How has the South China Sea issue evolved to its current stage?

Former senior Chinese diplomat's detailed account of history of the South China Sea issue

and

May 15, 2024

Recently, a sequence of crucial news events directly tied to China have aligned with significant milestones. In just five days, Taiwan will have a new leader, and today, a spokesperson of the mainland's Taiwan affairs office said at a regular press conference that China will introduce legal measures to punish diehards whose actions and rhetoric aggressively promote "Taiwan independence."

From Thursday to Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin will pay a state visit to China, which that has garnered much attention. Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden is ramping up tariffs on Chinese-made electric cars, solar panels, steel and other goods. China's commerce ministry said on Tuesday said China firmly opposes U.S. tariff hike on Chinese goods, and will take resolute measures to safeguard its own rights and interests.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen discussed U.S.'s tariffs policy on China today in an interview, and I fear her remarks might quickly overshadow some positive reception she gained during her "culinary diplomacy" in China — a term coined by some China watchers, not officially confirmed.

The situation in the South China Sea remains concerning. About 100 Filipino activists and fishermen, along with journalists, sailed Wednesday to a shoal in the South China Sea, according to AP.

I'm unsure if I can cover all these significant issues in my upcoming newsletters due to time constraints. In today's piece, I will share a translation of two chapters related to the South China Sea issue from the book 看世界2: 百年变局下的挑战和抉择 Seeing the World 2 by Fu Ying, Vice-Chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China's 13th National People's Congress and previously Vice Foreign Minister and Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Philippines. I believe her perspective is worth noting, even if it may differ from some Western readers' views.

As some of you might have observed, about a month ago, a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers introduced legislation to establish a research center “dedicated to producing publicly accessible, accurate English translations” of open-source materials from China. Given the surge in translation projects involving publicly available information from China, challenges with accuracy are not uncommon, especially from some overseas translation projects. Today’s piece strives to offer overseas observers of China accurate information.

Moreover, a recent interview conducted by Xinhuanet with Anthony Carty, a British scholar on international law, concerning the South China Sea, is also worth noting. You can also learn about this interview by listening to a podcast episode.

Lastly, some GRR readers recently pointed out that the term "the West" often used in Chinese discourse to refer to many countries, including those in Europe, doesn't always reflect the diverse viewpoints of individual nations. I'm considering alternatives to this term and welcome your suggestions.

Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea Issue[1] (from Page 358 to 360)

The Hague tribunal will issue a final verdict on 12 July 2016 regarding the much-discussed South China Sea arbitration case, between China and the Philippines. Many Western countries have already started urging China to accept the ruling, seemingly they already know the result: China will lose. But Beijing's position is clear: no acceptance, no participation, no recognition and no implementation. There is a solid international legal basis for China to oppose this case. As in doing so, China is not only safeguarding its national interests but is also protecting the integrity and legitimacy of the international maritime order.

Why does China refuse to accept or participate in the proceedings of this tribunal, being held at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague? Because as a sovereign state, China is entitled to choose its means of dispute resolution: a legitimate right under international law. Moreover, the Philippines' case is inherently illegal and ﬂawed, as it is not only an abuse of the dispute settlement procedures, but also a distortion of concepts, with deliberate concealment of the real nature of the disputes.

The Philippines' arbitration relates to the dispute over sovereignty of islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and to maritime delimitation. But these territorial issues are not regulated at the Hague, as they are beyond the scope of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 2006, China declared it would exclude "disputes concerning maritime delimitation" from compulsory arbitration, under Article 298 of UNCLOS. Furthermore, the Philippines failed to meet UNCLOS preconditions when it unilaterally initiated the compulsory arbitration process.

UNCLOS clearly stipulates "no arbitration without the existence of a dispute," a principle that requires the existence of a real dispute between the parties. Additionally, discussions or at least exchanges must have taken place between the two countries, before arbitration is requested. In fact, neither precondition was met. China has never presented specific claims relating to individual islands, as it has always treated them as part of its Zhongsha Islands and Nansha Island groups. The Philippines and China did not have discussions or exchanges on this matter. So the assertions of an "impasse" with China in "the bilateral exchanges" and "the great many subsequent exchanges," were untrue. In fact, China had tried in vain to engage the Philippines in meaningful discussions.

The Philippines' unilateral initiation of arbitration fell short of meeting UNCLOS's conditions, and in doing so, it violated an earlier agreement with China. Both countries had previously stated their commitment to bilateral negotiations and consultations as the means of settling disputes.

Why does China find it impossible to recognize and implement the tribunal's upcoming decision? Although Article 288(4) of UNCLOS stipulates that the tribunal should decide whether it has jurisdiction and the application of this provision is not unconditional. Indeed, there is no such thing as absolute power in international law. This tribunal, whose authority and powers are conferred by its member states, is an international dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS. If the tribunal abuses its power, China or any other member of the international community has the right to reject its decisions. And in this case, the tribunal has acted recklessly. In violating the basic principles of the international law, the faith China and other nations had in UNCLOS has been undermined.

Although we do not yet know the outcome, we do know that the tribunal failed to fully understand or investigate the real dispute between China and the Philippines. It disregarded the essence and purpose of the Filipino claims and deliberately regarded it merely as an issue of the interpretation and application of UNCLOS. But in fact, the handling of the submissions went far beyond this scope. There is a deep concern in China that the tribunal is failing to consider the specific geographical framework and situation in the South China Sea, where the maritime claims of the two countries potentially overlap.

