction," and that "China's lack of clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims has created uncertainty, insecurity and instability in the region. It limits the prospect for achieving a mutually agreeable resolution or equitable joint development arrangements among the claimants." He said that "the international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its 9-dotted line claim."[27] In the same month, the US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert announced US' support for the Philippines in the event of a China-Philippines conflict,[28] in so far the toughest and most partial talk on the issue by any high-ranking US officials. At the Post Ministerial Conference of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Naypyidaw in August the same year, the US Secretary of State John Kerry called for a moratorium on land reclamation, building on disputed islands, and actions that might further escalate disputes.

It was evident that the US started to make a "cost-imposing" tactic against China, namely trying to employ all means at its disposal, political, diplomatic, media and military, to raise the cost of China's actions in the South China Sea, forcing China to back off and reining in "China's expansion".[29] In 2015, the US released four strategic security documents, entitled Forward Engaged and Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, respectively, all of which elaborated on the South China Sea issue, claiming that it would let China pay the cost.

The US policy changes from non-involvement to interference not only undermined itself as a supposedly unbiased party, but also deepened China's concern over the possible threat to Chinese important interest, and this in turn stimulated China to further strengthen its defense capabilities.

While the US was changing its policies, its military became more active, targeting at China by taking various provocations and measures of deterrence. It intensified surveillance and close-in reconnaissance at the Nansha Islands and its surrounding waters. The number of sorties flown by the US planes increased from about 260 in 2009 to over 1,200 in 2014.[30] Its muscle-showing moves also include sending navy ships to make "freedom of navigation operations" near Nansha Islands, and even within 12 nautical miles of Xisha Islands, an area not under dispute. For example, on 27 October 2015, the USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Zhubi Reef in the Nansha Islands; On 30 January 2016, the USS Curtis Wilbur passed near Zhongjian Island in China's undisputed Xisha territorial waters. Different from before, the US was very open about these actions. Admiral Harry B. Harris, commander of US Pacific Fleet, announced that the US would conduct more extensive and complicated patrols in the South China Sea at least "twice a quarter."[31]

The US defense forces started to take more activities aimed at deterring China. In July 2015, Admiral Scott Swift, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, joined the surveillance mission on board the ASW P-8A Poseidon to conduct close-in reconnaissance at the South China Sea. On November 5, the then United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter boarded the USS Roosevelt and spoke on the South China Sea issue, when USS Roosevelt passed through the area about 150-200 nautical miles south of the Nansha Islands and about 70 nautical miles north of Malaysia. On November 8 and 9, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near China's reconstructed islands in the South China Sea. On 15 April 2016, Carter, while on a diplomatic visit to the Philippines, boarded on the USS John C. Stennis during its navigation in the South China Sea. There were also some incidents where the US military vessels and aircraft entered the Chinese territorial waters and airspace, and claimed that they were careless mistakes.

The US has strengthened its alliance with countries near the South China Sea and its military networking. Since its Pivot-to-Asia policies, the US has endeavored to increase military presence in Darwin, Australia, Changi Naval Base, Singapore, as well as in the Philippines and Malaysia. It also enhanced cooperation with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam to conduct intelligence gathering and reconnaissance cooperation in the region, and expanding military support to the Philippines and Vietnam, helping them to improve reconnaissance, patrol control and anti-access capabilities. In March 2016, the US and the Philippines announced at their sixth annual Bilateral Security Dialogue that the US forces were allowed to use six Philippine military bases. In April 2016, the US military and the Philippine military conducted "shoulder-to-shoulder" exercises which had well-targeted missions, including "recapturing lost islands and protecting oil rigs", all based on scenarios of the South China Sea disputes.

Those activities by the US in the South China Sea, be it deployment of its own forces or military cooperation with other parties, have certainly further flared up tensions, and exaggerated the South China Sea's position on the international strategic chessboard. It started to look like that the competition between China and the US was becoming the main focus in the South China Sea issue.

Upon reflection, the US was involved and even took lead in almost all the world's confrontations and tensions after the Cold War, some of which has dragged on till today. This compels Chinese to wonder, what is the US' real intention on the South China Sea issue?

China increasing its capability in managing the situation while pushing for cooperation

It can be seen from the above that the situation in the South China Sea came to the state of where we are today is the result of the entangling effect of the actions and reactions along multiple lines of development. There is also the influence of the changes in the international and regional security environment. The elements that pushed the spiraling twists and turns include not only such considerations as sovereignty, resources and strategic security, but also tangible interests. There is also the problem of information incoherence and institutional memory loss. Moreover, the guessing game about each other's strategic intentions and policy objectives is playing a role as well. It has to be pointed out that the US, as a power from outside the region, has played a major role by coming into the issue and adjusting its policies towards the disputes since 2009. The question arises: what is the future of the South China Sea? The US is watching China's next step, while China has some deep doubts towards the US's intentions. There is a danger of intensifying confrontations and strategic misjudgments regarding the South China Sea issue and disputes on Nansha Islands.

China's position in the South China Sea has not been changed and is consistently maintained. That is to safeguard national territorial integrity and maintain regional peace and tranquility. For Chinese, the painful memory of history is not long gone and they have not forgotten that the country suffered the humiliation of foreign invasion and aggression. That is why the Chinese people and government are very sensitive about anything that is related to territorial integrity and would never allow the recurrence of territorial loss even if it's just an inch of land. This is something the outside world needs to be aware when looking at China and trying to understand China's behavior. Admittedly, there is no major external threat that can endanger China's survival or development in today's world. China adheres to the path of peaceful development and is dedicated to promoting world peace, development and cooperation. Its belief and commitment are firm and unchanged.

In his speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Meeting of the CICA Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 28 April 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated: "China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. We firmly stand by our sovereignty and rights and interests in the South China Sea, and remain committed to resolving disputes peacefully through friendly consultation and negotiation with countries directly concerned".[32] Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held many rounds of consultations with his counterparts from ASEAN countries. From the discussion results, one could see that China's proposition of "dual-track" approach, meaning disputes be resolved peacefully through negotiation between the parties directly concerned and China and ASEAN countries work together to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, has been well received and supported. Many ASEAN countries started to realize the importance of keeping the situation under control and return to the track of dialogue.

So, to be specific, China's policy objectives in the South China Sea could be read through the following angles.

First, China's fundamental policy objective for the South China Sea is to protect the security of its sovereignty and maritime rights. China's principle is not to make the first move, and act with restraint. However, when provoked, China would not hesitate to take countermeasures. The Chinese people would not tolerate any further infringement of sovereignty and rights concerning islands and shoals and the legitimate waters off them in the South China Sea, and therefore hold high expectations towards Chinese government to protect national interests. China will not give up its sovereignty stance and will increase its capabilities to control the situation and prevent any further loss. As long as no new major threat looms large, China will continue to uphold the policy of "shelving the disputes and seeking joint development". China's policy of solving the dispute through negotiations and peaceful means remains firm.

Second, China's policy also pay important attention to the freedom and safety of navigation. The South China Sea is an international pathway of strategic importance and has the busiest commercial shipping routes, allowing 40 percent of the world's ocean freight to pass through. The freedom and safety of navigation in the area are indispensable to all major economies. China relies on those routes for more than 70 to 80 percent of its trade and energy supplies. The pathway also serves as an important passage for Chinese navy to sail to the wider sea.

Third, the common denominator of China and its neighbors is regional peace and stability. China does not have an agenda or motive to seek hegemony in the region. The very reason that China exercises restraint and try to keep the disputes and differences under control is exactly for the sake of maintaining general peace in the neighboring environment. In this regard, China would continue making efforts in the following aspects: to provide and share more information with others for better understanding; to offer more public goods for the well-being and safety of all; to complete the "code of conduct" with ASEAN members for a rule based regional order. From a long-term perspective, as the biggest coastal country in the South China Sea, China should have the ability not only to defend itself but also to maintain peace in the South China Sea, and to gain a good position for seeking a negotiated settlement.

Fourth, China and the US should both care for maintaining the freedom and safety of navigation, and promoting stability and prosperity in the South China Sea area. The US has no territorial disputes with China in the south China Sea. Therefore, the two countries should avoid the trap of security dilemma and misunderstandings by engaging in dialogues, clarifying each other's intentions. China and the US need and should be able to work towards cooperation. As China is building its maritime capabilities, the wider seas and oceans in the world are increasingly important to its development as well as its global cooperation. China's vision will surely go beyond the South China Sea.

The future direction of trend would very much depend on the perceptions and choices of the parties involved. If they choose to cooperate, they may all win. If they choose to confront each other, they may only head for impasse or even conflict and no one can benefit totally.

References

[1] This article was published on the website of the American magazine Foreign Policy under the title on 11 July 2016. Its Chinese version was published on 12 July in the Chinese newspaper Global Times (Iss. 3947).

[2] This article's shorter English version was published in the website of National Interest in the US on 10 May 2016. The complete Chinese version was published in the China Newsweek (Issue No.755), 11 May 2016. The following is a longer version with some new information added into it.

[3] China's discovery of the Nansha Islands dates back to the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D). During the Tang and Song dynasties (7th-13th century), China's knowledge and development of the islands increased substantially. The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) exercised jurisdiction over the islands, and since then, China's official maps have all included the Nansha Islands.

[4] In 1939, Japan circled out a heptagon area (at 7°-12°N; 111°36'-117°30' E) in the Nansha Islands and the surrounding waters, which included Taiping Island, Nanzi Island and Beizi Island, collectively known as the Xinnan Islands. They then were under the control of "Kaohsiung City, and of the Office of the Governor-General."

[5] The Cairo Declaration, The Cairo Declaration, November 26, 1943, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 448-449. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122101.

[6] The Potsdam Proclamation, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/zcfg/t1367519.htm.

[7] Treaty of Peace with Japan, http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts volume%20136/volume-136-i-18-english.pdf.

[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and the Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, Central Party Literature Press, 1990. pp. 38-46.

[9] Aileen Sanpablo-Baviera ed., The South China Sea Disputes: Philippine Perspective, Philippine China Development Resource Centre & Philippine Association for Chinese Studies, 1992, p. 53.

[10] Xinhua news release, "The People's Republic of China Government Solemnly Declares Chinese Sovereignty over the Nansha Islands Inviolable", the People's Daily, May 30, 1956, front page.

[11] The Final Declarations of the Geneva Conference July 21, 1954". Vietnam War, Alpha History. https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/geneva-conference-1954/. Retrieved 14 January 2019.

[12] A. V. H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of Philippines: the Magsaysay Administration, Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1961, p.217. Xiao Xiqing, History of China-Philippines Diplomatic Relations, Chinese Taipei Academic Press, 1995, p. 217.

[13] http://www.china-nanhai.org.cn/events.html, accesssed August 20, 2016.

[14] Ibid. Accessed August 20, 2016.

[15] ASEAN, 1998 Ha Noi Plan of Action, Ha Noi, 15 December 1998.

[16] Department of Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China Foreign Affairs, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2000, p. 659.

[17] ASEAN, 2002 Joint Communique of 35th ASEAN Ministers' Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, 29-30 July 2002.

[18] Nguyen Hong Thao, "The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note," Ocean Development & International Law, 34:3-4, pp. 282-284. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/yzs_673193/dqzz_673197/ nanhai_673325/848051.shtml, accessed April 11,

[19] US Department of State Daily Briefing, May 10,1995. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/, Access date, 11 April 2016.

[20] Speech of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Vietnam, 23 July 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2010/07/145095.htm, accessed 14 April 2016; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices, Simon & Schuster, 2014, p. 79.

[21] Statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs on the "Scarborough Shoal" issue, 25 April 2012, http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/25/statement-of-the-department-of-foreign-affairs-on- "scarborough-shoal"-april-25-2012/

[22] Campbell's response,http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/conduct-06272012194950. html/. Access date 15 August 2016.

[23] Armed Clash in the South China Sea, http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south- china-sea/p27883. Access date 1 September 2016.

[24] Remarks With Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188982.htm. Access date 1 September 2016.

[25] http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/228456/the-law-of-the-sea-of-viet-nam.html, accessed 14 April 2016.

[26] China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: China's Reclamation Efforts on Part of its Nansha Islands are Legitimate and Legal, Xinhuanet, 9 April 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2015-04/09/ c_1114920500.htm, accessed 11 April 2016.

[27] Subcommittee Hearing: America's Future in Asia: From Rebalancing to Managing Sovereignty Disputes, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-america-s-future-asia- rebalancing-managing-sovereignty-disputes, accessed 14 April 2016.

[28] Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, 13 February 2014, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Greenert/Speech/140213%20National%20Defense%20College%20of%20the%20Philippines%20remarks%20only.pdf, accessed 14 April 2016.

[29] The challenge of responding to maritime coercion. Center for New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Maritime1_Cronin.pdf, accessed 14 April 2016.

[30] Opinions: The US Conducts Frequent Close-in Surveillance Missions to China's Three Major Construction Projects in the South China Sea," People's Daily, July 3, 2015. http://military. people.com.cn/n/2015/0703/c1011-27247801.html, accessed 14 April 2016.

[31] Ministry of National Defense spokesperson: US Pacific Command commander Harry Harris' Remarks on the South China Sea Revealed His Lack of Historical Knowledge, Xinhua, 28 January 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/28/c_1117929534.htm, accessed 14 April 2016.

[32] Xi Jinping, "Jointly Create a Better Future of Peace and Prosperity for Asia Through Dialogues and Consensus," 28 April 2016, http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t1359296.htm, accessed 1 May 2016.

Today, I've translated some key insights from an article titled "Europe Reflects: After Losing Russia, It Cannot Afford to Lose China" by Dr. Wang Wen, Executive Dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China. His article was published on guancha.cn on Tuesday. Additionally, I've invited Ren Ke, who has experience in European journalism, to share his thoughts on Xi’s Europe visit.

Wang Wen：

On Ukraine crisis

The most interesting scene occurred at the second China France Global Governance Forum, where I frankly expressed several views that are generally considered "politically highly incorrect" in France:

"I am the only scholar here who has visited the battlefield of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. After more than 70 days and 21 Russian cities, having conducted six field researches, I must tell the truth to our French friends. Western countries should not delude themselves; merely providing Ukraine with some military weapons will not defeat Russia."

"The most crucial issue now is to stop the war. China has done a lot towards this end. Apart from official mediation, many Chinese businessmen are trading in the eastern regions of Ukraine, fulfilling the daily consumer needs of the Ukrainian people. China has not provided weapons to Russia like the U.S. has to Ukraine. About 70 percents of the world's drones are made in China, but China's export controls on drones to Russia are very strict."

"China’s dealings with Russia are merely commercial trade. If it were really providing military support to Russia, the situation on the battlefield might be very different. From this perspective, China truly is the only one promoting peace and facilitating dialogue."

On Europe's economy

"Europe is more eager than ever for economic recovery, which is why the increasing return of Chinese tourists to Paris, Berlin, and Rome is a significant reason for excitement in the European cultural and tourism sectors. The fact that EU member states' economic growth in 2024 will not exceed 1.5 percent is making more Europeans realize that returning to economic growth and improving public welfare is currently Europe's urgent task."

"In the first week of May, I attended over ten events in France, Germany, and Belgium. I was relieved to hear almost no European mention 'decoupling from China,' and the alternative term 'de-risking' was also rarely mentioned. What France and Germany frequently discuss is China's 'overcapacity.'"

"China does not like this term; it does not align with the facts and is not conducive to future Sino-European cooperation."

On European elections & U.S. Presidential elections 2024

"More and more Europeans are becoming aware that after losing Russia, they cannot afford to lose China too. These reflections are prompting Europe to 'turn right' faster. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, far-right populist parties are becoming increasingly prominent. In the Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy, figures or parties typically seen as representatives of far-right populism have come to power or are participating in governance. In countries like France, Germany, Finland, Portugal, and Denmark, support for far-right populist parties continues to rise."

"Most Chinese people do not understand what it means for Europe to turn left or right, nor do they wish to interfere in European political elections. However, the desire of European right-wingers to return to their own development and promote economic growth is indeed commendable."

"What makes most Europeans uneasy is that if Trump returns to the White House in 2024, it will be a significant shock. On the other hand, it also means that Europe will continue on the path of strategic autonomy and signifies the failure of the Biden administration's attempts to align Europe against China."

"At the OECD headquarters in Paris and the Adenauer Foundation in Germany, I posed a question: Do you really believe in the so-called 'peak China theory' that China's economy will not surpass that of the United States in the future? Do European investors really want to leave China? The answers I received were all negative."

"This further convinces me that more frequent interpersonal exchanges will allow Europeans, including those in France, to move away from American thinking and return to a path of pragmatism. This is why I am cautiously optimistic about the future of Sino-European interactions."

On "the West" narrative in China & more on the Ukraine crisis

"In Chinese media, 'Europe and the United States' are often collectively referred to as 'the West.' If 'the West' is merely a term for criticism and an external force, then of course the term is valid; but if it is seen as a directive for policy, then the concept of 'the West' is actually hollow. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a 'Western policy towards China.' However, if we do not differentiate between Europe and the United States, it is easy to inadvertently merge the two, creating a unified 'Western policy towards China.'"

"In light of this, Chinese research on Europe and its countermeasures should emphasize change and guide policies towards Europe in response to immediate changes."

"For example, during this field research, I discovered that France's expectations for the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine have shifted from 'Russia must lose' to 'Ukraine cannot lose.'

In the past, many French people believed that with NATO's full support and thousands of sanctions, Russia's defeat was certain. Unexpectedly, Russia has withstood more than ten rounds of sanctions and defended against several Ukrainian counterattacks since September 2022. Currently, U.S. and NATO support is more rhetorical than substantial, and since October 2023, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shifted the focus of U.S. support. Despite French President Macron's claim to deploy ground troops, the general belief in France is that defeating Russia on the battlefield is now a distant hope, and the current goal is simply 'Ukraine cannot lose.'

However, this goal is not something that can be openly discussed; France continues to outwardly maintain full support for Ukraine, but these postures are merely to ensure that Ukraine does not suffer too harshly. From this perspective, China's room to promote peace and facilitate dialogue has grown."

"Moreover, France's complaints, criticisms, and even hatred towards China regarding its domestic business environment, human rights developments, and so-called 'support for Russia' are gradually transforming into demands for China to promote third-party cooperation and expectations for China's positive contributions."

Ren Ke, the former deputy editor-in-chief of Xinhua's Europe Regional Bureau in Brussels, shared his views on President Xi’s Europe vist:

The France-China-EU triparty meeting is one of the highlights of Xi Jinping’s Europe trip and reflected some features of China-EU relations.

It reminds me of the meeting in March 2019 during Xi’s last state visit to France. At that time, Macron invited German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to hold a four-party meeting with Xi and presented him the EU’s China strategic outlook, which defined China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival at the same time.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was invited by Macron this time, but Scholz declined it. Macron wanted to show that the EU talks to China with one voice, however, France and Germany are not the same in their economic policies toward China. During the meeting, Macron and Ursula von der Leyen raised the “over-capacity” of China’s green products and the “fair competition” between European and Chinese companies, dovetailing with Washington’s approach.