Given the above, it is not hard to understand why China has decided not to recognize and implement the tribunal's decision. More than 60 countries have voiced their support for China's position of resolving the issue through negotiations and consultations. China, as a signatory to UNCLOS, supports and respects the treaty's principles and spirit. What China opposes is not UNCLOS and compulsory arbitration, but the tribunal's abuse of power in handling this case.

Today, most disputes are resolved through negotiations directly between the countries concerned. The prerequisite for such negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, is the consensus of or an agreement reached by all concerned. China's claim and position in this case are consistent not only with the spirit of international law but also with recognized practices in international relations.

This arbitration cannot resolve the disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, but will increase tensions and undermine peace and stability in the region. If the coastal countries around the South China Sea do not intend to heighten tensions, they need to return to the path of seeking resolution through negotiation. China and the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have agreed to handle issues through a dual-track approach and resolve disputes through peaceful negotiations. Consultations on the code of conduct in the South China Sea region are making progress, and this momentum should not be interrupted.

As President Xi Jinping said, China is committed to upholding international justice and is opposed to forcing one's will upon others. The handling of the South China Sea issue has a bearing on justice, as well as peace and stability. Countries in the region need to work together to build rules-based cooperation. The international community should support the efforts made by China and other coastal states to manage and resolve disputes in a peaceful manner, respect China's choice of resorting to negotiations as the means to settle disputes, and protect the legitimacy and fairness of international mechanisms, especially UNCLOS.

Got to This Stage[2] (from Page 371 to 376)

The second decade of the 21st century has seen the South China Sea issue turning into the most important and difﬁcult topic in the China-US dialogues. The rhetoric is heating up on both sides and tense atmosphere is also rising between the militaries of the two countries. This issue is turning into a platform of rivalry and confrontation between China and the US, which leads to the two sides to reassess each other's intentions from a strategic perspective.

In the year 2016, the debate is about who is militarizing the South China Sea and freedom of navigation operations. Voices in favor of military confrontation are emerging in both countries. The friction over the South China Sea issue further reveals the lack of strategic trust between China and the US. David M. Lampton, an American scholar, has warned the two countries by stating that "a tipping point in US-China relations is upon us". The South China Sea issue, if not a major contributor to the current turbulent China-US relations, is at least an important catalyst.

The two countries have different opinions about what has led to the current situation. In China, it is widely believed that it is the US' Asia-Pacific Rebalance strategy, its taking sides on disputes in the South China Sea, and its direct intervention in the disputes that have escalated tensions and made the South China Sea issue more complicated. In the US, the concern is that China is trying to drive the US out of the South China Sea with a salami-slicing strategy and will try to eventually turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake.

History shows that the core issue in the South China Sea is disputes between China and some Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines. All the incidents and events that have unfolded over the years have been about sovereignty and rights over the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters. Such disputes are not uncommon, as throughout the world history, especially in the Cold War after World War Two when seeds of disputes were sown for many African and Asian countries.

However, the disputes in the South China Sea have long been kept under control thanks to the joint efforts of China and the other coastal countries. A good proof was the "golden era" of the China-ASEAN relations from 1991 to the end of 2010, during which bilateral cooperation flourished and trade ballooned nearly 37 times, from no more than $8 billion to $300 billion. During this period, China's GDP rose rapidly, and most Southeast Asian economies expanded more than five-fold.

Tensions started to build up in 2009 and have further escalated since 2012. It is worth the effort to examine the incidents and the behavior of countries concerned, the reactions they triggered, and the consequences incurred, in the leading up to the current state of affairs. This paper provides an overview of the chain of events contributing to the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea, as well as their context and possible connections.

It is hoped that this paper will help those interested in the issue see the bigger picture and get to the heart of why things have happened the way they have. It is also hoped to be a reminder of the danger of deepening misunderstanding and spiraling of tensions.

The Japanese and other foreign invasion of Nansha islands and reefs

The South China Sea is the largest marginal sea in the West Pacific region, covering an area of 3.5 million kilometers. It is located south of China and the island of Chinese Taiwan, west of the Philippines, north of Kalimantan and Sumatra, and east of the Malay and Indo-China peninsulas. It connects the Pacific through the Bashi and Balintang channels in the northeast, and the joining the Sulu sea through Mindoro and Balabas straits in the southeast; joins the Java Sea through the Karimata and Gaspar straits in the south, and is linked with the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca in the southwest. Rich in fishery resources and oil and gas reserves, the sea plays an important role in the economic development of the coastal countries.

since 2012. It is worth the effort to examine the incidents and the behavior of countries concerned, the reactions they triggered, and the consequences incurred, in the leading up to the current state of affairs. This paper provides an overview of the chain of events contributing to the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea, as well as their context and possible connections.

The Japanese and other foreign invasion of Nansha islands and reefs

China has sovereignty over all the four archipelagos in the South China Sea, namely, the Xisha, Nansha, Zhongsha and Dongsha Islands, which are indicated by the 9-dotted lines (originally 11-dotted lines) on the map drawn in 1947 by the Chiang Kai-shek clique which was an ally to the US. The Nansha Islands (coordinates: 3°40'-11°55' N; 109°33'-117°50' E) comprise over 230 islands, islets, sandbanks, rocks and shoals that are scattered along a 1,000-kilometer span from the southeast to the northwest of the Sea. China was the first to discover, name the Nansha Islands (meaning south-sand islands) and the first to exercise sovereignty over them. That exercise has been ongoing[3]. Before the 1930s, there was no dispute over China's ownership of the Nansha Islands and China's ownership was reflected in many maps and encyclopedias published around the world.

At the beginning of the 20th century, western colonial powers, including the UK, Germany, France and Japan, kept coveting the Nansha Islands as they were colonizing Southeast Asia and invading China. But most of their territorial ambitions ended in failure due to strong resistance from China's late Qing dynasty and later Chiang Kai shek clique as well as the general public. In the 1930s, France provoked the "Nine Isles Incident" in the South China Sea and tried to take over some of the isles and was again strongly opposed by the Chiang Kai-skek clique. During World War Two, Japan seized the Nansha Islands in 1939, as part of its effort to control Southeast Asia and in preparations for invasion of Australia.[4]

The Cairo Declaration of November 1943, signed by the heads of the Republic of China(1912-1949), the United States and the United Kingdom, proclaimed that "...Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of WWI in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Presentday Taiwan, China), and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."[5] The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 also stipulated in its eighth article that "the Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine, as had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943.[6]

In December 1946, a year after the defeat of Japan, the government of the Republic of China organized patrols by warships and to reclaim to the Nansha Islands including Taiping and Zhongye. During that trip monuments were erected on Taiping Island (a pronunciation based on the Chinese dialect in the island) and Zhongye Island. Also in 1947, on Taiping Island, administration was established by Chiang Kai-shek clique.

In 1947, it organized the compilation of Nan Hai Zhu Dao Di Li Zhi Lüe (A Brief Account of the Geography of the South China Sea Islands), and on the basis of geographic survey, renamed some of the islands in South China Sea historically under China's jurisdiction, including their components such as islands, reefs sandbanks and shoals, which accounted a total of 172 collective and individual geographic names. Among them, 102 belonged to the Nansha Islands.

Its officials, together with experts made a trip to South China Sea in 1947 and accomplished the ceremonies of recovery of sovereignty over Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands. They also made survey of the two groups of islands, and drew the Nan Hai Zhu Dao Wei Zhi Tu (A Location Map of the Islands in the South China Sea) on which the 11-dotted line was marked. They completed the work with the US help. This map was officially published and made known to the world in February 1948.

Given the American presence in the regionduring World War Two and in the postwar Asia and its alignment relationship with the Chiang Kai-shek, and then the Taiwan region, there is every reason to believe that the US government was aware of and supported China's recovery of sovereignty over Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands. It should also be in the know of the postwar publication of map and geographic names, and the status quo in the South China Sea. The US had made no objection after the publication of the map. Chiang Kai-shek and his clique fled to the island of Taiwan and continued to enjoy American support. This development started to subtly change the US attitude. In the face of China's division on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and the outbreak of the Cold War, the US opted for a more pragmatic approach regarding the ownership of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea. This was reflected in the Peace Treaty of San Francisco between Japan and some of the Allied Powers. Signed on 8 September 1951 and entering into force on 28 April 1952, the document served to end the allied postwar occupation of Japan and establish Japan's territory and role in the international arena after its defeat in World War Two. Japan officially renounced its rights to Korea, Taiwan and Penghu, Kurile Islands, sakhalin Island, Ckuye Island, the Nansha Islands and the Xisha Islands. Article 2(6) provided that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Nansha Islands and to the Xisha Islands." But the document failed to specify the ownership of these islands.[7] Though China was one of the biggest victims of and one of the four largest victors over the Japanese militarism, the People's Republic of China was not invited to the treaty talks held in San Francisco. As the talks were going on, the central government of the PRC issued a Declaration in the name of the then Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on 15 August 1951, over the Draft Peace Treaty with Japan by the US and the UK and on the San Francisco Conference. The Declaration affirmed China's consistent sovereignty over the archipelagos in the South China Sea, including the Nansha Islands, and protested about the absence of any provision in the draft on China's taking over of the South China Sea islands following Japan's renouncement of all rights, title and claim to them. It reiterated that "the Chinese Government of the day had taken over those islands" as referred above after the surrender of Japan and that "the People's Republic of China's rightful sovereignty shall remain intact, whatever the outcome of the conference may be."[8]

Following the San Francisco Talks, the US, in its effort to reconcile the relations between Japan and the Taiwan authorities for the sake of serving its strategic interest in the Asia Pacific, presided over the signing of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Taiwan authorities in April 1952. Article 2 of the document provided that "It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Peace Treaty with Japan by the US and the UK signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan and Penghy (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands(China's Nansha Islands) and the Paracel Islands(China's Xisha Islands)." Indeed, the United States at that time still deemed the Taiwan authorities as China's legitimate government and there is no doubt that the Treaty means for the Taiwan authorities to have reclaimed, on behalf of China, the territories in the South China Sea forcibly seized by Japan.

Contending parties during the Cold War

Starting from the mid 1950s, the Philippines and the South Vietnam (then the Republic of Vietnam) started to move onto some of the islands and shoals in the South China Sea. Growing occupation activities by other claimants in the later years give rise to territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.