It was France that suggested initiating an anti-subsidy investigation against China’s electric vehicles, while Germany is quite hesitant to do so because it fears China’s retaliations against its cars sold in China. The France-China-EU meeting was tougher than the China-Germany meeting in April. Scholz’s China trip last month was dominated by topics of investment, cooperation, businesses, etc..

Due to the differences among member states and the EU’s comprehensive decision-making process, China feels easier to deal with member states directly rather than the EU, especially in bilateral issues. However, China has reiterated many times that it DOES want a united Europe when it comes to global issues – only a strong and united European Union can better play a role in safeguarding a multipolar international order, in addressing international and regional issues and issues like climate change and others.

Macron said recently that the international situation needs Euro-Chinese dialogue more than ever. It’s true, and Europe needs China more than ever, because China can play a positive role in mediating an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and China is, to some extent, leading in some future technologies and industries.

Another reason, perhaps the most urgent one, is that both the EU and China should prepare for a possible return of Donald Trump as the next U.S. president. In that case, the European strategic autonomy that Macron always calls for will become more important and meaningful.

1. Secretary Blinken's visit to China

1) Decorative plants

Chinese President Xi Jinping met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Friday afternoon. This marked Blinken's second visit to China within a year, his previous visit being in June of the prior year, during which lotus flowers adorned the meeting room.

This time, however, Chinese netizens noted that the decorative plants were variegated leaf crotons. Although I'm no expert in botany—indeed, it was my weakest subject in middle school—I did verify through online photos that the plants resembled variegated leaf crotons.

It is said that the lotus symbolizes a love for peace, while the variegated leaf croton suggests something elusive or complex, echoing a common critique by China regarding U.S. actions in bilateral relations: "The U.S. should be trustworthy and resolute in action, not saying one thing and doing another."

While I believe it is a Chinese custom to imbue plants with symbolic meanings to convey goodwill, I am skeptical that this practice is a standard tactic in diplomacy. Instead, it appears to be a topic of interest among observers of Chinese foreign policy, despite the myriad other ways these nations communicate.

2) Taylor Swift & Dou Wei

Before leaving Beijing, Blinken visited a local record store, where he purchased an album by Taylor Swift and one by the legendary Chinese rock musician Dou Wei.

Initially, when I saw Blinken attending a Chinese Basketball Association game in Shanghai during this trip, I thought it might signal a shift towards "sports diplomacy," contrasting with Yellen's earlier "culinary diplomacy" in China. However, I overlooked Blinken's interest in music. His itinerary in China, which included sampling local snacks in Shanghai and engaging in sports and music, was diverse and multifaceted. Thus, it's challenging to encapsulate the softer aspects of his visit with a single term.

Additionally, some have questioned why Blinken didn't purchase Taylor Swift's album in the United States, opting instead to buy it in China. On Chinese social media, there's speculation that Blinken's purchase was a symbolic gesture, suggesting that while China's hard power may be increasingly comparable to that of the U.S., there is still a significant gap in soft power. While it's unclear whether Blinken intended to send this message, he did comment during the purchase that the album was "a successful American export,” according to a report by Reuters. You can also say it's an example of efforts to improve "people-to-people" exchanges.

3) Overcapacity

Politicians from both the U.S. and China are discussing the "overcapacity" issue now and numerous Chinese media outlets and experts have published comments and analyses on the issue. I've tried to summarize the perspectives from Chinese media and experts, which I believe can be encapsulated as follows: Many argue that "overcapacity" can emerge at different times and be viewed from various perspectives globally. (See a piece penned by Liu Ying, a research fellow of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies). The U.S. accusation of Chinese overcapacity is seen as an attempt to politicize the issue, and China rejects being singled out for overcapacity at this time. China believes that if it is to be criticized for overcapacity, then many other countries, including the U.S., also face similar issues, making such critiques unfair. The international success of Chinese products, such as electric vehicles, is seen as a manifestation of China's competitive advantage.

Furthermore, prominent Chinese scholar Zheng Yongnian suggests in a recent article which was published on WeChat that "China should not shy away from discussing the impact of its exports on some developing nations. Although the notion that not only Western countries but also emerging economies like Brazil, India, and Mexico are aligning against China may be exaggerated, theoretically and practically, China’s exports due to its comparative advantages in certain industries do indeed exert influence and pressure on these economies, at least in some sectors. In response, China needs to adopt more open policies towards these countries and import more of their competitively advantageous products."

2. Elon Musk's visit to China

Yesterday afternoon, I was browsing videos on my phone when I came across reports of Elon Musk's sudden visit to China. Later that evening, I saw the most important program on TV is 新闻联播 Xīnwén Liánbō/News Simulcast showing Chinese Premier Li Qiang meeting with Musk, and I couldn't help but marvel at how quickly Musk and the Chinese government arranged this visit.

Today, on China's internet, many are sharing news that some local driving bans on Tesla are about to be lifted. This coincided with Musk's arrival in China on Saturday, when a Chinese industrial association published a list of 76 models of intelligent connected vehicles that meet the country's auto data security requirements, including those from BYD and Tesla.

Elon Musk in China: Tesla passes data security assessment that could pave way for lifting of bars to its cars’ movements -- SCMP

The American carmaker has been assessed by the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM), a government-backed industry consortium, and given the all-clear for its protection of privacy in handling of personal data, which encompass facial recognition, and the collection and processing of cockpit data.

The result of the review on Sunday evening coincides with CEO Elon Musk’s visit to Beijing where he met Chinese Premier Li Qiang to discuss Tesla’s operations in the world’s largest electric vehicle (EV) market.

Tesla said in a statement that the endorsement of its Model 3 and Model Y vehicles assembled at the Shanghai Giga factory would lead to an easing of restrictions on its cars’ access to certain state-backed entities, airports and motorways.

......

The endorsement also bodes well for the approval of Tesla’s Full Self-Driving (FSD) system, its autonomous driving software, in China.

During his meeting with Musk on Sunday, Premier Li said Tesla’s operations in China represented a successful example of an economic tie-up between China and the US as he encouraged more cooperation between the two countries.

The English headline from Xinhua about this news prominently featured Tesla and it did not mention other car brands that passed this assessment.

China publishes list of intelligent cars compliant with data security requirements, Tesla included -- Xinhua

A Chinese industrial association has published a list of 76 models of intelligent connected vehicles that meet the country's auto data security requirements, including those from BYD and Tesla.

My friend has indeed encountered situations at some local government facilities in China where driving a Tesla was not permitted entry. The security guards often don’t explain the reason, but many speculate it’s due to concerns about the potential risk of Tesla's data being leaked outside of China. Additionally, when I test-drove a Tesla, the salesperson informed me that due to Chinese government policies, the full capabilities of Tesla’s FSD system, such as navigating through traffic lights, are not available in China.

I think that if Tesla could not only gain access to previously restricted government sites but also receive full approval for its FSD system, it would be beneficial both for Tesla and China. China is a huge market for Tesla, and as China is currently ascending in the international electric vehicle market, fully liberalizing its autonomous driving policies could spur domestic electric vehicle companies to intensify their efforts in this area.

Moreover, the complex road conditions in China (which anyone who has driven in China would understand) might also provide an unparalleled wealth of data for the development of autonomous driving systems, potentially enhancing the intelligence of related products? And this would enhance their competitive edge internationally, which I mentioned earlier.

I welcome your thoughts and comments on this issue.

During Scholz's visit, President Xi and Premier Li Qiang met and held talks with him to exchange views on bilateral relations and issues of common concern. One of the focuses this time undoubtedly is China's response to the issue of overcapacity. Both Xi and Li mentioned this in their meetings with Scholz, respectively.

Xi commented on the claims regarding "overcapacity" during his meeting with Scholz, saying:

中国出口电动汽车、锂电池、光伏产品等，不仅丰富了全球供给，缓解了全球通胀压力，也为全球应对气候变化和绿色低碳转型作出巨大贡献。

China's export of electric vehicles, lithium batteries and photovoltaic products has not only enriched global supply and eased global inflationary pressure, but also made important contribution to the global response to climate change and the green and low-carbon transition.

Li also mentioned this when he met with Scholz:

以市场眼光看，产能多少是由供需关系决定的，供需平衡是相对的，不平衡是普遍的，适度的产大于需有利于充分竞争和优胜劣汰.......中国的新能源产业优势是靠真本事获得的，是通过充分的市场竞争塑造的，而不是靠政府补贴形成的。

From a market viewpoint, the amount of production capacity is determined by the relationship between supply and demand, and having production moderately greater than demand is conducive to full market competition and promoting the survival of the fittest in the market......China's new-energy industry has gained advantages through self-improvement and sufficient market competition, rather than by government subsidies.

Today's piece include the translation of some key paragraphs from two popular WeChat blog posts on Scholz's recent visit to China, both have received more than 100,000 clicks (“10万+”) from readers in China, a remarkable feat for articles published on WeChat blogs.

Additionally, I've invited Ren Ke, a senior journalist from Xinhua News Agency, to share his insights on this visit. Ren has extensive experience in Europe, from 2017 to 2021, he served as a Xinhua correspondent in Berlin, focusing on Germany's domestic politics and foreign policies. From 2021 to 2023, Ren was the deputy editor-in-chief of Xinhua's Europe Regional Bureau in Brussels and a correspondent covering EU institutions. Notably, in February 2022, Ren was among the first Chinese correspondents to report on the Russia-Ukraine conflict after traveling to Ukraine.

The first piece is from an article on the independent Wechat blog, Zhengshitang2019 (政事堂2019), dated April 16.

Scholz, Here He Comes Again -- Zhengshitang2019, April 16 朔尔茨，他又来了

Scholz visits China again, and he has become the first Western leader to make a second visit to Beijing after the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). This move signifies Germany returning to its traditional diplomatic pattern with China.

Since Angela Merkel's sudden shift from a tough stance on China to a pro-China stance in 2006, her every visit to Beijing has been followed by a visit to another Chinese city closely linked to German trade and commerce once every year.

The visit of the German leader has set a precedent for other European leaders. The once frozen relations between China and Europe are set to accelerate their recovery.

Of course, Scholz won't return empty-handed either.

Since the "Two Sessions" earlier this year, "equipment renewal" has become a major task for governments at all levels and central enterprises, with various reports being submitted.

Different from the previous years' focus on domestic substitution mainly on the consumption end, this round of "equipment renewal" primarily targets the production end, and the most advanced equipment in global production comes from none other than Germany, known for its rigor.

Coincidentally, besides a few traditional key enterprises in China-German relations, Scholz has brought along new players from Germany's chemical, electronic, and machinery industries, perfectly matching the national policies China is about to implement, giving the impression of bringing a bid team to compete for the "equipment renewal" project.

The second piece is from an article written by Hu Xijin, the former editor-in-chief of Global Times. The piece was published on his WeChat blog Huxijinguancha (胡锡进观察), dated April 15.

Why is the German Chancellor making a three-day "run through China" so eagerly? -- Huxijinguancha, April 15 德国总理利用三天“跑遍中国”，这么“拼”图啥？

In November 2022, when China's epidemic prevention and control measures were gradually being relaxed, Scholz became the first leader of the Group of Seven (G7) countries to visit China. Less than a year and a half later, his second visit to China has already signaled his strategic choice.

However, that's not enough for him. Through his visits to China, he needs to show German officials and the public, along with the moving camera, what China looks like today and promote consensus on strengthening economic ties with China.

German general elections are held every four years, and new elections will come a little over a year later. Germany's economic recovery has been lukewarm, and its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been extensive but so far ineffective. If he can persuade China to make some move valuable to Germany regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict during this visit., this will be widely seen as a boon for Scholz's bid for re-election.

In the West, nothing is more important than elections, and when Scholz ties the fate of the next election to his achievements in diplomacy with China, it shows that China has been placed at the forefront of his interests. In matters as crucial as these, there is no room for anything but absolute sincerity and substantial achievement (in his visit to China).

......

Competition exists between Europe and China in various fields such as EVs and solar panels, but in which world does competition not exist? While Germans are clamoring for "de-risking" with China, they are also increasing their investments in the Chinese market. The slogan of "de-risking" contains both genuine concerns and a strategy for bargaining with China under pressure from U.S. "decoupling."

In conclusion, both Scholz and Macron are advocates of developing relations with China. As the most influential figures in Europe, their actions represent their stance on how to deal with China. We see a huge gap in the stance towards China between the United States and Europe. China's strategic initiative is not achieved through maneuvering; it is the inevitable result of China's real achievements and its changing face of economic development.

The third piece was written by Ren Ke. In an article titled "Downplaying value differences, Scholz’s visit shows consistency of Germany-China ties," Ren shares his views on Scholz's visit to China:

The anticipation surrounding German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's visit to China was met with a warm reception. The visit highlighted the steadfast nature of China-Germany relations. This stability and consistency not only benefit both countries, but also extends to the European Union and the global economic recovery.

In many ways, Scholz's visit echoes the trajectory of Germany-China relations over the past decade, particularly during Angela Merkel's tenure as chancellor. Merkel's frequent visits to China underscored a significant deepening of economic and political ties between Berlin and Beijing. Despite differences in political values, she maintained that dialogue and cooperation between Germany and China should persist.

Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with visiting German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Beijing, capital of China, Sept. 6, 2019. (Xinhua)

While relations have remained relatively stable over the past decade, recent years have seen some challenges. Since the current coalition government took office in late 2021, Germany has placed increased emphasis on values in its foreign policies. Some politicians have criticized China on various fronts, accusing China of threatening the Western liberal and democratic systems and lifestyles, and advocating for “de-risking” by reducing economic dependency upon China and strengthening closer ties with like-minded partners.

The change does have reasons. The COVID-19 pandemic blocked exchanges and triggered crises and protectionism. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict broke the European security framework and caused rising energy costs and economic hardships in Europe but tied the trans-Atlantic alliance closer than ever since the end of the Cold War.

As a result of all these reasons, Germany is paying the price. The German economy now has one of the worst performances among the world’s major economies. Many people are unsatisfied with the government in boosting the economy, addressing livelihood and managing migration, leading to a series of large-scale demonstrations and strikes.

Germany’s “de-risking” policies have led to the drops of China-Germany imports and exports. The policies are harmful in alleviating the challenges and pressures Germany is facing now.

The German economy is highly export-oriented and benefits from China's huge market, complete supply chains and abundant labor resources. But “de-risking” has pushed up the costs of German companies, which to some extent has contributed to de-industrialization in Germany.

Fortunately, many German giant companies are not “de-risking” or shifting away from China, instead, they keep expanding their presence, including BASF in Guangdong, BMW in Liaoning, Bosch in Chongqing’s hydrogen enterprise that Scholz visited this time, and Volkswagen in many cities nationwide.

Scholz's focus during the visit was primarily on issues such as overproduction and subsidies in the electric vehicle sector, fair competition, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, rather than political values that some German politicians often stress. The business delegation with him indicated that both German political and economic circles are willing to do more business in China, showing that the pragmatic mainstream in German politics has gained some upper hand in its China policies.

The stability and consistency of China-Germany relations will not only benefit the two countries with economic complementarity, but also the whole EU as Germany remains the leading economy and one of the dual powers along with France in the bloc.

China and Germany are the world’s second and third largest economies respectively, and both are top exporters, their cooperation is also in the interests of the recovery of the world economy, not to mention addressing climate change, strengthening global governance, finding ways for peace in Ukraine, the Middle East, among others.

Today's piece features an article by Jerry Grey, a former British police officer, about Australia's absence from the Boao Forum recently held in China (some regarded it as the “Asian Davos”).

This article was initially published on Pearls and Irritations, an independent Australian public policy journal founded by John Menadue, who has served many key roles in the Australian government, including the head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet from 1974 to 1976 and Australian Ambassador to Japan from 1977 to 1980.

I found much of the content in this article to be very thought-provoking, and with John's permission, I am sharing it here.

Globally, there are some hugely positive steps taking place right now, such as a meeting between Xi Jinping and a large delegation of US business and academic leaders, the arrival in Beijing of the Dutch Prime Minister, the Nauruan PM, and the Sri Lankan PM both also met with Xi and the Dominican Republic’s PM also had a state reception in Beijing.

But there is a worrying development too. Anyone paying attention might note that Australia is fundamentally absent from this week’s Boao Forum. Outside the Region, little is known about a small town called Boao on China’s Hainan island province but it’s a remarkably important place for a few days of each year when thousands of delegates arrive from dozens of countries, usually Asian but always some from different regions.

The forum has not only been ignored totally by the ABC, it appears the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) too. If they are there, there is no mention of it on DFAT’s web page; the last article related to this Forum was Tim Ayres announcing he would attend last year. One must wonder if Australia wants to be part of the Region or prefers something else, since the only media mention of Australia’s involvement in this important regional forum is a Global Times interview with the CEO of Fortescue Mining.

Given the importance of the reset in the relationship, an absent, or low-key Australia is confusing. Boao was initially formed, with Australia as one of the key players and founding members, as an “Asian Davos”, it is strange that the Australian government and Australian media would ignore this event and some might interpret this as a telling moment in the Sino-Australian relationship.

Whilst not getting the same coverage as Davos might, the Forum is significant. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, former Cambodian prime minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen, Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization Daren Tang, and Secretary-General of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECDE) Mathias Cormann were all in attendance.

The theme of “Asia and the World: Common Challenges, Shared Responsibilities” is a good one. The world sits on the edge of conflict, tensions are high and there are several hotspots. On top of that global issues such as climate change and the developments of AI with the promotion of peace and prosperity are on the agenda for the four-day conference.

Prosperity and even peace are placed at risk by predatory practices, this is why we have international rules and international bodies to oversee them. However, as Danilo Turk, the former President of Slovenia said from the Forum: “It is widely known that sanctions do not achieve the intended results, but instead produce negative consequences”. Another indicator that politicians want one thing but business leaders want something else.

Proof of this, comes in the form of the Netherlands’ PM visiting for behind closed doors discussions at the highest possible level, as well as US Semiconductor manufacturer, Nvidia, entering into a business agreement with BYD, Xpeng and other NEV manufacturers to supply chips for both factory automation and autonomous vehicles. China wants their chips and they want China’s business.

This will no doubt please Dino Ortranto, Fortescue’s CEO as more vehicle construction means more steel and more steel means, at least for the time being, more Australian dirt in the form of iron ore will be needed. These things happen on the sidelines of these forums and are why no regional economy should want to miss them.

Inside the conference rooms of Boao delegates are discussing the threats and challenges posed by AI. China is currently the largest producer of research papers into AI and has filed more patents than the rest of the world combined. China is also a country that has dug deeply into the field and has tasked academics, rather than politicians, to create draft legislation (in Chinese). Western media might not like the proposed rules but Chinese people do and, of course, so do the academics. The problem for Western media is that, as usual in China, they protect the people using technology as much as the people creating it. All of this is in keeping with Australian research too, Professor James Laurenceson, of Sydney’s UTS reported this several years ago, there is far more for Australia to gain by cooperating with China in this field than it has to lose. He also pointed out in the same paper that China’s military was not the main developer, in fact, only 6% of all the papers had a military connection.