In 1956, Tomas Cloma, a Filipino adventurer, announced his discovery of a group of islands in the Nansha waters, and regarded them "free land".[9] The Philippine government then claimed that they were entitled to those islands. But being aware of the Taiwan authority's position on the sovereignty over these Islands, Manila once intended to send a delegation to Taiwan to discuss the matter.[10]

After Vietnam was divided into the North part and South part by the Geneva Treaty of 1954,[11] a fierce civil war erupted in the country. The two sides took different positions regarding this issue. North Vietnam, held a clear position supporting China's sovereign rights in the South China Sea. South Vietnam started in 1962 to occupy some islands and shoals in South China Sea, including Nanzi Islands, Dungian Cay, Hongxiu Island, Jinghong Island, Nanwei Island, and Anho Cay. Such actions provoked strong voice of protest on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

During the period between 1970 to 1980, a bigger wave of occupation took place. It was mainly prompted by the discovery of oil and gas resources in the islands and waters off the Nansha Islands. Multiple survey published by the US and UN disclosed that the continental shelf of the South China Sea was rich in oil and gas resources. The negotiations and completion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also influenced the development. According to UNCLOS, a state has jurisdiction over 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (about 370 kilometers) from its territorial sea baseline, one of utmost system innovations in UNCLOS.

The new rules concerning the maritime rights have further complicated the South China Sea issue given to the reality that the ownership of the islands shoals is in disputes and the delimitation of maritime right are without proper base. However, lured by precious resources, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia sped up infringing upon China's legitimate rights in the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters.

Vietnam's position went through a change as affected by the domestic development. Up to 1974, the government of North Vietnam had consistently acknowledged that the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands were integral part of Chinese territory. However, as the North was winning the war and was about to unite with the South, it began to reverse their stance. In 1975, North Vietnam, on the pretext of "liberation," occupied six islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands which were formerly seized by South Vietnam.

In 1979, China fought a self-defense war with Vietnam in land border areas and the relationship became colder. In 1988 China started setting up marine observation station in Nansha Islands area in the project coordinated by the Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO. Vietnam tried to prevent it, and on 14 March 1988, it sent combat ships and fired at Chinese personnel working on the Chigua Reef. Later Chinese military fired back. So the two sides exchanged fires, claiming heavy casualties. After this incident, to make sure that the project safely implemented and also to prevent further occupation of islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands, China decided to deploy forces on longshu Reef, Huayang Reef, Dongmen Reef, Nanxun Reef, Zhubi Reef, Chigua Reef.

Other claimants have also become more aggressive in their stance on the Nansha Islands. By formulating their national laws of the sea or issuing political statements, they officially asserted sovereignty claims over the Nansha Islands and rights claims over waters off the Nansha Island. Towards the end of 1980s, the Philippines had already occupied eight islands and reefs, including Feixin Island and Zhongye Island included. Malaysia had seized Danwan Reef, Nanhai Reef and Guangxingzai Reef.

During this period, the US remained committed to acknowledging China's sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. This is clearly indicated in the form of diplomatic inquiries, measurement requests, and flight plan notifications. The Taiwan authorities received visits by American military officials on Taiping Island of Nansha which it occupied. Regarding issues on islands occupation by countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, the US government did not reveal its stance in public, but it did make enquiries to the Taiwan authorities multiple times relating to the Nansha sovereignty issue.[12] Take for example, from 1957 to February 1961, the US Government made application requests to "the Taiwan authorities" for allowing the US Air Force based in the Philippines to conduct nautical chart measurement and meteorological surveys in the vicinity of Huangyan Island and the Nansha Islands.

For a long period after World War Two, the acknowledgement of China's sovereignty over the islands and shoals in the South China Sea was also indicated in a variety of maps and books published in the US, such as Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World (1961), Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (1963), and Constitutions of the Countries of the World (1971), to name a few.

A policy dilemma for the US was that on the ground of international laws and moral principles, it should have supported China's sovereignty over these territories.However, for its anti-communism stance and its strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region, the US was unwilling to let the PRC to have control over them. Furthermore, it was also unwilling to hurt relations with its allies like the Philippines.

Road to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China

In the early 1990s, as the Cold War came to an end and economic integration accelerated in the Asia Pacific region, China and Southeast Asian countries and the Association of Southeart Asian Nations (ASEAN). switched to a fast track toward establishing rapport. In 1990 it resumed diplomatic ties with Indonesia and established diplomatic relations with Singapore. In 1992, it became ASEAN's dialogue partner.

Since then, China has embarked on a path of confidence-building and all-round cooperation with ASEAN, guided by its foreign policy of building and maintaining stability in the neighborhood. In China's dialogues with its Southeast Asian neighbors, the Nansha issue was the most frequently debated problem. China, based on its ancestrally inherited ownership of the islands in the South China Sea with historical and legal evidence, had consistently defended its indisputable sovereignty as it did in the past. However, in order to stabilize the newly established ties, China resorted to the approach it used for addressing the disputes over the Diaoyy Islands in the East China Sea: Setting aside the disputes while pursuing joint development of resources without abandoning territorial sovereignty.

In 1994, China normalized its diplomatic relations with Vietnam. In 1995, ASEAN expanded to 10 countries with the admission of Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. In 1996, China became ASEAN's full dialogue partner. When a serious financial crisis hit Asia in 1997, China stood firm and offered strong support to the region, living up to being a responsible partner, winning wide praise and greater trust from ASEAN countries. In 1997, the first ASEAN-China (10+1) Informal Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at which the 11 countries announced the establishment of "a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust."

During this period, the rapid development of the China-ASEAN relations largely masked undulating contention in the South China Sea; nevertheless, disputes surfaced from time to time.

A major development was a new wave of unilateral occupation of the Nansha Islands and the drilling for oil and gas in the surrounding waters. In the 1990s, Vietnam took 5 more reefs and shoals, bringing a total of 29 islands and reefs under its occupation. By March 1994, Vietnam had licensed out 120 oil blocks for bidding in the Nansha and Xisha waters. Malaysia also seized Yuya Shoal and Boji Reef in 1999, and it accounted for over half of the oil rigs erected by all claimant countries. Its maritime law enforcement forced also registered the largest number of expulsions and arrests of Chinese fishermen in the 1990s.