Another aspect of the Forum is China’s acknowledgement of its own diversification through a marked shift in China’s exports. This shift takes two forms, one is the transition from mass-produced, low-tech products to a high-tech environment, specifically with the “big three”: Photovoltaics; Lithium-ion batteries; and New Energy Vehicles. All things Australia could use. The other is the shift in exports to “Global South Countries”. The Dean of Peking University, Lin Yifu has said: “China will remain the primary driver of global economic growth”, this sentiment was echoed by Ajay Banga, the President of the World Bank in another Forum taking place right now in Beijing; the China Development Forum.

There are always risks doing business with China, but no more than there are doing business with any other major player any field. The benefits for Australia’s economy in maintaining a good relationship with China far outweigh the risks of ignoring the largest customer, largest supplier and the leader of the field in all the technologies Australia may need to survive impending challenges. Now isn’t the time to be moving away from China.

Jerry Grey

Jerry Grey is a former British Police officer who was a general manager in a multi-national security company based in Australia for 17 years. He has lived, worked, travelled extensively and studied in China for almost two decades. He holds a Master Degree in cross cultural change management. Jerry Grey is a freelance writer living in Southern China's Guangdong province.

Subscribe now

It is hoped that the United States will abide by the basic norms of market economy including fair competition and open cooperation, refrain from turning economic and trade issues into political or security issues, and view the issue of production capacity objectively and dialectically from a market-oriented and global perspective, Li said.

On Sunday afternoon, the “玉渊谭天” "Yuyuan Tantian" Weibo account (Chinese version of "X") released a post mentioning the details of Janet Yellen's dinner on arriving in Beijing on Saturday night. The cooking techniques of Sichuan cuisine are used as a metaphor to emphasize the importance of grasping the direction of China-U.S. relations. Many China watchers believe that China Media Group (CMG) manages "Yuyuan Tantian."

Exclusive: Yellen learns about Chinese history in a Sichuan cuisine restaurant -- Yuyuan Tantian 独家：#耶伦在四川餐厅了解中国历史#

4月6日晚，美国财政部长耶伦抵达北京，直奔老川办餐厅。#美国官员吃中国菜更要看中国史#，谭主听餐厅的工作人员说，是耶伦主动和美方工作人员提要吃川菜。

On the evening of April 6 (Saturday), U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen arrived in Beijing and went directly to Lao Sichuan Restaurant (老川办餐厅). According to the restaurant staff, the American officials, when dining on Chinese cuisine, were even more inclined to delve into Chinese history and it was Yellen who first suggested having Sichuan cuisine to her American colleagues.

就餐前，餐厅工作人员给耶伦介绍了发掘出土于四川广汉的三星堆文物，以及1000多年前的宋瓷器，并赠送了中国的非物质文化遗产蜀绣。随后耶伦也回赠了刻有她名字的美国财政部纪念章。根据美媒报道，耶伦此前在美国就经常在一家中餐馆吃一道名为“四川虾”（Szechuan shrimp）的菜。这一次，耶伦也算是吃到了正宗的川菜。

Before dining, the restaurant staff introduced Yellen to the Sanxingdui (三星堆) artifacts excavated in Guanghan, Sichuan, and Song dynasty porcelain from more than 1000 years ago. Yellen was also presented with Shu embroidery (蜀绣), an intangible cultural heritage. She gave a commemorative medal from the U.S. Treasury Department engraved with her name, as a gift exchange. According to U.S. media, Yellen had often enjoyed a dish called "Szechuan shrimp" at a Chinese restaurant in America. This time, she got to taste authentic Sichuan cuisine.

中国菜考验火候，川菜尤其是，无论是干煸还是小炒，都需要掌握火候。对于耶伦来说，美方需要掌握好中美关系的火候，确保中美关系不偏航、不失速、不相撞，在沟通与互动中，探索中美正确相处之道。

Chinese cuisine puts heat control to the test, especially true with Sichuan style - whether it be dry-fried or stir-fried. It is important for the U.S. to manage the intricacies of "heat" in China-U.S. mutual relations, and to ensure that there being no veering off course, slowing down, or collision. It remains important to explore the right way through communication and interaction.

In today's piece, we selected and translated the key paragraphs of the top three trending WeChat blog posts on Yellen's visit to China in the past three days. They were posted on April 4, 5 and 6 and they each generated more than 100,000 clicks (“10万+”), a remarkable feat for articles published on WeChat blogs.

By the way, for those interested in exploring a variety of Chinese cuisines at the finest restaurants in Beijing, I highly recommend reaching out to Yang Liu. Yang is the founder of Beijing Channel and the chairman of the "Provincial Cuisine Club," offering valuable insights and recommendations.

The first post is from an independent WeChat blog, Zhengshitang2019 (政事堂2019), which is often thought to represent the interest of China's capital elites, but has a large follower base nonetheless. It argues that Yellen's attention on new energy vehicles (NEVs), lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, the three major tech-intensive green products, or 新三样 the "new three" of excess capacity in China spells America's concerns over forthcoming meetings between Chinese and the European officials, and consequently the U.S.'s efforts to pressure China on issues that have preoccupied America's allies.

"What issues does Yellen want to discuss during her visit to China -- Zhengshitang2019, April 4 耶伦过来谈什么？

According to the division of roles between the "good cop" and "bad cop," Yellen, who plays the "good cop," is expected to showcase the most progress in repairing relations between China and the United States during this round. However, Yellen's dovish stance is only relative within the Biden administration. Before this visit, Yellen abruptly launched a severe criticism of China's new energy vehicles (NEVs), lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, the three major tech-intensive green products, or 新三样 the "new three" of excess capacity—drawing global media attention. Logically, Yellen, assigned the role of "good cop," should not act this way. Abnormal behavior often indicates something unusual, thus, this should be a key focus in analyzing Yellen's visit.

Firstly, the "new three" fall under the purview of the U.S. Commerce Secretary and the U.S. Trade Representative, not Yellen, who is overstepping her duties by making bold statements on matters outside her sphere, reminiscent of the proverb of "a dog trying to catch mice" (Note: Yellen, the Treasury Secretary, is responsible for taxation, fiscal policies, national debt, minting, financial institutions, and financial crimes, roughly equivalent to a Deputy Prime Minister in charge of finance and banking in China).

Secondly, the "new three" represent China's national policy, with upstream companies classified at a systemic security level, areas where China cannot afford to make concessions. As a pioneer in thawing China-U.S. relations, Yellen's role is to pave the way for Blinken's subsequent visit, not to demand concessions in areas where China will not budge.

Thirdly, the interest groups behind the "new three" hold no political status in the United States. Even Elon Musk does not have the standing to meet with Biden alongside other traditional automakers. These sectors lack the power to squeeze into the domain of China-U.S. rivalry or negotiations.

Based on these points, it can be surmised that Yellen's hawkish stance before the visit was a feint, with ulterior motives. The administration aims to rally allies against China by voicing concerns over the "new three," a matter of great concern to its European allies, as part of a consistent foreign policy strategy since Biden took office, especially as China is preparing for a series of upcoming China-Europe leadership meetings.

The second post is from DeDeDe of the City (城市的地得), a Chengdu-based WeChat blog that mostly writes about Chinese city life and social news. It posits that the appearance of details about Yellen's meal in Chinese official media platforms bespeak a long-lost way of reporting that renders foreign officials more likeable to the Chinese public. However, the article ends on a pessimistic note about the reticence of those present at Yellen's meal.

Yellen's visit to China: Shift in Chinese public opinion unnoticed -- DeDeDe of the City, April 5 耶伦访华：舆论悄然改变

Yellen's first stop was Guangzhou, where the Deputy Minister of Finance from China greeted her at the airport. This would be standard practice, but in the current discouraging atmosphere of China-U.S. relations, it was considered very warm hospitality.

A news media believed to have an official background, Yuyuan Tantian (玉渊谭天), covered and live-streamed the event up close, which was undoubtedly a deliberate arrangement. In reality, their on-site reports do not contain much information, essentially amounting to the announcement that Yellen has disembarked from the plane. Media outlets like the Global Times began to prominently report on Yellen's visit to Guangzhou, focusing on details such as what she ate for her first meal, which dishes she ordered, and noting that she has mastered the use of chopsticks.

These long-absent details used to be a common way for the media to report on foreign dignitaries, as well as a way for the general public to learn about the world. However, such reports have become rare in recent years as coverage of foreign dignitaries has generally cooled off. This is especially true for U.S. officials, who are treated with caution.

The last time Yellen visited China, her meal with several Chinese female economists and entrepreneurs sparked a moderate online "human flesh search" (collective efforts of Chinese netizens to glean information about people using all possible means).

It's noteworthy that none of the participants in the meal spoke out about their impressions afterward or discussed what was talked about during the meal, as if that would touch on a taboo. In such an atmosphere, it's understandable that the visit could hardly be considered fruitful.

This time, Yellen's visit to China has indeed created quite a scene, though not that sizable. Although it's too early to talk about achieving significant outcomes (and it's unlikely that there will be any breakthroughs), there is clearly an expectation from China regarding her visit.

The third post is from the WeChat blog of Global Times, an English-language Chinese newspaper under the People's Daily. It makes a metaphor of the cooking in Yellen's Sichuan meal, and argues for greater consistency between America's words and deeds in China-U.S. relations, before offering understanding and reconciliation over past fractures.

Food for thought on Yellen's table at Washington -- Global Times, April 6 耶伦访华的这个细节，值得华盛顿深思

Washington may very well engross itself in one thought-provoking detail during Yellen's visit to Beijing. Yellen is seen frequenting little diners, mastering chopsticks, or sending welcoming gestures to the Chinese public. Odds are that Washington wants to be seen warming up to the Chinese people. However, the Chinese public simply do not buy this stock of American goods. Many Chinese remain vocal in their criticism of Washington. The Chinese feel that they have wasted their trust, with America's inconsistency between words and deeds. No pains, no gains - many Chinese now indeed see their peers across the Pacific with greater clarity. If the US really wants to engage itself in some serious signaling with China, studying public opinion, as such, would be a worthy and true case-in-point.。

We witness, including American media, a near-consensus of global public opinion leaning positively towards the communication and dialogue between China and the U.S.. While there are underlying concerns, the predominant sentiment is hope for stability and improvement in China-U.S. relations. Many of the dialogue mechanisms between China and the U.S. have been actively initiated and restored by the American side, indicating an acknowledgment from the U.S. that complete decoupling from China is not feasible, as America cannot afford the costs of comprehensive conflict with China. "When China and America cooperate, both benefit; when they fight, both suffer" – this is not an empty slogan, but a necessity rather than a choice for both parties involved. Elevating America's cost in suppressing China is never the aim of China's development, but shall remain a consequence necessarily entailed. This includes intertwined interests between China and the U.S., as well as those between China and the rest of the world.

In the latest conversation with President Biden, President Xi Jinping comprehensively stressed several key principles in China-U.S. relations this year: valuing peace, prioritizing stability, and upholding credibility. Among these, "upholding credibility" not only signifies expectations for China-US relations, but also serves as a demand on the U.S., urging it to fulfill commitments through actions. It is necessary to remind Washington that if the relatively pragmatic aspects of current U.S. policies towards China are merely utilitarian or opportunistic, the damage inflicted on mutual trust between China and the U.S. will be long-lasting. Following Janet Yellen's visit to China, we hope to see America's concrete actions that truly embody the principle of "upholding credibility."

Bonus: This is the menu allegedly ordered by Janet Yellen at the Sichuan cuisine restaurant on Saturday, translated by GRR.

Lao Sichuan Restaurant

Menu for Yellen

Stir-fried water spinach

Loofah tips salad with Sichuan peppercorn

Water-boiled beef

Spinach salad with nuts

Dry-sautéed green beans

Mapo tofu

Sichuan cold noodles

Northern Sichuan Liangfen (starch jelly)

Smashed cucumber with sesame oil and garlic

Twice-cooked pork slices

Dandan noodles

Zhong dumplings in a spicy sauce

Subscribe now

The ten questions and answers I selected for translation include: China-Russia Relations, Russia-Ukraine conflict, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, Taiwan, South China Sea, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Korean Peninsula issue, Artificial intelligence and Global South.

For those who are curious to learn about the information about the candidate for China's next foreign minister, you can skip this piece because it was not mentioned in today's press release.

As of now, Ginger River Review has published three articles about the on-going Two Sessions, which are expected to conclude on Monday next week:

Agenda, daily schedule of Two Sessions 2024

Full-text & highlights of government work report

Xi Jinping's "new quality productive forces": Meaning, significance, and implementation

Among them, on the new buzzword of 新质生产力 new quality productive forces, Ferenc Banhidi, a Hungarian economist, sent me in his understanding as follows and he allows me to share it here:

In my simplified interpretation 新质生产力 new quality productive forces means defying government stimulus program (see Yu Yongding’s proposal), defying radical reform measures (complete transformation of hukou and land ownership system) concentration on supply side like industrial upgrade or increase Total Factor Productivity (TFP). For Hungarians it would important, that the government supports not only FDI coming to China, but outward FDI coming from China to the outside world. (See the huge investment of CATL and BYD Hungary)

With your permissions, I am happy to share more readers' insightful comments in this newsletter from time to time in the future.

As mentioned above, today's piece is the fourth newsletter focused on the Two Sessions that we've updated in the past three days. Producing this series is quite a hustle, especially considering that it's just me and a few university interns working on these.

If you happened to have read our recent content over the past few days and found it valuable, please consider buying me a coffee or making a donation via PayPal. I promise you that any donations made will go directly to these university interns who have dedicated their time to contribute to our Two Sessions series. Thank you for your support!

1.China-Russia relations

RIA Novosti correspondent: This year is the 75th anniversary of Russia-China relations. Over the years, our bilateral relations have reached an unprecedented level. In your opinion, what is the most effective way the potential of Russia-China cooperation under the current conditions of global transformation in international relations?

Wang Yi: Under the strategic guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Putin, our comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era has maintained sound and steady at a high level. Political mutual trust, mutually beneficial cooperation are deepening and people-to-people exchanges are thriving. Last year, two-way trade reached a record 240 billion U.S. dollars, already meeting the target of 200 billion U.S. dollars ahead of schedule. Russian natural gas is available to thousands of Chinese households and Chinese cars are driving on the streets of Russia, which fully demonstrates the strong resilience and broad prospects of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.

Safeguarding and advancing China-Russia relations is the strategic choice made by two country base on our people’s fundamental interests and is the natural requirement to follow the underlying global trends. As major countries in the world, permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia have fostered a new model of major-country relations completely different from the old cold war era. We stay committed to good neighborliness and amity and deepened comprehensive strategic coordination on the basis of non-alliance, non-confrontation and non-targeting of any third party. In today’s world, hegemony gains no support, division has no future, major-countries should not confront and the Cold War must not be repeated. The China-Russia relations follows the trend of of global multi-polarity and the democratization of international relations, which is of great value to uphold international strategic stability, to promote sound interactions between the world’s major countries and cooperation among emerging major countries.

This year is the 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations, and the two sides will jointly hold the Year of China-Russia Culture, presenting new opportunities for the development of bilateral relations. China is ready to work with Russia to further foster new drivers for expanding mutually beneficial cooperation and consolidate the the friendship between our peoples. Russia is in the chair of BRICS this year, and China will assume the presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the second half of this year. The two sides will strengthen international multilateral coordination, practice true multilateralism, safeguard the international system with the United Nations at its core, and safeguard regional and global security and stability.

2.Russia-Ukraine conflict

Reporter from CGTN: Currently the Ukraine crisis has been going on for more than two years, and at the Munich Security Conference last month you talked about what China has done is to promote peace, but at the same time, saying that the conditions are not right to move forward with a peace on the negotiate table. When do you think the conditions will be right and what are you looking for to continue this pursuit of peace? Thank you.

Wang Yi: On the Ukraine issue, China has always maintained an objective and impartial position and has called for talks to achieve peace. President Xi Jinping has personally engaged in in-depth communication with the leaders of various countries, including Russia and Ukraine. China has issued a position paper on this issue and sent special envoys to promote shuttle diplomacy; and everything we have done has been directed towards a single goal, namely, to pave the way for peace talks to end the conflict.

During the recent visit to the Munich Security Conference, we strongly felt that more and more people were beginning to worry about the "lose-lose" consequences of the Ukraine Crisis and were willing to create the conditions for exploring a credible way out of the conflict.

Historical experience has proved that conflicts, if prolonged, tend to deteriorate and escalate even beyond what the parties envisioned. If peace talks fail to start, misunderstandings and miscalculations will accumulate and multiply, thus creating an even greater crisis. There are lessons to be learned in this regard.

The end of any conflict is the negotiating table. The sooner they can negotiate, the sooner peace will come. As long as all parties observe the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and properly take into account the legitimate concerns of all parties, Europe can truly establish a balanced, effective and sustainable security framework.

President Xi Jinping's "four points about what must be done" are the fundamental guidance for China in promoting a political solution to the Ukraine Crisis. China supports the timely convening of an international peace conference endorsed both by Russia and Ukraine, with the equal participation of all parties and fair discussion of all peace proposals. China looks forward to restoring peace and stability on the European continent and is ready to continue to play a constructive role to that end.

3. China-U.S. relations

Bloomberg reporter: After last year's meeting in San Francisco, China and the U.S. agree to jointly manage differences and promote mutually beneficial cooperation. Since U.S. has continued to increase its trade and technological restrictions, my question is how does China think this trend will change in the next one to two years, and how does China plan to respond to this? Thank you.

Wang Yi: China-U.S. relations concern the well-being of our two peoples and the future of mankind and the world. No matter how the international situation changes, China has always maintained the stability and continuity in its policy toward the United States, and always handled China-U.S. relations with a sense of responsibility for history, for the people and for the world.

Our position is the three principles put forward by President Xi Jinping: mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation. This is not only a summary of the experience gained and lessons learned of over half a century of China-U.S. relations, but also a grasp of the law of major-country interactions. It should become the direction that China and the United States should both follow and strive for.

To be specific, mutual respect is the prerequisite. Because the social and political systems of the two countries are different, and only when the differences are respected and recognized can bilateral exchanges be sustainable. Peaceful coexistence is the bottom line. The consequences of conflict and confrontation between two major countries like China and the United States would be unimaginable. Win-win cooperation is the goal. Together, China and the United States can accomplish many great things that benefit both countries and the world.

In last November, the presidents of China and the United States held a historic meeting in San Francisco, during which the two sides reached consensus and set a clear direction for China-U.S. relations to stabilize and steer the relations back to the track of healthy development. President Xi Jinping has profoundly elucidated China's basic policy and principled position on China-U.S. relations. President Biden reiterated that the United States does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to change the China's system, does not seek to strengthen alliance against China, does not support "Taiwan independence", and said that the United States is happy to see China's development and prosperity, does not seek to suppress China's development, does not seek to decouple from China.

Since the San Francisco summit, the China-U.S. relations has indeed made some progress, which is in line with the interests and aspirations of the people of the two countries and the world. But I have to point out that the United States still has wrong perceptions of China, and the promises it made have not been delivered. The means to suppress China are constantly updated, the list of unilateral sanctions is constantly extended, and the desire to inflict punishment on China has reached an unimaginable level. If the United States always says one thing and does another, where will its credibility as a major country be? If the United States is nervous and anxious whenever it hears the word "China," where is the self-confidence of a major country? If the United States only allows itself to maintain prosperity and does not allow other countries to develop properly, where is international justice? If the United States insists on monopolizing the high end of the value chain and only lets China stay at the low end, where is fair competition? America's challenges lie within itself, not in China. If the United States focuses on suppressing China, it will end up hurting itself. We urge the United States to recognize the historical trends, view China's development in an objective and rational way, actively and pragmatically engage with China, and fulfill its commitments with words and deeds. We will work with China to put China-U.S. relations on the track of stable, healthy and sustainable development.

This year is the 45th anniversary of China-U.S. relations. President Xi Jinping has pointed out that the hope of the China-U.S. relationship lies in the people, its foundation is in our societies, its future depends on the youth, and its vitality comes from exchanges at subnational levels. We are always ready to strengthen dialogue and communication with the United States, promote friendly exchanges between people of all sectors, build bridges for more mutual understanding, and clear up unnecessary misunderstanding and prejudice. We believe that we can find a correct way for two major countries to get along in this world.

[To learn prominent Chinese experts' opinions on last November's Xi-Biden Summit, check a GRR piece including six Chinese experts' interpretations of this meeting.]

4. China-Europe relations

Spanish news agency EFE: China's relations with Europe have improved over the past year, what does China expect from Europe? What does China think about the European countries not joining the Belt and Road Initiative?

Wang Yi: Last year was the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership, and exchanges and dialogues between the two sides at all levels were fully restarted. 17,000 China-Europe freight trains connect 219 cities in 25 countries in Europe, and construct a safe and smooth lifeline of production and supply chain in the turbulent world. China has granted visa-free treatment to many European countries, which has facilitated people and economic and trade exchanges between the two sides. You mentioned the Belt and Road Initiative, in fact, there are many successful examples of China-EU cooperation in building the Belt and Road, such as the Hungary-Serbia railway, the Piraeus port in Greece, and the Peljesac Bridge in Croatia, all of which are representative of this.

A few years ago, an EU policy paper labeled China as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival at the same time, but it has been proved that this triple positioning is not in line with the facts, nor is it feasible, but rather it has brought unnecessary disturbances and obstacles to the development of China-Europe relationship. It is just like a car driving to an intersection, red, yellow and green lights are on at the same time. How can the car drive?

As a matter of fact, China and Europe do not have any conflict of fundamental interests or geo-strategic contradictions, and our common interests far overweight differences. The correct positioning of China-Europe relationship should be partnership, the mainstream tone should be cooperation, the key value should be autonomy, and the development prospect should be mutual benefit. We hope that China-EU relations will move ahead smoothly with green lights at every crossing.

A strong Europe is in China's long-term interests, and likewise, a strong China is in line with Europe's fundamental interests. China and Europe should work together to be practitioners of multilateralism, advocates of open development and promoters of dialogue between civilizations. Looking around the world, as long as China and Europe cooperate in a mutually beneficial way, bloc-based confrontation will not work and the "anti-globalization" will never prevail. Thank you!

[Weeks before, I shared my opinions on the trade relations between China and Europe in a piece published by Dagens industri, a Swedish media.]

5. Taiwan

Lianhe Zaobao: Following the Taiwan elections, there have been concerns that tensions will further rise across the Taiwan Strait and take a toll on peace and stability in the region. Do you think that the prospect of peaceful reunification is diminishing? What is your take on the current situation across the Taiwan Strait? And what measures should be taken to avoid further escalation?

Wang Yi: The Taiwan elections are a local election in China and the results will not change the fact that Taiwan is part of China, nor will they change the historical trend that Taiwan will return to the motherland. After the elections, over 180 countries and international organization have openly reiterated their commitment to the one-China principle, supporting China's efforts to uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This fully exemplifies that the one-China principle has become the consensus in the international community.

Those who still connive at and support "Taiwan independence" are challenging China's sovereignty and those countries insisting on maintaining official relations with Taiwan are interfering in China's internal affairs. I believe that there will be a family photo of the whole international community in which all members uphold the one-China principle. It is only a matter of time.

Separatist activities seeking "Taiwan independence" remain the most destructive factor to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. To really maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, it is imperative to unequivocally oppose "Taiwan independence." The stronger the commitment to the one-China principle is, the greater the guarantee for peace across the Strait will be.

China's policy on the Taiwan question is clear, which is to continue striving for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity. Our bottom line is also quite clear: We will never allow Taiwan to be separated from the motherland. Whoever engages in "Taiwan independence" on the island will be held accountable by history and whoever in the world connives at and supports "Taiwan independence" will get burned for playing with fire and taste the bitter fruit of their own doing.

The kinship of people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the roots of the Chinese nation are inseparable. All descendants of the Chinese nation, all heirs of the loong, should uphold the overall interests of the Chinese nation, jointly oppose "Taiwan independence," and support peaceful reunification.

[In January, I published the electronic version of a journal published by the Taiwan Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) on Ginger River Review. I also made a podcast interview on the Taiwan elections with Prof. Wu Yongping 巫永平, the dean of the Institute of Taiwan at Tsinghua University and a renowned expert on Taiwan affairs and cross-Strait relations.]

6. South China Sea

Antara News correspondent: In Jul. 2023, China and ASEAN member countries agreed to advance the negotiation for a binding Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea. For a more harmonious and peaceful South China Sea, what will China put forward to promote the conclusion of the Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea?

Wang Yi: The Chinese people have lived and worked in the South China Sea for generations, and the Nanhai Zhudao (islands in the South China Sea) have long been under the jurisdiction of the Chinese government in accordance with law. Today, the South China Sea is the busiest, safest, and freest shipping route in the world.

Over the past few decades, 50 percent of global commercial ships and one-third of maritime trade have passed through this area without complaining about any interference or obstruction. In the midst of a turbulent world, the peace and stability of the South China Sea are the result of the joint efforts of China and ASEAN countries, a feat that is truly remarkable and should be cherished.

The most important experience China and ASEAN countries have drawn in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea is adhering to the following two principles. First, differences should be properly managed and resolved through dialogue, consultation, or negotiation between states directly involved. Second, peace at the sea should be upheld by China and ASEAN countries working together. These principles are also the central tenet of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) signed in 2002.

Regarding maritime disputes, China has consistently exercised utmost restraint, advocating a spirit of good-neighborliness, respecting historical and legal facts, and seeking mutually acceptable solutions. However, we do not tolerate the misuse of goodwill and reject the distortion of the Law of the Sea. In the face of intentional infringements, we will legitimately defend our rights; in response to unreasonable provocations, we will promptly and justifiably counteract. We also advise certain non-regional countries not to provoke trouble, take sides, or become disruptors and troublemakers in the South China Sea.

To maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN countries should continue to implement the DOC, accelerate the negotiation of the COC, and establish more effective and substantive regional rules in accordance with international law, including the Law of the Sea. With strong support from China, the second reading of the draft text of the COC has been completed, and the third reading has been initiated. China is willing to work together with ASEAN countries to strive for the early conclusion of the COC, effectively turning the South China Sea into a sea of peace and cooperation.

[This topic reminds me that Zhao Lijian, former spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China (MoFA), reposted a tweet on March 6 about China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning's elaboration on China's position on the "Maritime Zones Act" approved by the Senate of the Philippines.]

Zhao currently serves as deputy director of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at the foreign ministry. The department develops policies concerning land and maritime boundaries, guides and coordinates external work concerning oceans and seas, manages land boundary delimitation and demarcation, and joint inspections with neighboring countries, handles external boundary matters and cases concerning territories, maps, and place names, and engages in diplomatic negotiations on maritime delimitation and joint development.

7. Palestinian-Israeli conflict

Nile News Television: From my observation on the ground when covering Palestinian-Israeli conflict, I found that people are suffering from hunger, stress and the loss of all the savings. Another scene is that every day, a large amount of humanitarian aid is waiting to enter Gaza. So, how can the international community provide protection necessary for Palestinian people? China's just position on the Palestinian question has been recommended by Arab countries. What will be the way out of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? What role will China play to this end?

Wang Yi: You raised this question on behalf of the Arab countries, and I find it to be extremely important and necessary. The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict has resulted in the death and injury of 100,000 civilians, with countless innocent people buried under the rubble. Life knows no distinctions of value and should not be divided based on race or religion. It is a tragedy for humanity and a disgrace to civilization that in the 21st century, this humanitarian disaster cannot be stopped. No reason can justify the continuation of the conflict, and no excuses can absolve the killing of civilians.

The international community must urgently take action, making an immediate ceasefire the overriding priority and ensuring humanitarian relief as an urgent moral responsibility. The people of Gaza have the right to survive in this world, and women and children should receive the care of their loved ones. All individuals held captive should be released, and any actions causing harm to civilians must be halted.

The catastrophe in Gaza serves as a stark reminder that the long-standing occupation of Palestinian territories cannot be ignored any longer. The Palestinians' legitimate aspiration for an independent state must no longer be evaded, and the historical injustice suffered by the Palestinian people must not persist for generations without correction. Only by granting justice to the Palestinian people and fully implementing the "two-state solution" can we break the vicious cycle of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, eliminate the breeding ground for various extremist ideologies, and truly achieve lasting peace in the Middle East.

China firmly supports Palestinian people's just cause to restore their legitimate national rights and has always been committed to a comprehensive, fair, and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue. We support Palestine's full membership in the UN, and urge certain UN Security Council member to stop laying obstacles to that end. China calls for a more broad-based, more authoritative, and more effective international peace conference to work out a timetable and road map for the "two-state solution."

We advocate for the prompt resumption of negotiations between Palestine and Israel to ultimately achieve peaceful coexistence between the two countries and realize harmony between the Arab and Jewish nations. China will continue to work with the international community, striving for peace restoration, making efforts to save lives, and upholding the cause of justice.

[To learn more about China's specific stance on the current humanitarian crisis in Gaza, here is a piece including an oral statement by China in the International Court of Justice on Feb. 22 regarding the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. The article was published on the WeChat official account of the Department of Treaty and Law at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, and this oral statement was made by Ma Xinmin, Director General of the Department of Treaty and Law. ]

8. Korean Peninsula issue

Korean Broadcasting System (KBS): On the Korean Peninsula issue, China has stated the three principles of "promoting peace and stability, denuclearization and settlement through dialogue and consultation." Are these still the positions of the Chinese government? Recently, tensions have been rising on the Korean Peninsula. Where does China see a way out of it?

Wang Yi: The Korean Peninsula issue has been lingering for years. It has a clear root cause. That is, Cold War vestiges persist, a peace mechanism remains absent, and the security issue is yet to be fundamentally resolved. It also has a ready script. This is what China envisages as the dual-track approach and the principle of phased and synchronized actions.

The current situation on the peninsula is increasingly tense. This is something China does not want to see. The world is already chaotic enough, and the Korean Peninsula should not become a new source of conflict and disorder. Anyone trying to use the Korean Peninsula issue to revive the retrogressive Cold War confrontation will be held accountable by history; anyone undermining regional peace and stability will pay a heavy price.

China's stance on the Korean Peninsula issue remains consistent, with all efforts concentrated on promoting peace, stability, and long-term stability in the region. The imperative now is to desist from acts of deterrence and applying pressure, and move out of the spiral of escalating confrontation. The fundamental solution lies in resuming dialogue and negotiation; addressing the legitimate security concerns of all parties, especially those of the DPRK; and advancing the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue.

9. Artificial intelligence (AI)

Phoenix TV: The international community closely follows the development of artificial intelligence, and one after another, proposals were introduced for global AI governance. China also proposed its Global AI Governance Initiative. In China's view, what should be done to ensure that AI develops in a way that is truly conducive to the progress of human civilization? And what is China's position on cooperation between major countries on AI?

Wang Yi: We are entering a crucial stage of explosive development in artificial intelligence. We advocate for a balanced approach between development and security to collectively advance global governance on artificial intelligence. New things and new opportunities should be embraced, while brakes should be checked before setting off. In October of last year, President Xi Jinping proposed the "Global AI Governance Initiative," clearly stating China's position and propositions.

Our primary focus revolves around three "ensuring":

1. Ensuring benefits: we should ensure that the development of AI benefits the well-being of humanity, aligns with ethical norms, adheres to rules set by international law, and advances human civilization.

2. Ensuring security: we should ensure that AI is always under the control of humanity, continually enhancing interpretability and predictability. This necessitates the establishment of various risk assessment and control mechanisms.

3. Ensuring fairness: Establishing an international governance institution for artificial intelligence under the framework of the United Nations to ensure that every country can participate in and benefit from the development of AI equally.

Another thing I want to stress is that attempts to create “small yard, high fence” in AI development would result in mistakes with historic consequences. Such attempts cannot block other countries’ technological development. They would only fragment international industrial and supply chains and undercut humanity’s ability to tackle risks and challenges.

China maintains a positive and open attitude toward cooperating with countries worldwide on AI. To date, we have established dialogue mechanisms with several nations. In the field of AI, cooperation between major countries is vital, so is capacity-building for developing countries. We will submit in due course to the U.N. General Assembly a draft resolution on enhancing international cooperation on capacity-building of artificial intelligence in order to encourage technology sharing among parties, bridge the AI divide, and leave no one behind.

10. Global South

Latin American News Agency: Global South grew significantly last year, and Cuba successfully hosted the Summit of the Group of 77 (G-77) and China. However, some western media outlets and scholars believe that the rising Global South is challenging the international order led by the west. As an important member of the Global South, China has played an important role. What is China's comment on these matters? Thank you.

Wang Yi: The development and growth of BRICS countries represent the strengthening of peacekeeping forces and the expansion of the world's just forces, and should not be viewed as a challenge. In a broader sense, the BRICS expansion represents the collective rise of the "Global South" and the acceleration of the world's multipolarization process.

As a collective of emerging market and developing countries, the Global South now accounts for over 40 percent of the world economy, profoundly reshaping the global economic landscape. Independence is the distinct quality of the Global South and seeking strength through unity is its tradition. The Global South is no longer the "silent majority," but a key force for reforming the international order and a source of hope as the world undergoes profound changes unseen in a century.

China was, is and will be a steadfast member of the Global South. We go through thick and thin and head toward a shared future together with countries of the South, and we are always a crucial force for the development and prosperity of the Global South.

This year will be a year of harvest for Global South cooperation and a new starting point for unity among Asian, African and Latin American countries.

The China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) celebrates its 20th anniversary, the China-CELAC Forum has achieved a decade of success, and the new Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) will be held in China this fall.

China looks forward to joining hands with all parties to continuously gather the "Southern strength" of unity and cooperation among developing countries. We also support Russia in hosting the BRICS Summit after the expansion, and endorse Brazil and Peru hosting the G20 Summit and the APEC leaders' informal meeting, respectively, to jointly create a shining "South moment" in global governance.

Subscribe now

Given the strong interest in China's military affairs among observers and the lack of an English version of the press conference, we've translated and compiled the key points of the press conference into several major topics for those keen to understand the latest stance of the Chinese Defense Ministry on these issues.

"Taiwan Strait's median line" & America's arms sales to Taiwan

Reporter: Recently, Chinese Foreign Minister delivered a keynote speech at the Munich Security Conference, stating that China should be a stabilizing force in a turbulent world. Some U.S. media have speculated that the Chinese mainland has increased military pressure on Taiwan in recent years, deploying warships and aircraft around Taiwan almost on a daily basis, and that Chinese military aircraft often cross the "Taiwan Strait's median line". Any comment on this?

Zhang Xiaogang: There is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an integral part of China's territory. The so-called "Taiwan Strait's median line" does not exist. The exercises and training activities carried out by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) over the Taiwan Strait are legitimate actions to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests. They constitute deterrents and countermeasures against interference from external forces and provocations by "Taiwan independence" forces. They are important and necessary actions in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We will continue to strengthen military training in preparations for war, and resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Reporter: According to reports, Taiwan will prepare a multi-year budget of NT$13.37 billion (about 420 million U.S. dollars) to purchase 500 Stinger missiles from the United States. Lai Ching-te recently declared in an exchange with personnel from the American "Hudson Institute" that the US government will promote the normalization of arms sales to Taiwan and help Taiwan improve its self-defense capabilities, and Taiwan will continue to strengthen its asymmetrical warfare capabilities. Any comment on this?

Zhang Xiaogang: First and foremost, no matter how much of the common people's hard-earned money is spent on weapons in Taiwan, it will not change the basic fact that Taiwan is part of China, let alone stop the historical trend of the reunification of the motherland. We solemnly warn the Democratic Progressive Party authorities that there is no way out through "seeking independence by force" and will only push Taiwan into the extremely dangerous situation of impending war and hazard.

Zhang Xiaogang (cont'd): The U.S. has repeatedly violated the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiques, especially the provisions of the August 17 Communiqué. The U.S. has broken the political commitments made on issues related to Taiwan, continued to sell arms to the Taiwan region, strengthened U.S.-Taiwan military collusion, and thus seriously impinged on China's sovereignty and jeopardized China's security. Consequently, the "Taiwan independence" rampancy has been fuelled, with peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait undermined. The PLA will take all necessary measures to resolutely crush any form of "Taiwan independence" separatist plots, staunchly defend China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and unwaveringly maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait region.

China assists U.S. in search for remains of WWII military personnel

Reporter: It is understood that since the beginning of this year, archival cooperation between the Chinese and American militaries has made new progress. Would you mind providing further information on the relevant situation?

Zhang Xiaogang: Not long ago, assisted by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Central Military Commission, and the Chinese military department of archives, the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency under the U.S. Department of Defense has dispatched a team to conduct site surveys in China's Guangxi and Hunan, in searching for remains of U.S. military personnel from World War II. These site surveys mark the first joint efforts between the two countries in searching for missing U.S. service members, since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Over the years, China has unwaveringly upheld the spirit of humanitarianism, and has made practical progress in coordinating with the U.S. military to find remains of missing U.S. military personnel in China.

Militarization and battlefieldization of outer space

Reporter: According to reports, the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force recently stated that China’s growing arsenal of long-range missiles and anti-satellite weapons threatens America’s leading position in areas such as air combat and space intelligence. The U.S. Air Force announced a reshaping of the Air Force and the newly-formed Space Force, to focus its resources entirely on strategic competition with China. Any comment on this?

Zhang Xiaogang: China firmly opposes America's expansion of its own military power, under the pretense of so-called "threats" from other countries. As is widenly known, the United States recognizes outer space as a "warfighting domain", develops and deploys offensive space weapons, organizes military offensive and defensive exercises and technological experiments, and even maliciously tracks and dangerously approaches other countries' spacecraft, increasing the risk of collisions with space objects. America has become the most powerful push behind the militarization and battlefieldization of outer space, and the biggest threat to space security.

Zhang Xiaogang (cont'd): China has always insisted on the peaceful use of space, opposed space arms race, and actively promoted building a community with a shared future for mankind in the space field. We urge the United States to abandon the Cold War zero-sum game mentality, cease spreading false statements, and stop acts of military expansion and preparation for war. America should truly shoulder its due responsibilities, and prevent serious blows on global strategic security and stability.