Another source of tension was caused by a series of provocations from the Philippines concerning Meiji Reef, Huangyan Island and Renai Shoal.

In 1994, to better provide for Chinese fishermep, China built shelter facilities on Meiji Reef. The Philippines reacted strongly by taking a series of actions. In late March 1995, its navy force blew up survey markers that China had installed on Wufang Atoll, Xian'e Reef, Xinyi Shoal, Banyue Shoal and Ren'ai Shoal. Its patrol ships, with the support by its air force, attacked 4 Chinese fishing vessels berthed near Banyue Shoal and 62 Chinese fishermen on these vessels were brought into custody. On May 13, the Philippine military escalated the tension and send out fleets in an attempt to land on Meiji Reef by force to hamper the construction, only to end up in an 8 hour standoff against China's fishery administration ship "Yuzheng 34". Chinese side managed to finish its construction work on Meiji Reef.

Huangyan Island is part of China's Zhongsha Islands, east of the Manila Trench and facing the Philippine Islands. No later than in Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), China had already discovered and exercised jurisdiction over Huangyan Island. Both the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) Party and the PRC have declared China's sovereignty over Huangyan Island on multiples occasions. The Philippine official document and maps made no indication of differences regarding this fact and the Huangyan Island has always been marked as outside of Philippine territorial water on its national maps. It was only from 1990s that the Philippine government started making disputes regarding this island. In fact, before 1997, the Philippines had never staked a claim over Huangyan Island.

It is recognized that, the Philippines' territory was defined mainly in the 1898 Treaty of Paris, between the US and Spain, the 1900 Treaty of Washington between the US and Spain as well as the 1930 Convention between the US and Great Britain. All three treaties contain explicit clauses defining the territory of the Philippines as being east of the 118th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich. Huangyan Island is located clearly to the west of that line and has never belonged to the Philippines. The Philippine government had not included Huangyan Island into its scope of territory or sovereignty, and its own officially published maps of 1967, 1981 and 1984 clearly marked Huangyan Island is outside of the dotted Philippine boundary.

In a letter responding to a German radio amateur's enquiry in February 1992, the then Philippine Ambassador to Germany clearly stated that the Huangyan Island did not fall within the territorial sovereignty of the Philippines.[13] Even as recently as on 18 October 1994, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority of the Philippines (NAMRIA) confirmed that the territorial boundaries and sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines were established in Article III of the Treaty of Paris signed on 10 December 1898. Huangyan Island clearly lies outside those limits.[14]

In late April of 1997, a Philippine Naval ship came to the Huangyan Island, blew up the territory monument that China had erected, and planted the national flag of the Philippines. Chinese marine surveillance ships arrived on the scene and the two sides went into a stand-off for some time and ended without serious incident. In the following years, the Philippine navy continued to expel, arrest and even shoot at Chinese fisherman who passed the Huangyan Island.

In May of 1999, when I was serving as Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, a fishery dispute occurred near Huangyan Island. I was invited to speak to the International Press Club in Manila the next day. On my way to the club, I stopped over at a newspaper stand on the street and bought a map of the Philippines published by the NAMRIA. As I was speaking to both the local and international journalists, I showed the map to them see that the Huangyan Island was clearly marked outside of the Philippine territory.

On 9 May 1999, the Philippine military sailed the Landing Ship Tank the Sierra Madre (No 57) into the Ren'ai Reef and refused to move away on the excuse of a leakage at the bottom of cabin. It has stayed there ever since and the servicemen on the retired military vessel have been rotated from time to time. Chinese side made repeated diplomatic representations requesting them to leave but with no success. On 3 November 1999, the Philippines played the same trick again and this time at the Huangyan Island. It claimed another retired military vessel was "stranded" on the northern side of the Southeastern mouth of the Huangyan Island lagoon. Then Chinese side brought compelling diplomatic pressure on the Philippines. Under the then Philippine President Estrada's order, the Philippine military towed the ship back to pier on 29 November, 1999.

Chinese government, with a view to containing the disputes and stabilizing the situation for the sake of preserving the sound China-ASEAN partnership, stepped up diplomatic efforts to communicate with the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. In particular, China held multiple rounds of negotiation and consultation with the Philippines, to ease the situation. In March 1999, the first round of China-Philippines Experts Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures took place in Manila. More consultations were subsequently held, and the two sides agreed to exercise restraint and "not to take actions that might escalate the situation".

The other ASEAN countries were watching the South China Sea issue closely, and held multiple rounds of consultations with China too. Earlier in the 1990s, there were also Track 1.5 meetings, a series of semi-official and semi-academic closed-door dialogues. They were all aimed at in-depth discussion on territorial disputes and territorial water delimitations. Both China and Chinese Taiwan region participated in these dialogues. One important consensus was that the Nansha disputes were complicated and difficult to solve, nevertheless, they should be settled through peaceful negotiations, and the proposition of "shelving the disputes" which China put forward was the most viable option in the process. It was also generally acknowledged by the parties that before any resolution of the disputes was achieved, persisting in one's territorial claim would only escalate the conflict. Therefore, it was wise to shelve the disputes and start joint developments. Those discussions laid foundations for further consensus between China and the ASEAN countries later. In 1998, with an aim to enhance regional integration, the ASEAN Summit adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action, proposing that efforts should be made to "establish a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea among the parties directly concerned." [15] Working for building mutual confidence and friendly relations with the neighbors, China in principle agreed to join consultation about "the code of conduct."[16]

On 15 March 2000 an informal consultation was held between China and ASEAN countries in Thailand, and "the code of conduct" documents drafted by China and the ASEAN countries respectively were exchanged and discussed. However, due to disagreements on how binding the code of conduct should be and also different opinions between China and Vietnam on the range of disputes the code should cover, the re was little progress in the code of conduct" and subsequent meetings did not bring significant headways neither.

At the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei in July 2002, Malaysia, with a view diffusing the standoff, proposed to replace the code of conduct with a compromising and non-binding "declaration". The motion was approved by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, and a joint statement was published after the meeting, stating that ASEAN and China would work closely together to make the Declaration a reality.[17]

Several months later, a consultation on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was held. Since then, China and the ASEAN members were engaged in many rounds of difficult negotiations. At the 8th ASEAN Summit convened in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on 4 November 2002, Mr. Wang Yi, then China's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Ministers of the ten ASEAN Member States jointly signed the DOC.

In the DOC, which contains ten provisions, the parties recognize the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea; undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea; undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner; and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of the document's objective.[18] The focus throughout the negotiations was on the disputes over the sovereignty of the Nansha islands and reefs. Much attention was directed to preventing escalation of disputes and the main purpose of the DOC was to prevent further act of occupying and controlling islands.

It is worth noting that, right before the final signing of the DOC, opinions were divided about what name to use referring to the disputed areas. Most ASEAN member states agreed to use the expression of "Spratly Islands," while having no objection to China using the Chinese name "Nansha Islands." However, Vietnam insisted using "the Hoang Sa Islands" and "the Truong Sa Islands" (respectively referring to the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands) as a way to assert its stance. And this went beyond China's bottom line, as China had never admitted there is any dispute in the Xisha Islands, nor had the consultations touched upon those islands. Chinese side can't accept such unreasonable request. Eventually, in the hope of breaking the long deadlock and maximizing common interests, China agreed to use a more ambiguous expression -- "Parties in the South China Sea," "the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea" and "code of conduct in the South China Sea." Description about islands disputes were also vaguely rendered as "refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features." without specific mention to the Nansha Islands. The DOC played a vital role in diffusing disputes in the Nansha Islands and maintaining regional stability. But the ambiguity on the specific area in dispute made the local territorial disputes look like a more generalized maritime issue.The mixing up of the concepts of "disputes over islands" and "maritime disputes" is confusing.Gradually, disputes over portions of the Nansha Islands and delimitation of their surrounding waters are more often refered to as South China Sea issue.

In the period immediately after the Cold War, the US remained committed to its policy of not taking sides on the legitimacy of territorial claims in South China Sea, emphasizing that the disputes should be peacefully resolved, and that the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea be maintained. Relatively speaking, Asia was not on the radar of American global security concerns as its relationship with China was improving and the tense relations across the Taiwan straits were eased. Occasional frictions in the South China Sea region did not change the US policy of not taking sides. It only emphasized that the territorial dispute should be peacefully resolved.[19]

Under the peace mask, a decade of undercurrent of tension

In nearly ten years after the introduction of the DOC, China faithfully observed the principles and spirit of the document, refraining from taking any action that might escalate the disputes in the South China Sea. China also consistently promoted peaceful cooperation and joint development of resources in disputed waters. However, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines appeared to be half-hearted about full implementation of the DOC. They kept on transforming and expanding occupied islands and reefs, reinforcing its control, and accelerated the development of oil and gas in surrounding waters. They also occasionally arrested Chinese fishermen operating in these waters. One common purpose of these claimant countries is to solidify their illegal occupation and deny the existence of any disputes, let alone shelving them. Such development continuously enraged Chinese public and media, eliciting sustained attention on the Nansha disputes.

Vietnam was particularly active. In April 2003, it held a commemoration to celebrate the 28th anniversary of the "Liberation of the Nansha Islands." In June, it signed a secret pact with Indonesia on the delimitation of continental shelf under the South China Sea. In April 2004, it organized the first commercial tour to the Nansha Islands. In early 2005, it published a revised map of Vietnam, which included China's Xisha and Nansha Islands into its Danang city and Khanh Hoa Province respectively. In early 2006, Vietnam and Malaysia set up a navy hot-line to coordinate the resource development and settlement of sovereignty disputes over the islands and reefs. In April, it started another round of bidding for oil blocks in the surrounding waters, and announced cooperation with foreign corporation on building natural gas transmission pipelines in the Nansha Islands. In May 2007, it conducted an extensive geological survey in surrounding waters using a charted Russian surveying ship; a month later, it held elections of "National Assembly representatives" on some of the occupied Nansha shoals.

In April 2003, Malaysia sent four flotillas one after another totaling 11 surveying vessels to the waters around Nantong Reef ("Louisa Reef") to conduct prospecting operations; in May, it organized an international maritime challenge in waters around Danwap Reef and approved for the first time commercial tourism to Yuya Shoal by travel companies. In November 2004, it published stamps showing a Malaysian map which included Nansha islands. In August 2008, Malaysia's then Minister of Defense landed on Danwap Reef with some 80 journalists in a high-profile visit.

The Philippines made a lot of moves too. In April 2003, it celebrated the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Kalayaan Municipality in Zhongye Island and in June 2006, it started to renovate and upgrade the air strip and other facilities on that island. In March 2008, it set up satellite communication facilities on some of the occupied islands and reefs.