China prepared to resolutely respond against provocations in South China Sea

Reporter: Recently, the Philippines and the United States held joint maritime military exercises and joint air patrols in the South China Sea. The PLA Southern Theater Command organized naval and air patrols in the South China Sea around the same time. The Philippines contended that it would not back down on its maritime claims. A spokesman for the Philippine Coast Guard claimed that the Chinese vessel violated the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and approached the Philippine Coast Guard ship patrolling Huangyan Island at close range. Any comment on this?

Zhang Xiaogang: Recently, the Philippines has teamed up with countries outside of the region to stir trouble in the South China Sea, organized so-called "joint military exercises" and "joint patrols", and sought extravagant publicity. Thus, the Philippines seriously violates the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and jeopardizes regional peace and stability. Such plots run counter against other countries' efforts to maintain peace in the South China Sea. Notably, America is irrelevant to -- and should uphold its commitment to not taking a position on -- the South China Sea issue. It should stop maliciously muddling in affairs totally unrelated to itself.

Zhang Xiaogang (cont'd): The Philippine side is confusing right and wrong, and maliciously seeking extravagant publicity. The Philippine Coast Guard ships have repeatedly made illegal forays into the waters adjacent to China's Huangyan Dao. China has taken measures such as warnings and expulsions and water route control in accordance with the law, with on-site reactions reasonable, legal, professional and restrained. China has indisputable sovereignty over Huangyan Dao and its adjacent waters. We urge the Philippines not to act arbitrarily and stir trouble. China will continue operations of rights protection and law enforcement in the waters under its jurisdiction, and resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.

Zhang Xiaogang (cont'd): The South China Sea is a shared home of the countries in the region, and China is resolved to manage differences with relevant countries through dialogue and consultation. The Chinese military has always been ready to respond resolutely to any infringement and provocation, and has always been resolute in upholding its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.

Urge Japan to stop using the Taiwan question to make provocations

Reporter: Recently, the U.S. Marine Corps and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force conducted exercises to seize outlying islands in Kyushu and Okinawa. Some analysts believe that this is to demonstrate the response capabilities of the U.S.-Japan alliance under the current situation where China is increasing its military presence in relevant sea areas. It is also reported that Japan is studying and formulating an evacuation plan to deal with a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Japanese maritime security officials predict that in the case of war in the Taiwan Strait, even if the Chinese mainland military implemented a naval blockade, hundreds of Taiwan refugee boats will still flow in. Any comment on this?

Zhang Xiaogang: We have noticed relevant media reports. It needs to be pointed out that defense cooperation between relevant countries should not be directed at third parties, let alone China. It is extremely irresponsible and dangerous to deliberately look for excuses, exaggerate the tension, and create confrontation, and even more contrary to the good intentions to seek peace and development of the countries in the region.

Zhang Xiaogang (cont'd): The Taiwan question is purely China's internal affair. How to resolve the Taiwan question is the Chinese people's own business. No external interference is allowed. Historically, Japan launched a war of aggression against China, colonized Taiwan for half a century, committed countless crimes, and bore serious historical responsibilities against the Chinese people. We urge Japan to deeply reflect upon its history of aggression, stop causing trouble on the Taiwan question, and take concrete actions to win the trust of its Asian neighbors and the international community.

AUKUS undermines international and regional peace and stability

Reporter: According to reports, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister said that New Zealand has recently begun negotiations with Australia on joining AUKUS (Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership) to carry out “second pillar” cooperation in cyber warfare, artificial intelligence and long-range hypersonic missiles. Any comment on this from China?

Zhang Xiaogang: For their own geopolitical interests, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia have established the so-called "trilateral security partnership", and made such a fuss in forming an exclusive small circle. They promoted cooperation on nuclear submarines and other military technologies, threatened the international nuclear non-proliferation system, and stimulated the arms race. This has triggered strong concerns and widespread opposition from peace-loving countries.

Zhang Xiaogang: We urge relevant parties to listen carefully to the calls of the international community, and discard the Cold-War mentality and zero-sum game mindset. They should never go down the wrong and dangerous road, undermine international and regional peace and stability, nor harm their own security interests.

China and India maintain effective communication on current border situation

Reporter: A security official from the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs said that during the 21st round of the China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting, "the Chinese military has become tougher in its stance, and continues to reject India's request for the Chinese military to withdraw from 'Depsang Plains and Demchok' along the traditional customary line in the western section of the China-India border". "The new round of talks did not make any progress". What do you think of the current situation on the China-India border?

Zhang Xiaogang: The above remarks are inconsistent with the facts. The current situation on the China-India border is generally stable, and the two sides maintain effective communication through diplomatic and military channels. On Feb. 19, the Chinese and Indian militaries held the the 21st round of the China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting at the Moldo-Chushul border meeting point on the Chinese side. The two sides conducted positive, in-depth, and constructive communication on resolving border issues of mutual concern, and to reach an acceptable solution for both sides as soon as possible. China attaches great importance to the military-to-military relations between China and India, and hopes that India will move in the same direction with China, and that the two countries shall promote mutual trust and properly handle differences, to jointly safeguard peace and tranquility in the border areas.

Subscribe now

As in past elections for the region's leadership, I found myself once again in front of the television, witnessing the voting day unfold in Taiwan – the casting and counting of votes, followed by the press conferences and statements from both the victorious and defeated candidates.

Just moments ago, 陈斌华 Chen Binhua, a spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, commented on the outcomes of Taiwan leadership and legislature elections. I have included the full text of Chen’s comment here, along with the translation, and I did a quick analysis on the comment. In a nutshell, neither the election results nor the mainland's official response to the results offered any real surprises.

Full-text comment by Chen Binhua (Chinese & English)

国务院台办发言人陈斌华13日晚就台湾地区选举结果表示：

Chen Binhua, a spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, commented on the outcomes of Taiwan leadership and legislature elections on Jan. 13:

这次台湾地区两项选举结果显示，民进党并不能代表岛内主流民意。台湾是中国的台湾。这次选举改变不了两岸关系的基本格局和发展方向，改变不了两岸同胞走近走亲、越走越亲的共同愿望，更阻挡不了祖国终将统一、也必然统一的大势。

The outcomes of Taiwan leadership and legislature elections reveal that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) cannot represent the mainstream public opinion on the island. Taiwan is China's Taiwan. The elections will not change the basic landscape and development trend of cross-Strait relations, will not alter the shared aspiration of compatriots across the Taiwan Strait to forge closer ties, and will not impede the inevitable trend of China's reunification.

我们解决台湾问题、完成国家统一的立场一以贯之，意志坚若磐石。我们将坚持体现一个中国原则的“九二共识”，坚决反对“台独”分裂行径和外部势力干涉，与台湾有关政党、团体和各界人士一道，促进两岸交流合作，深化两岸融合发展，共同弘扬中华文化，推动两岸关系和平发展、推进祖国统一大业。（完）

Our stance on resolving the Taiwan question and realizing national reunification remains consistent, and our determination is as firm as rock. We will adhere to the 1992 Consensus that embodies the one-China principle and firmly oppose the separatist activities aimed at "Taiwan independence" as well as foreign interference. The mainland will work with relevant political parties, groups and people from various sectors in Taiwan to boost cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, enhance cross-Strait integrated development, jointly promote Chinese culture, and advance the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations as well as the cause of national reunification. Enditem

Analysis

1.

这次台湾地区两项选举结果显示，民进党并不能代表岛内主流民意。

The outcomes of Taiwan leadership and legislature elections reveal that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) cannot represent the mainstream public opinion on the island.

Lai garnered only 40% of the votes in Taiwan's first-past-the-post system, and his party lost its parliamentary majority. These outcomes provided the mainland with a straightforward basis for the comment, which I consider to be fair.

2.

这次选举改变不了两岸关系的基本格局和发展方向，改变不了两岸同胞走近走亲、越走越亲的共同愿望，更阻挡不了祖国终将统一、也必然统一的大势。

The elections will not change the basic landscape and development trend of cross-Strait relations, will not alter the shared aspiration of compatriots across the Taiwan Strait to forge closer ties, and will not impede the inevitable trend of China's reunification.

The "will not impede the inevitable trend of China's reunification" part is not new. Just two weeks ago, Chinese president Xi Jinping said in his 2024 New Year Address that “祖国统一是历史必然” “China will surely be reunified”, which is also aligned with what he said to President Joe Biden in San Francisco in November last year.

3.

我们解决台湾问题、完成国家统一的立场一以贯之，意志坚若磐石。我们将坚持体现一个中国原则的“九二共识”，坚决反对“台独”分裂行径和外部势力干涉

Our stance on resolving the Taiwan question and realizing national reunification remains consistent, and our determination is as firm as rock. We will adhere to the 1992 Consensus that embodies the one-China principle and firmly oppose the separatist activities aimed at "Taiwan independence" as well as foreign interference.

The mainland's position is that the 1992 Consensus is the political foundation for the development of cross-Strait relations and the anchor for peace and stability across the Strait. As I said in a post ten days ago, due to various reasons, the historical process of reaching this consensus requires extensive explanation, so I believe a paper on the 1992 Consensus from an English journal titled "China Taiwan Studies" by the 中国社会科学院台湾研究所 the Taiwan Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) is valuable. In that post, I provided the full-text of the paper on the consensus online. Today, I uploaded all the papers in the inaugural issue of "China Taiwan Studies" via Google Drive for you to download and share.

4.

与台湾有关政党、团体和各界人士一道，促进两岸交流合作，深化两岸融合发展，共同弘扬中华文化，推动两岸关系和平发展、推进祖国统一大业。

The mainland will work with relevant political parties, groups and people from various sectors in Taiwan to boost cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, enhance cross-Strait integrated development, jointly promote Chinese culture, and advance the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations as well as the cause of national reunification.

The "cross-Strait integrated development" parts remind me that in September last year, the Chinese government issued a detailed plan on making Fujian, a province situated on the southeast coast, a demonstration zone for integrated development with Taiwan. The document listed the general requirements and 21 specific measures for building the zone. It said the objective is to make Fujian 第一家园 the first-choice destination for Taiwan residents and enterprises to pursue development on the mainland. I have posted a full-text translation of the document and an interview with the Taiwan Research Institute on this document.

***

I am confident that numerous analyses will emerge soon regarding the election results. Below, I have curated a selection of relevant Substack posts, tweet and WeChat post that I guess you might want to read:

Following the yuan

Week #36: Taiwan influencers🍍, the Harbin marketing gimmick 🧙‍♂️, Fosun’s struggle with fashion 😵‍💫 | Following the yuan

Ok, guys, admittedly, what I want to talk about first today is simply newsjacking, given that the Taiwan 2024 presidential election is around the corner. As someone who previously worked for an employer predominantly composed of designers and consultants from Taiwan (pre-journalism), it was saddening to see how cross-strait relations deteriorated within…

Read more

2 years ago · 17 likes · 4 comments · Yaling Jiang

Taiwan influencers on Chinese social media

There have been conversations about how social e-commerce platform Xiaohongshu has become China’s battlefield for “cultural unification”, as it’s also widely used by youth in Taiwan. And now that users are disclosing their IP location since June 2022 under rules of the Cyberspace Administration of China, IPs in Taiwan must be showcased as “China Taiwan” across all Chinese social media.

Pekingnology

Chairman Rabbit on tomorrow's Taiwan election

It would be malpractice not to have something on the election in Taiwan tomorrow. Below is a WeChat blog post today by Ren Yi, better known by his pseudonym Chairman Rabbit 兔主席 [links to his Twitter], a well-connected, influential commentator in China with a significant readership…

Read more

2 years ago · 55 likes · 6 comments · Jiawen Zhang and Zichen Wang

"Intervention in the Election by the Communist Party of China (CPC)"

It is worth mentioning the "CPC intervention in the election" rhetoric proposed by the DPP or Lai Ching-te. Generally, it means that any information appearing in the election that is unfavorable to the DPP is fabricated. In this way, Luo Chi-cheng's indecent video is "deepfake" and is the embodiment of "CPC intervention in the election". Lai Ching-te himself had to come forward immediately to endorse Luo, accusing the "deepfake" and "CPC intervention in the election." Not only that, the 41-minute audio of Luo and Tsai that was heatedly discussed is also accused of being "fabricated" and "CPC intervention." It seems that "CPC intervention in the election" is an excuse that can explain everything.

But if people look at the video and audio, they will find such evidence is definitely real. First, they cannot be made with "deepfake" because all have solid content. Second, they cannot be targets of "intervention in the election." As has been analyzed by Chen Guoxiang, to put it most euphemistically, the DPP or Lai Ching-te also cannot remove reasonable doubts from the public. With further analysis, it is more likely that the video and audio are divulged by somebody within the DPP as a result of internal struggles. Lai Ching-te stood out to endorse Luo and used the excuse of "CPC intervention in the election," showing they are unscrupulous in their efforts to protect Luo. Perhaps they truly believe that all problems of the DPP can be covered by external excuses –– as if all Taiwanese people can be convinced with "CPC intervention," which is not too different from calling white black or "call a stag a horse" (a proverbial expression in Chinese, referring to distorted facts). This is seeing themselves as sages like Zhuge Liang (a statesman and strategist in Chinese history) and the public as fools, fundamentally despising the intelligence of the public and having no scruples about political manipulation.

Chong Hua Professor of Chinese Development William Hurst's tweet on the elections:

A piece titled "他上台了，又能怎么样？！He's in Power Now, But What Can He Really Do? " was published online on Saturday night by Youlieryoumian 有理儿有面, a very popular individual WeChat account featuring editorials on geopolitical shifts related to the Chinese government and society, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Taiwan question, and China-US relations. The piece says

不管是谁胜出，如果不能推动两岸的和平统一进程，就是台湾大选的失败，没有赢家。我们绝不能，也不会把台湾的未来寄托于一场选举的胜利者。

No matter who emerges victorious, if they cannot advance the process of peaceful reunification across the strait, it is a failure of the Taiwan elections, with no true winner. We absolutely cannot, nor will we, entrust the future of Taiwan to the victor of a single election.

That's all for today's writing. I keep waking Anna up with my typing and obviously she is not very happy with me now, so I need to go to sleep…

The Taiwan Research Institute of the CASS on Dec. 25 launched the "China Taiwan Studies", the Chinese mainland's first English academic journal on pertinent issues for international readers. Wang Changlin, vice-president of the CASS, said the launch was timely against the backdrop of cross-Strait relations facing a choice between peace and war, and between prosperity and decline.

In October last year, I posted a GRR interview of 刘匡宇 Liu Kuangyu (an associate research fellow with the Taiwan Research Institute) about the circular on the cross-Strait Fujian and Taiwan integration development plan and cross-Strait relations.

In today's piece, I have selected a paper focusing on a key issue concerning cross-Strait relations -- the "1992 Consensus" or "九二共识" -- from the inaugural issue of "China Taiwan Studies". The paper, titled "30 Years of the 1992 Consensus in Retrospect," was written by Ding Yanling from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, and Sun Yafu from the National Society of Taiwan Studies. Sun Yafu was Deputy Secretary-General of the ARATS in 1992 and was involved in the process of reaching the 1992 Consensus.

Recognizing the extensive nature of academic research, my approach will be to succinctly highlight key sections and findings of the paper. For those who wish to delve deeper, I have uploaded the full paper in English via Google Drive for downloading and sharing with others.

In the context of the 1992 Consensus, on the one hand, officials from the Chinese mainland such as Song Tao, head of both the Taiwan Work Office of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, have emphasized on multiple occasions that

“九二共识”是两岸关系发展的政治基础和台海和平稳定的定海神针

The 1992 Consensus is the political foundation for the development of cross-Strait relations and the anchor for peace and stability across the Strait

On the other hand, it has been observed internationally that there are differences in the understanding of the 1992 Consensus between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. There has been even heated argument concerning the very existence and definition of the 1992 Consensus and whether it should be maintained or abolished.

Due to various reasons, the historical process of reaching this consensus requires extensive explanation, so in Part I of today's newsletter, I excerpted three paragraphs that I believe are most representative from the paper. They mainly include the content of the 1992 Consensus and why the Chinese mainland perceives the Taiwanese understanding of the 1992 Consensus, or “一个中国、各自表述” “one China, dual expressions”, to be different from its own.

Following these sections, in Part Ⅱ, I extracted the main parts describing the historical process of reaching the 1992 Consensus for readers who wish to study it in detail.

Before delving into the details of the 1992 Consensus, it's essential to introduce two special entities, which were directly involved in the formulation of the 1992 Consensus. In the context of cross-Straits relations, 海协会 the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) (established in the Chinese mainland) and 海基会 the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) (established in Taiwan) serve as pivotal non-governmental organizations.

This resulted in a unique arrangement in cross-Straits relations: both sides set up their respective non-governmental organizations with the authorization to communicate on issues arising from cross-Straits exchanges and work to find solutions. It was a workaround at a time when both sides of the Straits were in need of contact and consultation with their political differences unsolved (around the year of 1991). It proved to be effective.

I believe the 1992 Consensus may seem confusing to some international readers because it was reached through an “函电往返” exchange of notes or letters between ARATS and SEF, and the potential discrepancies arising from the Chinese-English translation process add to the complexity. This is why I think the publication of this English journal by the Taiwan Research Institute of the CASS is valuable.

30 Years of the 1992 Consensus in Retrospect

By Ding Yanling, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, & Sun Yafu, National Society of Taiwan Studies

Abstract: It has been 30 years since the 1992 Consensus was reached. This paper provides an overview of the formation process of the 1992 Consensus, expounds the important role the consensus has played, and recalls the twists and turns it has withstood in the past three decades. The paper also summarizes the historical significance of the 1992 Consensus, elaborates on its essence – both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China and will work together toward national reunification, and emphasizes the importance to uphold the 1992 Consensus to develop cross-Straits relations and achieve national reunification, in an effort to provide a just account of historical facts.

Part I （Three paragraphs that I believe are most representative from the paper）

Correspondence between the mainland and Taiwan and reports by media on both sides borne witness to the fact that a consensus was reached between the ARATS and SEF in 1992. Despite differences between the two sides in the means of achieving the consensus and the way to sum it up, the very existence and the content of the consensus cannot be denied. The consensus constitutes two written statements authorized and mutually accepted by both sides, specifying the position of both sides of adhering to the one-China principle and pursuing national reunification. With regard to the political meaning of one China, the SEF and the ARATS held different views, with the former suggesting “the two sides have different cognition”, and the latter agreeing “not to touch upon it during consultations on routine affairs”. These four points construct a complete sentence: both sides adhere to the one-China principle and seek national reunification, but they differ in the cognition of the political meaning of one China, and will not touch upon it in working-level consultations. It could be simplified as “upholding ‘one China’, pursuing national reunification, seeking common ground while shelving differences and promoting consultation”. ... Su Chi, former head of Taiwan’s the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), wrote in 2002, “The consensus was reached through correspondence and verbally stated by both sides, but correspondence is a form of exchange of notes or letters. Critics can blame a lack of a single document, but cannot deny the existence of documents or even a consensus.”