It should be noticed that before 2009, despite constant frictions, the situations in the South China Sea area was generally manageable. Greater complexity was brought by a series of events that happened in 2009. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) set 13 May 2009 as the deadline for the submission of claims defining extended continental shelf limits. This served as a stimulus, but the bigger factor was the readjustment of the US' Asia-Pacific policy.

In January 2009, Barack Obama was sworn in as the US president.

Shortly after taking office, the new president signaled that he would correct the Bush administration's misplaced foreign policy by shifting the US strategic priority to the Asia-Pacific region. This seemed had boosted some of the claimants' confidence in wrestling with China on the South China Sea disputes.

Between January and February 2009, the Philippine House of Representatives and Senate adopted the Territorial Sea Baselines Bill, which claims China's Huangyan Island and some islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands as Philippine territory. On May 6, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the South China Sea. They did so with no regard for the outstanding territorial and maritime delimitation disputes in these waters. On May 7, Vietnam separately submitted to the CLCS information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, claiming sovereignty over China's Xisha and Nansha Islands. In face of such a situation China decided to present a note verbale to the UN, providing its own position and the preliminary information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, to prevent further infringements on Chinese interests.

China and the US meanwhile started to experience frictions in South China Sea as reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance activities intensified. In 2009 alone, there were at least 5 incidents, of which the one about USNS Impeccable was the best known.

The year of 2010 witnessed a new turn in the US policy and it began to show an inclination to play a role on the issue. On July 23, at the Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Hanoi, Vietnam, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton openly spoke on the South China Sea issue. She said the United States "has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea." She also emphasized that claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the Convention, and that the US opposed the use or threat of force by any claimant. Hillary revealed in her memoir: "That was a carefully chosen phrase, answering the earlier Chinese assertion that its expansive territorial claims in the area constituted a 'core interest'."[20] Later, on multiple occasions, Hillary spoke on the Asia-Pacific policy of the Obama administration and on the South China Sea issue. In the meantime, the US military had increased its presence in areas in and around the South China Sea, including an increase of military drills.

China, with the aim of maintaining the general stability in the South China Sea and easing the tense atmosphere among the ASEAN countries, made consistent diplomatic efforts and achieved some progress. At the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting (10+1) held in Bali, Indonesia in July 2011, the Guidelines to Implement the DOC was adopted by China and ASEAN countries. China also obtained some bilateral understandings with the Philippines and Vietnam. However, China's diplomatic efforts failed to offset the impact brought by the American Asia-Pacific strategic adjustment, nor did Vietnam and the Philippines show restraint.

The change in the posture of the US side has made some ASEAN countries more restive. The Philippines and Vietnam step up reclamation activities on the features they occupied and frequently conducted military exercise with the US in the South China Sea. At the same time some ASEAN countries showed the tendency to group up against China, taking continued provocative activities in disregard of China's concern. In March 2011, the Philippine government disclosed plans to invest 230 million dollars in the renovation of the barracks and the airstrips on the features in the South China Sea. From June to July, a number of sensitive military exercises were held by the Philippines, Vietnam and some forces from outside of the region in the South China Sea which it has occupied. Aquino III, the President of the Philippines, ordered the official use of the "West Philippine Sea" to replace the standard name of South China Sea, with the hope of strengthening the Philippine territorial and maritime claims. What is more alarming is that such an irresponsible behavior of altering geographical names on the world map gained some kind of support by senior US officials, such as the Secretary of the State who used the term when visiting the Philippines. In March 2012, the Philippines and Vietnam made known that they agreed to make joint military exercises and maritime border patrols in the South China Sea. In April, Vietnam even dispatched some monks to settle in temples on some of the South China Sea islands.

The provocative actions of the US and some ASEAN countries gave rise to strong repercussions in China, inflaming public discontent. Chinese government has been exercising restraint on the issue, but it now is confronted with growing pressure from the public and has to reconsider how to explain and carry on the policy.

Behind the spiraling tension in South China Sea

To observe the rising temperature in the South China Sea, the Huangyan Island incident in April 2012 was like the last straw on the camel's back which touched upon the bottom line of Chinese policy and patience.

On 10 April 2012, Philippine warships launched a surprise raid on twelve Chinese fishing boats operating in the Huangyan Island lagoon, disturbing and harassing their fishing activities, and even forcibly boarded some of the boats and detained the fishermen. Photos of the Chinese fishermen being stripped to the waist and exposed to the scorching sun on the deck of the Philippine ship made media headlines in China and triggered off an outcry among Chinese public. Such a provocative action by the Philippine navy stimulated heated public debate in China which compelled, and consequently Chinese government take immediate counter measures. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made successive representations with the Charged'Affaires of the Philippine Embassy in Beijing without getting any clear response.

On 14 April 2012 China decided to requested all the Chinese fishing boats to leave temporarily from those waters, to prevent escalation of tensions. They returned about 9th of May and continued their licensed fishing operations. In the meantime, China send Marine Surveillance and Fishery Law Enforcement Command patrol ships to the waters around Huangyan Island.