Comment: Regarding the political implication of one China, the ARATS agrees “not to touch upon it during consultations on routine affairs”. "Not to touch upon it"presumably means not to explore or discuss this matter. But if one insists on asking government officials of the PRC what "one China" is in press conferences or any other official events, what answer do you expect to get other than "the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China" ? I think the answer should not surprise anyone, and it's different from the context of reaching the 1992 Consensus as explained above.

As the consensus was reached by way of exchange of letters between the ARATS and SEF, both sides produced different summary on the consensus afterwards. In Minutes of Wang-Koo Talks published by the SEF in August 1993, it was stated for the first time that “our Foundation started to take into consideration the talks after both sides agreed that adherence to the one-China principle could be stated verbally by both organizations.” The KMT and Taiwan authorities also meant respective interpretations of the principle whenever the consensus was later referred to; the term “one China, dual expressions” (“一中各表”) was widely used in Taiwan ever since 1995. Concerning the mainland’s take on the consensus, the ARATS summarized it as follows in its report to the third board meeting held in January 1994: “During working-level consultations in 1992, the ARATS and the SEF of Taiwan reached a consensus that both sides shall make their respective verbal statements on the position that ‘both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle’.” This summary was facts-based and covered key elements of the consensus. First, it was unequivocal that the consensus was reached by means of “respective statements”. Second, it made it clear that the content of the statements was that “both sides of the Straits adhere to the one-China principle” rather than the political meaning of one China. This is the very essence of the consensus.

Comment: Let me try to put ARATS's position in another way: "With regard to the political meaning of one China, The SEF can say “the two sides have different cognition” and the ARATS can say “not to touch upon it during consultations on routine affairs” "-- That is what ARATS refer to when it says "both sides shall make their respective verbal statements" rather than "With regard to the political meaning of one China, The SEF says “one China is the ROC” and the ARATS says “one China is the PRC”".

Again, "Not to touch upon it" is the ARATS's preference regarding the political implication of one China during consultations on routine affairs. I think the "during consultations on routine affairs" part is also important because in the example I mentioned in the last comment, you can only expect officials of PRC to say "the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China" if you must ask them what "one China" is.

Certain problems arise with regard to the term of “一个中国、各自表述” “one China, dual expressions” as described by the Taiwan side. First, it doesn’t conform to the reality in the first place. In fact, “one China, dual expressions” was no more than a unilateral position and desire of the KMT. The consensus shall be summarized based on the process of cross-Straits consultation and exchange of documents and their outcome, namely respective statements of the commitment that “both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle”. This is different from the KMT’s proposition of “one China, dual expressions”. Second, the wording of “one China, dual expressions” left a semantic loophole and may lead to arbitrary interpretations under certain circumstances.

Since 1993, Lee Teng-hui displayed a growing tendency of separatism in defiance of the one-China principle. He spoke publicly against the principle and said that “the Republic of China is in Taiwan.” After Lee Teng-hui raised the “two states” theory in 1999, the MAC of Taiwan exploited the term of “one China, dual expressions” in his defense, arguing that according to the term, both sides could express their own views regarding one China.[1] This is utter distortion and violation of the essence of the 1992 Consensus.

Comment: In the paper, the authors give more examples of arbitrary interpretations of the 1992 Consensus besides the examples of Lee Teng-hui. I believe the arbitrary interpretations are also related to the changes in the political ecosystem within the island of Taiwan.

Please understand the comments I added are neither official nor authoritative, as this is a PERSONAL newsletter which does not represent the views of any organization, let alone “China.” If you have any feedback to this newsletter, feel free to write me an email: jjiang.sisu@hotmail.com

Part Ⅱ (The main parts describing the historical process of reaching the 1992 Consensus)

From March 23 to 26, 1992, the ARATS conducted its first working-level talks with the SEF in Beijing on two issues: the “tracing of and compensation for cross-Straits registered mail” and the “usage of cross-Straits notarial certificate”. Li Yafei, then head of the research department of the ARATS, and Zhou Ning, then deputy head of the consulting department, chaired the two sessions respectively. During the meeting, representatives of the SEF refused to enter into any discussion on adhering to the one-China principle, stating that they were not authorized by the Taiwan authorities to discuss political issues. However, their position during the meeting revealed Taiwan’s attempt for the status of “equivalent political entity” by emphasizing “sovereignty” and “jurisdiction”, which was an outright violation of the one-China principle. For example, the SEF suggested to adopt the authentication procedures used by diplomatic missions in foreign countries on the issue of usage of cross-Straits notarial certificate and handle registered mails in the manner of postal services between countries. Clearly, a consensus on upholding the one-China principle by both sides shall be reached as the political foundation of cross-Straits consultation, and any talks in the absence of recognition of one China would be nonstarters.

To advance bilateral talks and in response to misinterpretation of the Taiwan authorities and public concerns in Taiwan, Tang Shubei, then Executive Vice Chairman of the ARATS, elaborated on the mainland’s position on adherence to the one-China principle at a press conference on March 30, 1992, after the conclusion of the consultation. He stated, “We think that there should be no problem to use notarial certificate or trace registered mails in a country. Given the fact that the two sides have yet to be reunified at present, it is necessary to find an extraordinary solution to the issues of using these documents, tracing registered mails and compensating mail loss across the Straits.” He noted, “At a time when the two sides are not reunified, we must make it clear first that what we are discussing or working to solve are the internal affairs of a country. As is known to everyone, both the KMT and the CPC acknowledge that there is only one China, which is also explicitly stated in the reunification-related documents adopted by the Taiwan authorities. Since both sides share the one-China view, why can’t we address routine affairs in accordance with this principle?” He pointed out, “We are not going to discuss any political issue with the SEF. What we are trying to do is to confirm the fact that there is only one China. As for the meaning of one China, it’s not something we plan to discuss with the SEF.” He went on to say that “we are open to discussions on how to phrase this principle.”[1] In his statement above, Tang required the SEF to clarify its position on adhering to the one-China principle, referred to the issues as “internal affairs of a country” and clarified that his side did not request discussions on the meaning of one China, but was open to exchanges on the wording of the one-China principle. After the Beijing talks, the ARATS stated its stance in the talks as follows: The concrete issues in cross-Straits exchanges are internal affairs of China and should be resolved through consultation in accordance with the one-China principle; in business discussions, as long as the fundamental position of adhering to the one-China principle is stated, the political meaning of one China might not be discussed; the method of presentation could be fully discussed; and the ARATS is willing to listen to the opinions of the SEF and representatives of all sectors in Taiwan. The ARATS had maintained this sensible stance throughout its efforts to resolve this issue.

Due to the firm position of the mainland, the Taiwan authorities realized that it could no longer dodge a statement of adhering to the one-China principle. To achieve the policy objectives they set for bilateral consultations, the Taiwan authorities also hoped that the talks could continue and progress[2]. In April 1992, the NUC began to lead research on viable solutions, arousing widespread discussions from various sectors of Taiwan. According to the reports of Taiwan media, some research members of the MAC and NUC disapproved of the SEF accepting the one-China principle during working-level talks with the mainland. They believed that, after the adoption of Resolution 2758 by the UN in October 1971, “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the international community. If a consensus on adhering to the one-China principle was reached during cross-Straits consultations and included in consequent agreements, it may be seen as a tacit admission that Taiwan is part of the PRC and the CPC-led government represents the only legal government of China, which would compromise Taiwan’s efforts to expand its “international space for survival” and achieve the goal of “two equivalent political entities”. People in charge of the SEF and some politicians in Taiwan, however, believed that Taiwan should not circumvent the one-China principle and that recognition of the principle would not impair Taiwan’s “pragmatic diplomacy”[3]. After three-month debate, the eighth plenary session of the NUC adopted the resolution On the Meaning of “One China” on August 1, 1992. The full text of the resolution is as follows:

“1. Both sides of the Taiwan Straits are committed to the one-China principle. However, the two sides have different opinions as to the meaning of ‘one China’. The CPC-led government regards ‘one China’ as ‘the People’s Republic of China’, and after unification, Taiwan would become a ‘Special Administrative Region’ under its jurisdiction. Our side believes that ‘one China’ refers to the Republic of China, which was founded in 1912 and has continued to exist till now; its sovereignty extends to the whole of China, but at present only covers the Taiwan-Penghu-Kinmen-Matsu area. Taiwan is indeed part of China, so is the mainland.

2. Since 1949, China has been in a temporary state of separation with two political entities governing the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. It is a fact that cannot be ignored in pursuit of unification by either side.

3. To promote development of the Chinese nation, prosperity of the country and wellbeing of its people, the government of the Republic of China formulated the Guidelines for National Unification, earnestly searched for common ground and taken actions in the direction of national unification. We hope that the mainland could adopt a pragmatic approach, get rid of prejudices, commit itself to cooperation and contribute wisdom and efforts to realize a free and democratic China where every citizen prospers.”[4]

This resolution adopted by the NUC reflected the position and attitudes of the KMT and Taiwan authorities in the early 1990s. It expressed the objective of national unification and the one-China position, despite different interpretation from that of the mainland. The mainland perceived the change in the Taiwan authorities’ attitude – from refusing the inclusion of the one-China principle in working-level talks to allowing the SEF to discuss the issue and to acknowledging unequivocally that both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle – was indeed a step forward. But it opposed defining “one China” under the framework of “the Republic of China” and “two equivalent political entities”. A leader of the ARATS released a statement on August 27, saying that “regarding the meaning of ‘one China’ in the talks between the SEF and our Association on an agreement on routine affairs, relevant party of Taiwan stated in their ‘conclusion’ on August 1 that ‘both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle’. The ARATS thinks that this affirmation is of great significance to the cross-Straits consultation on routine affairs and demonstrates that adhering to the one-China principle in working-level consultation has now become a consensus between both sides.” The statement also underscored the mainland’s consistent position that “as long as the one-China principle is observed during working-level talks, the two sides don’t have to discuss the meaning of one China.” “Our Association disagrees with the Taiwan side in its interpretation of one China. We have been consistent in the position of seeking peaceful reunification under ‘one country, two systems’ and opposing ‘two Chinas’, ‘one China, one Taiwan’ and ‘two equivalent political entities’.”[5] In its response to the resolution adopted by the Taiwan authorities, the ARATS highlighted the key point of “both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle” while expressing its disagreement to Taiwan’s interpretation of one China.

It can be seen from the above-mentioned process that although the mainland and Taiwan disagreed with each other on the political implication of one China, they shared the stance of upholding the one-China principle. This paved the way to further consultations and eventually a consensus.

Ⅱ. Reaching a Consensus: Seeking Common Ground While Shelving Differences

Following the ARATS statement on August 27, Chen Jung-chie, then Secretary General of the SEF, telephoned Zou Zhekai, then Secretary General of the ARATS, and requested a meeting. On the occasion of leading a team to hand over illegal migrants to Xiamen on September 17, Chen met with Zou and unofficially exchanged views on the way recognition of the one-China principle shall be expressed. Zou stated that “The conclusion made by the Taiwan side on the one-China principle demonstrates that both sides have reached a consensus on adhering to the one-China principle in consultation on routine affairs. However, we disagree with the Taiwan side concerning the interpretation of the meaning of one China, and we are not going to discuss the interpretation issue with the SEF.”[6] This meeting helped to strengthen mutual understanding between the two organizations.

From October 28 to 30, the SEF and ARATS conducted further talks in Hong Kong on the issue of cross-Straits use and verification of notarial certificates. Zhou Ning, then deputy head of the consulting department, represented ARATS during the meeting. From the very beginning, the meeting focused on how to reach a consensus on adherence to the one-China principle in routine affairs consultations, a topic both organizations were authorized to discuss[7]. Both sides listed five written proposals respectively for deliberation (See Table 1), but none was agreed on. Upon evaluating the status quo of the meeting, representatives of the SEF concluded that since solid progress had been made in working-level consultation, the consultation outcome could suffer if the mainland’s political concern was not addressed. Therefore, during the last closed session on the afternoon of October 30, the SEF verbally presented another three proposals (See Table 2), which were well documented by ARATS representatives at the meeting. The third one was a revised version of the fourth proposal of the ARATS. The fundamental difference between the two proposals lies in the addition of one sentence by the SEF: “(While both sides adhere to the one-China principle,) they differ in interpreting the meaning of one China.” The SEF also suggested that “Both sides could orally express their positions to the extent acceptable to each other.” The ARATS representatives promised to make a formal reply to the SEF back in Beijing.

Table 1 Written Proposals of the ARATS and SEF on Adherence to the One-China Principle

Table 2 Verbal Proposals of the SEF on Adherence to the One-China Principle

Source: ARATS (2005). Historical Documentation of the 1992 Consensus. Beijing: Jiuzhou Press.

Following the Hong Kong talks, the ARATS, after an in-depth evaluation of the outcome of the meeting, concluded that the eighth proposal of the SEF was raised on the basis of the fourth proposal provided by the ARATS and confirmed the SEF’s position of seeking national reunification and adhering to the one-China principle. Although the SEF stated that both sides differ over the meaning of one China, it didn’t specify its interpretation, which conformed to the consistent position of the ARATS. Before the talks between the two organizations kicked off, it was also taken into consideration by the ARATS that “both sides could orally express their positions to the extent acceptable to each other”. Therefore, a consensus could be achieved on adhering to the one-China principle by seeking common ground while shelving differences.

It was crucial for the ARATS to ensure that the oral proposal raised by the SEF was the official position of the Taiwan authorities. On the morning of November 3, Sun Yafu, then Deputy Secretary General of the ARATS, talked with Chen Jung-chie, then Secretary General of the SEF, on the phone, saying that the Association “respects and acknowledges the proposal by the SEF” and requesting formal endorsement of the proposal from the Taiwan authorities. Sun also proposed further consultation on the content of verbal statements.[8] Xinhua News Agency and China News Service made related coverage on the issue. Late at night, the SEF issued a press release, confirming that “with approval from our supervisory body, our Foundation agrees on the form of verbal statements by both sides. With regard to the content of the verbal statements, we will deliver it in accordance with the Guidelines for National Unification and the resolution On the Meaning of ‘One China’ adopted by the NUC on August 1.”[9]

In a letter to the SEF on November 16，the ARATS reviewed the progress on the issue of adherence to the one-China principle during consultations on routine affairs and pointed out, “The SEF suggested that both organizations make their own verbal statements on the one-China principle on the basis of mutual understanding and put forth its own proposals (See appendix), which affirmed that both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle. The proposals made by the SEF were also reported by Taiwan press.” The letter also mentioned the key points of the ARATS’s verbal statement: “Both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle and seek national reunification. Cross-Straits consultation on routine affairs, however, does not involve the political meaning of one China. In line with this, the issue of the use of notarial certificates across the Straits (or other affairs alike) will be properly handled.”[10] With the letter attached the eighth proposal by the SEF. In this way, the proposal recognized by the ARATS was documented in writing, underlining the content of the consensus reached between the two sides.

On behalf of the MAC and the SEF, Lee Ching Ping, then Deputy Secretary General of the SEF, told Taiwan media on November 17, “We welcome the proposal of the ARATS in its letter on November 16 that both sides make their own verbal statements.”[11] Taiwan’s mainstream media published related reports with the following titles: “both sides of the Straits made verbal statements on the meaning of one China” (China Times Express〔《中时晚报》〕, November 17), “the ARATS agreed to verbal statements on the one-China principle” (Central Daily News 〔《中央日报》〕, November 17), “both sides of the Straits agree to make separate oral statements on the one-China principle” (China Times 〔《中国时报》〕, November 18), and “we welcome the proposal of making verbal statements on the one-China principle” (Central Daily News 〔《中央日报》〕, November 18)[12]. Though the wording was not accurate, these reports reflected the prevailing public opinion in Taiwan that a consensus had been reached between the two sides. In its reply to the ARATS on December 3, the SEF made no objection to the key points of the verbal statement raised by the ARATS in its November 16 letter. By this point, negotiation on the issue of adhering to the one-China principle during consultations on routine affairs had come to a conclusion, resulting in two verbal statements mutually accepted. The SEF and the ARATS shared the view that a consensus had been reached.

As can be seen from the above historical facts and course, the 1992 Consensus was reached as a result of equal consultation as both sides accommodated each other’s concerns and drew on each other’s opinions instead of imposing the will of one side onto the other. Although the consensus was made in the form of verbal statements by both sides, its formation process and content were well documented. Verbal statements represented the format only rather than the substance. The two statements were mutually accepted by both sides. Both sides expressed their acknowledgement of the position of “upholding the one-China principle by both sides of the Taiwan Straits” and “seeking national reunification”, which constituted the core of the consensus. Concerning the political meaning of one China, the SEF suggested “different interpretations by both sides”, and the ARATS agreed “not to touch upon it during working-level consultations” to put aside the difference between the two sides. This is how the approach of seeking common ground while shelving differences works. In this case, the common ground referred to adherence to the one-China principle and the pursuit of national reunification whereas the difference in interpretation of the political meaning of one China was put aside for the time being. To seek common ground and to shelf differences are interrelated and interdependent. At a time when political differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits remained unsolved, the approach of seeking common ground while shelving differences allowed the two sides to reach the consensus, which laid the political foundation for cross-Straits consultation, paved the way for the Wang-Koo Talks of 1993, and played a critical role in maintaining an institutionalized consultation mechanism between the two organizations.

Subscribe now

As I mentioned in that piece, Chinese foreign affairs work is highly systematic, so, in today's newsletter, I select a couple pieces from the 217th issue of《国际问题研究》China International Studies, a bimonthly journal established by China Institute of International Studies (CIIS).

CIIS is a professional research institute directly administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. The Institute primarily focuses on issues associated with global politics and economics, providing opinions and suggestions for decision-making reference. In 2020, after review and approval by the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, CIIS was listed as a pilot unit for the construction of a high-end national think tank.

I selected three articles from the 217th issue of China International Studies, and selected three separated paragraphs from each article to translate them into English as a trial. If you like this topic and format, you can reply to the email to let me know. I have also included the link to the full-text Chinese version of all articles in the 217th issue here for readers who want to download and share.

The selections mainly cover China and the U.S., spanning from "Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy", "The New Washington Consensus", to "US-Japan Strategic Synergy". Below are the titles of the three pieces:

• Creating a New Pattern of Major-Country Relations Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy (By YANG Jiemian 杨洁勉)

• The New Washington Consensus and the Transition of U.S. Economic Strategy (by LI Wei 李巍)

• U.S.-Japan Strategic Synergy in Southeast Asia and Its Limitations (XIANG Haoyu 项昊宇 & BAO Zhipeng 鲍志鹏)

  Subscribe GRR newsletter for free to get a glimpse into the priorities of both the leadership and the general public in China.

Creating a New Pattern of Major-Country Relations Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy 习近平外交思想指导构建大国关系新格局

By YANG Jiemian, contract research fellow of the Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy research center, senior fellow and chairman of the Academic Affairs Council, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

美国及其紧随者英国和日本等在世界观和大国关系原则上的认知具有一致性和趋同性。拜登政府 2022 年 10 月发布的美国《国家安全战略》报告认为，美国正步入对其和世界来说具有决定性意义的十年，在此期间， 美国面临主要大国竞相塑造新世界秩序及严峻的跨国问题两大挑战。为此，美国要做的就是建立强大、广泛的国际联盟，与共享价值观的国家一起对抗那些提供“阴暗愿景”的大国，阻止它们威胁美国的利益，保持美国领导全球的地位。

The United States and its followers, including the United Kingdom and Japan, show uniformity and are moving towards convergence in their world outlook and principles of major-country relations. In its National Security Strategy released in October 2022, the Biden administration announced the U.S. is "now in the early years of a decisive decade for America and the world." During the period, the report says, the country faces two strategic challenges: a competition underway between the major powers to shape what comes next, and shared challenges that cross borders. The report then said building “the strongest and broadest possible coalition of nations that seek to cooperate with each other, while competing with those powers that offer a darker vision and thwarting their efforts to threaten our interests”, to maintain American leadership in the world.

发展中大国的兴起为大国关系注入了时代进步意义。习近平总书记指出：“国际力量对比发生深刻变化，新兴市场国家和一大批发展中国家快速发展，国际影响力不断增强，是近代以来国际力量对比中最具革命性的变化。”美国和发展中大国的矛盾是多方面的，但其中最主要和最本质的在于对历史进步和时代趋势的认知和行为分歧。世界力量对比的东升西降具有重要的历史进步性，正在纠正 500 年以来殖民主义和资本主义造成的历史不公。而且，世界力量对比的逆转已经体现在国际体系和全球治理的体制机制变革上，从二十国集团的升级、金砖国家机制的扩容到亚洲基础设施投资银行和金砖国家新开发银行的诞生， 国际秩序和国际体系迈向更加公正合理的趋势不可逆转。在世界的经济基础和上层建筑双重变化的作用下，以美国为首的西方掌控世界事务的能力日益式微，为此充满了旧时贵族的失落感，也产生了大权旁落的焦虑感。

The rise of major developing countries was significant for the advancement of the times in major-country relations. The international balance of power is undergoing a fundamental shift, said Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, at a study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in October 2015. The most revolutionary change in the international balance of power since modern times, Xi said, was rapid development of emerging economies and a large number of developing countries and their increasing influence in the international community. The contradiction between the U.S. and major developing countries is multifaceted, but the most important and essential aspect involves a divergence of views and behaviors on historical progress and the trend of the times. The rise of the East and the decline of the West in the international balance of power are of significance to historical advancement, as it is redressing the historical injustices caused by colonialism and capitalism over the past 500 years. Besides, the shift in global power is also reflected by the reform of the international system and global governance system and mechanism. The international order and system are becoming fairer and more reasonable in an irreversible trend, from the upgrading of the Group of 20 (G20) and BRICS expansion, to the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). Driven by changes in both the economic base and the superstructure of the world, the West led by the U.S. is becoming less capable of controlling world affairs, which has generated a strong feeling of the old nobility-style frustration and a sense of anxiety over the decline of great power.

在大国关系格局问题上，习近平总书记强调，不仅要认识世界，而且更要改造世界。他指出：“面对严峻的全球性挑战，面对人类发展在十字路口何去何从的抉择，各国应该有以天下为己任的担当精神，积极做行动派、不做观望者，共同努力把人类前途命运掌握在自己手中。” 当前国际形势中的挑战不断增加。在美国的挑动下，大国关系中冷战思维抬头、集团对抗回潮、地缘博弈加剧，甚至发生了北约支持下的乌克兰与俄罗斯的直接军事对抗。为此，中国力推的大国关系新格局旨在实现大国之间和平共处、总体稳定、均衡发展。

On creating a pattern of major-country relations, General Secretary Xi underscored the importance of transforming the world in addition to understanding the world. “All countries need to demonstrate a strong commitment to their global responsibilities in the face of daunting global challenges. Indeed, we need to determine a decisive direction for humanity at this juncture. We must take action instead of simply watching as bystanders, and endeavor to shape the future of humanity.” The current international landscape is experiencing an increasing number of challenges. Provoked by the U.S., a Cold War mentality is on the rise, bloc confrontation sees a resurgence, geopolitical games are intensifying, and there is even a direct military conflict happening between Ukraine and Russia supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, China strongly promotes creating a new pattern of major-country relations featuring peaceful coexistence, overall stability, and balanced development among major countries.

Comment: If you are a close Chinese diplomacy watcher, you must know 杨洁勉 YANG Jiemian's elder brother, 杨洁篪 YANG Jiechi, former director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China. I found an interesting story back in 2007 from ifeng.com titled "杨门双杰外交虎将" "Yang Brothers and Chinese Diplomacy", to brief the "Yang Brothers" and their significant connection to Chinese diplomacy:

1950年出生的杨洁篪属虎，而他名中的“篪”字里面正藏了虎字的变体，而杨洁篪本人则被美国政界人士称为“老虎杨”(Tiger Yang)。一岁之差的弟弟杨洁勉属兔，而“勉”字里也藏了兔字的笔意......与兄长直接参与外交决策不同，杨洁勉所从事的工作则是为中国外交提供思想武器和理论支撑。

Both Yang Jiechi and his younger brother Yang Jiemian have a career in Chinese diplomacy. In his fate, Yang Jiechi seems to have a connection with tiger. He was born in 1950, the year of the Tiger according to the Chinese Zodiac. The last character of his name "篪" contains a variant of the Chinese character for the tiger "虎". And he is called Tiger Yang by U.S. politicians.

Yang Jiemian, one year younger, was born in 1951, the year of the Rabbit. And the last character of his name "勉" contains the strokes of the Chinese character for the rabbit "兔". Yang Jiechi is directly engaged in diplomacy decision-making, while Yang Jiemian’s role is to provide ideological and theoretical support for China’s diplomacy.

The phrase "东升西降" “the rise of the East and the decline of the West" in the context of international power dynamics mentioned by Professor Yang Jiemian in his article is indeed a perspective that might be familiar to some China watchers, but seeing it characterized as "具有重要的历史进步性" a significant historical advancement in official or quasi-official Chinese documents is noteworthy.

The latter part of the statement, which mentions "正在纠正 500 年以来殖民主义和资本主义造成的历史不公" "redressing the historical injustices caused by colonialism and capitalism over the past 500 years", is intriguing. To understand the reference to 500 years, we need to look back to the year of 1523. I asked ChatGPT about what changes the world was undergoing around the year of 1523 and here are its answers:

Europe: The Renaissance was in full swing, leading to major advancements in arts, science, and thought. The beginning of the Protestant Reformation, with Martin Luther's activities, was also around this time.

Asia: In China, the Ming Dynasty was in power, known for its cultural prosperity and maritime exploration (e.g., Zheng He's voyages). The region was relatively stable and prosperous.

Americas: Pre-Columbian civilizations like the Aztecs and Incas were dominant in their respective regions. This was just before the extensive European colonization began in the Americas.

Africa: African empires like the Songhai in West Africa were powerful. The continent hadn't yet experienced the full impact of European colonization and the Atlantic slave trade, which would escalate significantly in the following centuries.

Middle East: The Ottoman Empire was a major power, controlling large territories in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Europe.

The reference to 500 years seems to point to the early stages of European exploration and colonization, which significantly altered global power dynamics. This period marked the beginning of widespread European influence around the world, often at the cost of indigenous cultures and societies, setting the stage for the development of modern colonialism and capitalism.

Feel free to leave your comments if you have any thoughts on this matter.

***

The New Washington Consensus and the Transition of U.S. Economic Strategy “新华盛顿共识”与美国经济战略的转型

By LI Wei, Professor at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC), and director of the Center for American Studies, RUC

“新华盛顿共识”的核心是，美国要摒弃“旧共识”对自由市场的过度迷信和美好期许，而是决心动用国家机器的力量，从国内产业政策和国际经济联盟两个方面，全面复兴美国国内的产业生态系统和科技创新能力，以达到在国际上“竞赢”战略对手、在国内重建强大中产阶级的战略目标。它既是对美国未来内外经济政策所提供的一个宏观指南，也是对过去两年多来，拜登政府既有实践的一个总结。

The core of the so-called New Washington Consensus is the U.S. will abandon the excessive faith in and bright expectations for the free market the old one had, and will instead seek to employ the power of the state machinery to fully revitalize the domestic industrial ecosystem and technological innovation capacity through domestic industrial policies and international economic coalition, in order to achieve the strategic goals of "outcompeting" its strategic rivals globally and rebuilding a powerful middle class domestically. The new consensus represents not only a macro guide for the country’s domestic and foreign economic policy in the future, but also a summary of the practices adopted by the Biden administration in the past two years.

但另一方面，尽管拜登政府的经济外交看似紧锣密鼓、声势浩大，但有多少政策举措能够最终实质性落地，还存在诸多变数。回顾历史，美国的不少外交倡议都是“雷声大、雨点小”，最后草草收场不了了之。美国的经济外交旨在联合盟伴共同遏制中国，但对于世界上绝大部分国家而言，遏制中国不仅不是他们的利益所在，而且会使他们付出非常高昂的代价，因此不会完全唯美国马首是瞻。不少国家难以心甘情愿搭上美国的“战车”，只是在美国的胁迫和利诱之下“逢场作戏”。

But on the other hand, although the Biden administration seems to have made a great whoop and a holler about its economic diplomacy, there are still great uncertainties over how many of its policies and measures could finally materialize. In the past, quite a few of the country’s diplomatic initiatives ended up with nothing significant despite a great deal of propaganda. Through its economic diplomacy, the U.S. aims to contain China together with its allies. But for most countries, containing China is not in their interests, and worse, comes at a very high price. So they will not completely follow the leadership of the US. Many countries, not entirely willing to ride the US “chariot”, are just acting with the carrots and sticks from the U.S.

美国战略精英提出和践行的“新华盛顿共识”所带来的美国经济战略大转型确实给中国带来了严重挑战，无论是经济发展还是经济安全，中国都将面临更为险峻的外部环境。但也应看到，拜登政府企图通过国内产业政策和国际经济外交来强行改变市场格局犹如逆水行舟，毕竟市场的主体是企业而不是政府，企业以追求利润为宗旨，未必会完全遵照政府指挥而违背市场规律。同时，改革开放 40 多年来，中国在基础设施、市场规模、人才储备和产业集群等方面积累了巨大的优势。这些优势对于全球商业力量而言，已然形成一种强大的“磁场效应”，会对拜登政府经济竞争战略构成强大的对冲之势。中国需要通过对内进一步深化改革，对外加强构建最广泛的经济伙伴关系网络，来化解美国施加的经济竞争压力。

Admittedly, a big shift in the U.S. economic strategy resulting from the New Washington Consensus proposed and followed by U.S. strategic elites has brought grave challenges to China. China will face a more severe external environment in terms of both economic development and security. But one irrefutable fact is that the Biden administration is sailing against the current by attempting to change the market landscape in a forcible way through domestic industrial policy and international economic diplomacy. After all, businesses, not the government, play a principal role in the market. Profit oriented, businesses will not necessarily follow the orders of the government completely and defy the laws of market economics. Besides, in the past 40 years since its reform and opening up, China has built enormous advantages in infrastructure, market size, talent pool, and industrial clusters, among other aspects. These advantages have produced a powerful “magnetic field effect” on the global business circle, and are expected to be a big offset against the economic competition strategy of the Biden administration. What China needs to do is to deepen reform domestically and to build the broadest economic partnership network externally to defuse the economic competition pressure from the U.S.

Comment: I am curious about how friends in the American academic community among GRR's readers view Li Wei's interpretation of the New Washington Consensus.

***

U.S.-Japan Strategic Synergy in Southeast Asia and Its Limitations 美日在东南亚的联手拓展：战略协同与影响限度

By XIANG Haoyu, specially appointed research fellow in the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies, & BAO Zhipeng, assistant research fellow in the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies

美日联手拓展东南亚的成效主要取决于美国的投入，但当前美国受制于国内矛盾以及全球其他方向的精力牵扯，对东盟的实质性投入有限。尽管美国在“印太战略”中提升了对东南亚的重视程度，但依然缺乏对东南亚专门战略谋划和全方位布局。有日本学者指出，拜登政府上台以来对东南亚的政策信号是混乱的，在价值观、对华态度、多边主义等诸多方面的态度自相矛盾。2022 年 5 月，美国邀请东盟十国领导人到华盛顿参加美国—东盟特别峰会，最终仅宣布向东盟投资 1.5 亿美元，用于加强东南亚清洁能源、海上安全和抗击新冠疫情等领域 , 此举令东盟国家感到失望。

The U.S. and Japan are working together to expand their presence in Southeast Asia. How the move will work mainly depends on U.S. engagement, but at present the U.S. isn’t doing much for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries as it has to deal with its domestic issues and problems involving other regions in the world. Although the U.S. has displayed an attitude of placing more importance on Southeast Asia in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, no special planning and all-round arrangement have been in place. A Japanese scholar pointed out that since taking office, the Biden administration has sent out mixed signals about the U.S. policy on Southeast Asia — being self-contradictory in its values, its attitude towards China, multilateralism, and many other aspects. In May 2022, the U.S. invited leaders of the ASEAN countries to a US-ASEAN Special Summit, held for the first time in Washington DC. But in the end, the U.S. only promised to spend 150 million US dollars on clean energy, maritime security, pandemic preparedness and other efforts, a move that disappointed the ASEAN countries.

从执行层面看，美日对东南亚投入依然缺乏战略层面的统筹协调。古贺庆（Kei Koga）认为，美国和日本在其“印太”框架内都缺乏对东盟战略定位的清晰愿景。尽管美日在外交姿态上表达了对东盟的支持，但两国间缺乏 一套明确的协同战略，难以有效赋能东盟。从美日与东南亚的官方合作清单来看，合作项目多侧重于人员培训等能力建设、技术标准制定等领域，虚大于实。在互联互通等基建领域缺乏大手笔项目，突出体现了美日想“花小钱办大事”的功利取向。

At the execution level, the U.S. and Japan still lack strategy-level coordination in their commitments to Southeast Asia. In a paper, Kei Koga said "Neither the United States nor Japan have a clear vision for ASEAN's strategic role in the Indo- Pacific." Despite their supportive diplomatic posture to ASEAN, the author noted, they have not developed a clear set of coordinated strategy to effectively empower ASEAN. The official list of areas for cooperation between the two countries and Southeast Asia mainly covers less-important areas like capacity building through personnel training, and creation of technical standards. There are no large infrastructure projects such as interconnectivity projects, reflecting their utilitarian logic of “doing more with less”.

在价值观层面，美日同盟与东盟的差异主要体现在美日宣扬的西方民主价值观念和东亚推崇的多元共生的文化传统之别。尤其对美国而言，对东南亚外交始终夹杂推广西方民主价值观的冲动。马凯硕指出，东盟帮助建立了一个奉行实用主义和包容文化的合作性地区秩序。这一秩序弥合了本地区重大政治分歧，使大多数东南亚国家专注于经济增长和国家发展。美国不应对各国的政治体制指手画脚。拜登决定将世界政治框定为“民主国家对抗专制国家”是一个错误。

And there exist differences in values between the US-Japan alliance and ASEAN. The former advocate Western democratic values, while the latter embraces diversity and coexistence. The U.S., especially, always tends to promote Western democratic values in its diplomatic engagement with Southeast Asia. In an article published in Foreign Affairs, Kishore Mahbubani, a Singapore-based scholar, said "ASEAN has helped forge a cooperative regional order built on a culture of pragmatism and accommodation. That order has bridged deep political divides in the region and kept most Southeast Asian countries focused on economic growth and development." The US should not interfere in the political systems of different countries. It is wrong for US President Biden to describe world politics as a battle between democracy and autocracy, the author said.

Comment: In September and December, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, a member of ASEAN, in turn. The international community is highly interested in the two countries' diplomatic activities in this region. China may have disagreements with some ASEAN countries on the South China Sea issue, but culturally and geographically, China is undoubtedly closer to ASEAN countries than the United States. This includes Laos and Vietnam, whose political systems, like China's, are socialist. The future diplomatic efforts of China and the United States in this region will certainly remain a hot topic of external attention for a long time.

Subscribe now

Recently, this internet celebrity found himself in a whirlwind of public opinion due to a controversy regarding the priority of his personal brand image and the company's development path. The issue has now reached a temporary resolution, and it seems Dong Yuhui will continue his live-streaming sales with East Buy.

In the era of personal social media, the relationship between companies and the internet celebrities they nurture is something that Chinese internet enterprises need to study further. If readers are interested, I will try to find time in the future to provide more details on this matter.

Today's newsletter will focus on several points of interest from Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Vietnam and his inspection of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. While I'm not sure if this is the President's last visit and inspection for the year, it could be one of the last few newsletters you'll read before the Christmas holidays. I also want to take this opportunity to wish you all a happy holiday season.

1. A China-Vietnam community with a shared future

China, Vietnam agree to build community with shared future that carries strategic significance -- Xinhua

China and Vietnam have announced the new positioning of relations between the two parties and countries and agreed to build a China-Vietnam community with a shared future that carries strategic significance on the basis of deepening the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two sides.

The announcement was made during the ongoing state visit to Vietnam by Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Chinese president.

Pan Jine, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said in an exclusive interview with China Newsweek that it has been 15 years since China and Vietnam established a "comprehensive strategic partnership." It is a logical progression for China and Vietnam to now elevate their bilateral relationship to "a China-Vietnam community with a shared future that carries strategic significance." This is based on the special relationship and historical pattern of the two countries and also meets the demands of the era. She also noted that the new positioning has rich connotations and involves substantive cooperation.

During Xi Jinping's visit, the two sides signed more than 30 cooperation agreements, covering various aspects such as the Belt & Road Initiative, development cooperation, digital economy, green development, transportation, inspection and quarantine, defense and law enforcement security cooperation, and maritime cooperation. These agreements have expanded the breadth and depth of China-Vietnam relations.

2. South China Sea

A joint statement on further deepening and elevating the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and building a China-Vietnam community with a shared future that carries strategic significance

The two sides engage in sincere and straightforward in-depth discussions on sea-related issues, and stress the need to better manage and actively address differences at sea, and maintain peace and stability in the East Sea and the region.

(1) The two sides agree to continue to adhere to important common perceptions between senior leaders of the two Parties and two states, persistently pursue friendly negotiations, strengthen the negotiation mechanism at the governmental level on Vietnam-China border and affiliated working groups; actively seek basic and long-term solutions acceptable by both sides, in accordance with the “Vietnam-China agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues”, and international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982).

(2) The two sides reach consensus on actively speeding up discussions on cooperation for joint development at sea, and on maritime boundary delimitation outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin; towards reaching substantive progress in these two works. The two sides will continue to actively cooperate in less sensitive fields at sea. Intensifying collaboration in fishery law enforcement, and in aquaculture and protection of creature resources in the East Sea. Intensifying cooperation in search and rescue missions at sea.

(3) The two sides agree to continue to comprehensively and effectively implement the “Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea” (DOC) on the basis of consultations and consensus, work to early reach a substantive and efficient “Code of Conduct in the East Sea” (COC) in accordance with international law, including the UNCLOS 1982. Implementing the mechanisms of senior official meetings (SOM) and the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group meetings on the implementation of the “Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea” (DOC); well controlling differences at sea, avoiding acts that complicate the situation and expand disputes, and jointly maintaining stability at sea.

(4) The two sides agree to jointly mark 25 years of land boundary delimitation and 15 years of the signing of three legal documents on Vietnam-China land border in 2024.

As countries that both have disputes with China in the South China Sea, Vietnam's approach is more pragmatic compared to the Philippines. This difference in style can be partially attributed to the special relationship and similarities between Vietnam and China.

Robert Wu, in his newsletter Lost in Translation, mentioned some points that could be enlightening for those not familiar with the relationship between the two countries:

Despite the many disputes and differences, China and Vietnam actually looks very similar. It is not just because both countries are ruled by a communist party. Both countries shared 3 main pillars of their respective societies: a socialist system, with a market economy, and East Asian confucian ethics. Actually in this regard, for both of them, there is no other country in the world that looks quite like each other (For example, even North Korea only shares 2 of the 3 attributes)....

3. China, Vietnam and ASEAN

According to China's General Administration of Customs, goods trade between China and ASEAN reached 5.80 trillion yuan (about 826 billion U.S. dollars) from January to November, accounting for 15.3 percent of China's total trade volume in the period, with ASEAN remaining China's biggest trade partner.

The joint statement also mentioned ASEAN, which many geopolitical analysts believe will play a crucial role in the regional power struggle between China and the United States in the near future. The Chinese leader's solo visit to Vietnam, coinciding with the conclusion of China's important year-end economic work conference, highlights the significance that China attaches to Vietnam.

A joint statement on further deepening and elevating the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and building a China-Vietnam community with a shared future that carries strategic significance

Both sides support ASEAN to maintain its centrality in the unceasingly evolving and changing architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. China supports ASEAN to build the ASEAN Community of solidary, unity, self-resilience and development; accelerates the construction of the version 3.0 ASEAN - China free trade area, deepen the ASEAN - China comprehensive strategic partnership.

In the interview with China Newsweek, Pan Jine points out:

Peripheral diplomacy has always been a priority in China's foreign policy. We have always placed great importance on ASEAN. Over the past 30 years, the relationship between China and ASEAN has continuously achieved new results. Since 2020, China and ASEAN have been each other's largest trading partners for three consecutive years.

Vietnam, as an important member of ASEAN, is a key focus for us. By elevating the China-Vietnam relationship, we aim to demonstrate China's emphasis on ASEAN and to instill confidence in the bloc. This will also inject new momentum into the cooperation between China and ASEAN.

This year also marks the 10th anniversary of Xi Jinping's proposal of the peripheral diplomacy concept of "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness." The enhancement of the China-Vietnam relationship once again demonstrates this diplomatic concept to the region and the world.

4. Guangxi inspection, ASEAN, digital infrastructure

On his way back to China, Xi inspected south China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, which borders Vietnam. On the morning of Dec. 14, he visited the China-ASEAN Information Harbor Co., Ltd. and the Panlong community in Liangqing District, and conducted a field study concerning economic and trade cooperation between China and ASEAN, the development and application of informatization, the improvement of urban community governance system and strengthening ethnic unity.

According to piece published by China News Service on Saturday, the China-ASEAN Information Harbor Co., Ltd., a platform-type information technology company established with the approval of the State Council of China, has been actively promoting the construction of digital infrastructure aimed at ASEAN. The company's Chairman and President, Lu Dongliang, recently revealed in an interview that China-ASEAN Information Harbor Co., Ltd. has completed three international submarine optical cables and twelve international land optical cables around ASEAN, including a transboundary optical cable that passes through the Indochina Peninsula to the Ngwe Saung Cable Landing Station in Myanmar.

Additionally, China-ASEAN Information Harbor Co., Ltd. has built and operates the Lancang-Mekong Cloud Computing Innovation Center in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The company has developed several digital platforms, including the China (Guangxi) International Trade Single Window and the China-ASEAN Cross-Border Credit Reporting Service Platform. These initiatives aim to enhance the level of trade facilitation between China and ASEAN.

I wouldn't be surprised if someone said that the Guangxi inspection and the visit to Vietnam were meticulously planned together.

Xi urges Guangxi to emancipate mind, innovate, promote ocean-oriented economy -- Xinhua

Xi called on Guangxi to actively serve the building of a China-ASEAN community with a shared future, expand in-depth cooperation with ASEAN members in sectors such as commerce, labor, industry, science and technology and education, create a hub where both domestic and international markets can operate conveniently, and deeply integrate itself into the development of the Belt and Road Initiative.

5. More on China-Vietnam cooperation

I invited Jiang Shengxiong, who were assigned to Vietnam by Xinhua for reporting work from 2020 to 2022, to share some of his observations on China-Vietnam cooperation:

Goods trade between China and Vietnam over the 11 months stood at 1.45 trillion yuan, accounting for 25 percent of the trade volume between China and ASEAN, making Vietnam China's largest trade partner within ASEAN.

The agricultural sector stood out as China's trade expenditure for Vietnamese agricultural products saw a 20.3-percent year-on-year increase in trade, with the three products that newly gained market access to China - fresh durians, fresh sweet potatoes and edible bird's nests - being the highlights.

The ever-strengthening China-Vietnam ties in various areas such as infrastructure have favored the transportation for such products. For instance, with the support and sound service from customs, it would only take a batch of Vietnamese sweet potatoes two hours to be granted entry permission and cross the border.

As a former correspondent in Hanoi, Jiang Shengxiong is happy to see such products gain more access to the Chinese market. Usually with fair quality and distinctive aroma, the products - which may also include various tropical fruits and are common in the Chinese market - are likely to become instant favorites among Chinese consumers, whose demand for more diversified and authentic products has been ever-growing.

While intermediate goods continue to hold a predominant position in the bigger picture of China-Vietnam and China-ASEAN trade, he believes it will be down to agricultural products that draw closer the hearts of the people of China and the ASEAN countries, and consolidate the popular foundation of China-ASEAN ties.

Subscribe now

Chinese President Xi Jinping talks with General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee Nguyen Phu Trong at the former residence of late Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, Vietnam, Nov. 13, 2017. (Photo by Xinhua)

Today's piece is a quick summary of some aspects of Xi Jinping's visit to Vietnam that might be of interest to overseas China watchers.

Your Ginger River's two friends, Huang Shuo and Jiang Shengxiong, who were assigned to Vietnam by Xinhua for reporting work from 2020 to 2022, also contribute to today's piece.

Subscribe now

Sino-Vietnam relations

Regarding China's stance on China-Vietnam relations, it is worth noting the latest remarks of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi when he met with his Vietnamese counterpart Bui Thanh Son in Hanoi, Vietnam's capital, on December 1:

Wang Yi Meets with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son -- MFA

Wang Yi said that sharing the same ideals and a shared future are the salient features of China-Viet Nam relations. The two parties and two countries have seen close high-level exchanges and frequent contacts like visiting relatives, which fully demonstrates the high level and special nature of China-Viet Nam relations. China and Viet Nam have the same social system and shared ideals and beliefs, and bilateral relations should be at the forefront compared to other countries. Defining a new positioning and setting new goals for bilateral relations will not only open up new prospects for the development of the relations between the two parties and the two countries, but also make new contributions of China and Viet Nam to the cause of peace and progress of mankind.

Wang Yi emphasized that the foreign affairs departments of the two countries should encourage, support and coordinate with various departments and sub-national governments to follow through on the strategic common understandings reached by the top leaders of the two parties, strengthen inter-party interactions and exchanges of experience in governance, and help reach a new climax in practical cooperation in various fields. China and Viet Nam should actively promote mutually beneficial cooperation related to the sea, prevent the interference of external forces, accelerate consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and make the South China Sea a sea of peace and cooperation. In the international and multilateral fields, China and Viet Nam should closely coordinate and support each other to jointly uphold international fairness and justice.

Bui Thanh Son said

the party, state and people of Viet Nam have special feelings for China, and the friendship between Viet Nam and China is deeply rooted in people's hearts. Viet Nam regards the development of relations with China as a strategic choice and top priority, and hopes to promote the sound, stable and lasting development of relations between the two parties and between the two countries, and elevate bilateral relations to new heights. The foreign affairs departments of the two countries can work closely together, give good play to the role of coordinating and promoting cooperation in various fields, strengthen high-level exchanges and exchanges at various levels, and deepen practical cooperation in agricultural products, connectivity, high technology, tourism, and other fields.

The Vietnamese side is willing to strengthen coordination and cooperation with the Chinese side in international and regional affairs, and support the building of a community with a shared future for mankind, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. China's ideals and initiatives are in line with the spirit of the United Nations Charter and the aspirations of all countries to build a better world, and are conducive to the cause of peace and progress of mankind. The Vietnamese side is willing to work with the Chinese side to jointly maintain maritime peace and stability in accordance with the high-level common understandings between the two countries.

Comment: "Special" is the word mentioned by both foreign ministers. The relations between China and Vietnam are special: both countries are socialist countries led by communist parties, with similar political systems and paths of development as well as interconnected futures; also, China's reform and opening up have provided abundant experiences for Vietnam's development.

• The year of 2023 marks the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between China and Vietnam. (Other countries that boast such a partnership with China include Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Congo, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Kenya, Tanzania, and DR Congo).

• In February, China and Cambodia released a joint statement on building a China-Cambodia community with a shared future in the new era, and in October, the leaders of China and Laos inked an action plan between the CPC and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party on building a community with a shared future for the two countries based on a previous plan of this kind four years ago.

Comment: What is the new position and the new goals that the Chinese foreign minister is implying? Will it be another level of partnership or something concrete in the building of a community with a shared future for humanity? And how will that help solve the divergence on the South China Sea issue?

U.S.-Vietnam relations

U.S. President Biden paid a state visit to Vietnam on September 10 this year. During Biden's visit, the U.S. and Vietnam announced the elevation of their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, expanding cooperation in multiple areas including semiconductor supply chains, workforce development, scientific research, and mineral supply chains.

Regarding the purpose of this visit, Biden repeatedly mentioned China at press conferences and other occasions. He claimed that the U.S. is not seeking to contain China and is looking to improve relations with China. He "want to see China succeed economically", but this is contingent on adherence to what he referred to as "the rules".

On September 11, 2023, U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam. Behind them is a large bust of Ho Chi Minh, who led Vietnam during the Vietnam War against the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. (Photo Source: Reuters)

Hanoi’s American Hedge -- Why a New U.S. Partnership Is Unlikely to Change Vietnam’s Multialignment Strategy -- Foreign Affairs (Sept. 13, 2023)

Yet it is far too simplistic to assume that Vietnam is choosing to align with the United States. For one thing, although Vietnam reserves its comprehensive strategic partnerships for a select group of countries, that list also includes China, India, Russia, and South Korea. And it maintains other levels of partnerships with many other states. In fact, such complex and multilayered ties—including with countries that are themselves rivals—is characteristic of Vietnam’s approach. The government has long sought to align itself with multiple countries rather than a single power. At the same time, for Vietnam, it is no secret that China is both an obstacle to and an impetus for enhanced security ties with the United States. Getting too close to Washington too soon could be seen as a provocation to Beijing and would likely invite some form of retaliation that Hanoi seeks to avoid.

Prof. 沈逸 SHEN Yi with Department of International Politics at Fudan University analyzed the U.S.-Vietnam relations in an article published on Global Times after Biden's visit to Vietnam:

Drawing over Vietnam is an important component of the United States' so-called strategy of confronting China around the world, which goes in line with some American elites' perceptions, and meets the Biden administration's needs to gain the upper hand in the 2024 presidential election in terms of short-term benefits.

......

For Vietnam, it's actually not hard to make a choice. Above all, based on basic rationality, it's easy to choose between having just a full meal and making sure every meal is full. Following the United States' steps as it envisioned might bring Vietnam some benefits in the short term, but such benefits are unstable and are largely dependent on the changes in the U.S. political picture and adjustments to the U.S. foreign policy.

......

On the other hand, what Vietnam can gain from China's economic development as China's neighbor not only includes inspiration and impact from a psychological and cognitive sense, but also includes the apparent development and enhancement brought by industrial transfer and economic and trade cooperation.

......

Generally speaking, in terms of Biden's visit to Vietnam, the U.S. side had put in a lot of effort in its early preparations and a lot of work in the international public opinion, trying to create a false perception that Vietnam would easily "jump onto the U.S. ship." The reality and the future development, however, will prove that the Biden administration's little ruses are all in vain.

Comment: How Vietnam navigates its relationships with both China and the United States is worth paying attention to. Perhaps many other countries facing similar situations, especially those in Southeast Asia, are also watching closely.

The Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)

China and Vietnam have been working closely together regarding development strategies, including joint efforts in advancing the synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the "Two Corridors and One Economic Circle" plan. During Xi's visit to Vietnam in 2017, more than 10 cooperation documents were signed between the two countries in fields such as frontier defense, the synergy between the BRI and the "Two Corridors and One Economic Circle" plan and renewable energy.

The "Two Corridors and One Economic Circle" plan, also known as "Two Corridors, One Belt," was proposed in 2004 by then-Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai during a state visit to China. The two corridors refer to the "Kunming-Laojie-Hanoi-Hai Phong-Quang Ninh" and the "Nanning-Luong Son-Hanoi-Hai Phong-Quang Ninh" economic corridors. The economic circle refers to the Beibu Gulf economic rim.

Officially inaugurated in January 2022, the China-constructed Cat Linh-Ha Dong metro line in the Vietnamese capital Hanoi stands as a landmark project of the synergy between the BRI and the "Two Corridors and One Economic Circle" plan.

A train runs during the operational drill of Cat Linh-Ha Dong urban railway project in Hanoi, capital of Vietnam, June 7, 2019. (Xinhua/Wang Di)

Comment: This Linh-Ha Dong metro line reminds me of a metro line project I saw in Lahore, Pakistan, which was constructed with Chinese assistance. Such projects, being closely connected to the daily lives of local residents, are sometimes more well-known locally than power station or hydroelectric projects in remote mountainous areas.

The South China Sea

Despite maritime differences between the countries, not least proven by Vietnam's long-term claim of sovereignty over what it calls as Truong Sa Islands and Hoang Sa Islands (China's Nansha Islands and Xisha Islands, respectively), the two countries have been strengthening maritime cooperation.

Chinese and Vietnamese coast guards have been carrying out joint patrols twice a year in the Beibu Gulf area as part of concrete measures to implement the consensus between the CPC and CPV on maritime law enforcement, according to China News Service.

The latest took place from Nov. 29 to Dec. 1. Such joint patrols have become an example of law enforcement cooperation in the South China Sea as they contribute to the efforts to crack down on maritime crimes and safeguard regional peace and stability.

Comment: I guess since Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned the South China Sea in his conversation on Dec. 1, there might be some statements regarding the South China Sea during the meeting between the leaders of the two countries. However, given the current complex regional environment, it is difficult to say whether there will be any major breakthroughs in their expressions.

Supply Chain

The transfer of some of China's lower-end manufacturing industries to countries like Vietnam is an undeniable fact, while China is currently upgrading to mid-to-high-end manufacturing.

Supply chains headline China-Vietnam talks as US vies for influence -- South China Morning Post

Vietnam is China’s biggest trading partner in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. China registered US$2.92 billion in direct investment in Vietnam over the first nine months of the year, 94.9 per cent higher than in the first three quarters of last year, according to Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment.

In late November, Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao told Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh that the neighbors should cooperate on “interconnection”, while Pham advocated the promotion of railway links.

The two countries are considering a major upgrade of their underdeveloped rail links to improve a line that runs across Vietnam’s rare earths heartland to the country’s top port in the north, according to a report by Reuters.

Vietnam's factory doldrums show limits of shift out of China -- NIKKEI Asia

HO CHI MINH CITY -- Weakening global demand has left Vietnam facing its worst factory downturn in a decade, a sign that the shift in supply chains away from China has benefited the Southeast Asian country less than expected.

Shipments of Samsung phones and Adidas shoes have slowed in the country, a top producer of electronics and textiles, and overall exports plunged 10% on the year in January through August, the latest data shows. That is a sharp contrast with the 17% growth recorded a year earlier.

One upshot is that manufacturers are cutting back on staffing at a time of year when they are typically gearing up for Christmas orders. Industrial job losses pushed 300,000 Vietnamese into the gray economy in the second quarter, doing work such as fishing, farming or cleaning homes, according to the national statistics office.

......

Washington will help fund development of rare earths in the communist country, which has the second-biggest deposits, after only China. It also will donate $2 million for training workers in the assembly, testing and packaging of semiconductors. Meanwhile Amkor will open a $1.6 billion chip factory and Marvell will establish a semiconductor design center in the country.

"This partnership might spawn new opportunities for Vietnamese enterprises," Chaisse said, "thereby catalyzing an economic rebound."

Comment: Although a year and a half has passed, some of the views expressed in the article published last year by GRR, comparing the potential of Vietnam, India, and China in being the 'world's factory', are still relevant:

The article points out that despite the fact that both Vietnam and India are major destinations for China's migrating electronics industry, Vietnam seems to China as a collaborator, whereas India comes off as a competitor.

The article also mentions that the business climate in the south and southeast Asian countries has its own set of issues. Industrial chain spillover is not necessarily a bad thing for Chinese enterprises that take the initiative to "go global," and China's dominant position will not be challenged in the short term.

Huang Shuo’s take

Huang Shuo worked as Xinhua's correspondent based in Hanoi between 2020 and 2022. Here she shares some of her memories of Vietnam:

When I first arrived in Hanoi in early 2020, I hardly went through any culture shock to adapt to this city. Streets, shopping malls, and the traffic of course, are as busy and crowded as those in Beijing; young people love pop culture and enjoy taking selfies at fancy cafeterias; the Vietnamese language even shares similar pronunciations with Cantonese for many words; propaganda posters can be seen along the street (you can also see a poster featuring Uncle Ho Chi Minh holding a baby at Trang Tien Plaza, Hanoi's key business street)...... Oftentimes I would not feel like living in a "foreign" city though sometimes Hanoi seemed like what Chinese cities looked like one or two decades ago.

In Hanoi and many other big cities in Vietnam, you can find a local person speaking more or less Chinese without much effort. Chinese television dramas and stars are popular among Vietnamese young people (One of our assistants, for example, has been learning Chinese by herself through watching Chinese dramas). Haidilao has opened several outlets in Hanoi, which have attracted many local customers. Although remarks defaming China can always be found in Vietnamese media reports, there is no doubt that cultural and personnel exchanges between China and Vietnam are frequent with a firm basis.

From political and economic perspectives, Chinese experiences are also inspiring for Vietnam. Like China's reform and opening up, Vietnam launched its economic reforms, known as "Đổi Mới" in Vietnamese, in the 1980s, which contributed to the country's economic take-off. As China steps up efforts to combat corruption, Vietnam is now intensifying its anti-graft crackdown, with multiple officials of medication and foreign affairs being investigated and punished for corruption during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This photo taken on April 10, 2022 shows the Hoan Kien pedestrian zone beside Trang Tien Plaza in downtown Hanoi. The pedestrian zone around Hanoi's Hoan Kien Lake opens every weekend, during which no motor vehicles can bypass. The poster features Ho Chi Minh holding a baby, with words below reading "Rebuilding our country to be a more decent and more beautiful one." (Photo taken by Huang Shuo)