Between April 15 and the middle of May 2012, Chinese government had more than once presented its position and the historic background of Huangyan Island to the international community through the media and Chinese Embassies overseas. I was the Vice Foreign Minister of China in charge of Asian affairs at that time, and tried many times to communicate with the Charged'Affaires ad interim at the Philippine Embassy in Beijing, questioning the Philippine behavior and its violation of the memorandum of understanding with China. But the Embassy gave no response. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on April 25th stating that "China thinks that the Philippines does not abide by agreements, and yet the Philippines thinks that there has never been any agreement between the two sides"[21]

Sadly, the provocations did not stop. Philippine coastguard ships once again forced their way into the lagoon and they went in and out in turns to maintain a constant presence. Some Chinese fishermen observed that there were armed personnel on board. This was a source of grave concern as there was the danger of clashes. Chinese side urged through diplomatic channels that the Philippines withdraw their armed vessels from the lagoon, but these requests were ignored. The Philippine DFA also refused any request for dialogue from the Chinese Ambassador in Manila.

This difficult situation continued for over two weeks, and by the end of May, China decided to send its own law enforcement patrol boats into the lagoon to protect the fishing boats. There was also a re-enforcement of the guarding ships outside the lagoon.

Throughout the time when these events were going on, the US, on many diplomatic occasions, reaffirmed the effectiveness of the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, and also strengthened diplomatic and military interaction with the Philippines. And yet, its approach regarding the incident was measured, refusing to respond to any hypothetical questions about possible conflict, and the US emphasized that its military maneuvers like the Balikatan war games were not targeted at China. The senior US officials such as the then Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also indicated that the US did not take any position on issues of the disputes, and had no intention of getting involved in the Huangyan Island issue.[22] Such attitudes obviously fell short of what the Philippines had expected.[23] On April 30 2012, the Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario admitted at the press conference after the US-Philippine "2+2" meeting that "the US has been clear that it does not get involved in territorial disputes like the one over Huangyan Island".[24]

The US' relative neutrality and its' distant position led the Philippines to waver about continuing to engage in provocations and prolonged confrontation with China. It realized that confrontation was not a sustainable strategy, as China was determined to strengthen control over Huangyan Island by sending surveillance ships to conduct routine patrols in waters off the coast of the Hunagyan Island. In addition, the Filipino Patrol forces, limited by the size of their ships, was overstretched during the month's standoff. Therefore, in late May, they were about to shift their position.

Meanwhile, China had been proactively seeking diplomatic solutions to ease the tension, talking to all the parties concerned.

In early June 2012, after the Philippine armed vessels left the lagoon, China started also to bring its law enforcement boats out of the lagoon. On 5 June the Philippine DFA publicly confirmed that the government vessels and boats from both sides had come out of the lagoon. Then, as the fishing season in the South China Sea was coming to an end, a routine fishing moratorium period (May 16 - August 1) was imposed in the area by China. The Chinese fishing boats, which extended their operation because of the disruption, gradually left Huangyan Island lagoon. From then on, China kept only 1-2 law enforcement ships in the nearby waters of Huangyan Island to make sure peace prevails and the situation had finally calmed down.

The facts are clear: the Philippines never owned Huangyan Island, let alone losing it. In dealing with these sudden provocations, China exercised great restraint and acted in goodwill. The focus of negotiation was how to cease the intense situation in the lagoon. China's main emphasis throughout the incident was to make sure that the fishing activities in the lagoon be left in peace. To clarify some of the stories about China not honoring an agreement about withdrawing its ships, China had never promised to leave completely from the area since the Philippines could not be trusted to refrain from making further moves. China's intention is to safeguard its territorial right of Huangyan Island by keeping a vigilant guard around its waters. However, during the incident, to manage risks and prevent conflicts,especially to make sure the Filipino armed vessels be brought out of the lagoon, China underwent negotiations through other parties including the US. That was a key step which finally allowed tranquility return to the area. But to say China deceived the US was untrue. The South China Sea disputes does not concern the US which is not a disputant.

Heating up tensions in the South China Sea, Vietnam made new moves too by adopting the law of the Sea of Vietnam on 21 June 2012. Such a "legislative move" made by Vietnam was meant to further thwart China's legitimate rights there, and draw more international attention to the disputes.[25] On the day of its adoption, China's then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhijun summoned the Vietnamese Ambassador to China Nguyen Van Tho to protest against this move. On the same day, China's Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that the State Council had approved Chinese long-planned establishment of Sansha city at prefecture level on Yongxing Island in the Xisha Islands, the place of the Administration Office for the Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha Islands. In the following months, a series of administrative, judicial and military measures were implemented to put Sansha city into function.

On 22 January 2013, the Philippines submitted to the UN the Law of the Sea tribunal a Notification and Statement of Claim in order to initiate compulsory arbitration proceedings. To this, China's Foreign Ministry stated: "The Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have abused relevant procedures and forced ahead with the arbitration, disregarding the fact that the subject matter of the arbitration involves territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation and related matters, evading the declaration on optional exceptions made by China in 2006 under Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." China therefore, decided not to acknowledge nor participate in the arbitration.

The Philippines applied for arbitration on account that its consultations and negotiations with China reached an impasse. But the truth is that ever since the Huangyan Island Incident, the Philippines refused to have any serious dialogue with China, let alone negotiations, nor did it consult the other DOC parties. As far as arbitration is concerned, China already made a declaration on optional exceptions in 2006 under Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since the Arbitration Court jurisdiction concerns sovereignty, historic rights and entitlement, China is exempted from the arbitration. Whatever the arbitration result is, it is not legally binding upon China.

Later, the standoff at Ren'ai Reef and Zhongjiannan Incident (Platform 981 Standoff) aggravated the situation. The Philippines aground a landing craft at Ren'ai Reef in 1999 on the excuse of needing repair and had never left. Now it had long become broken beyond repair, and the Philippine tried to start piling work on Ren'ai Reef in an attempt to actually occupy the reef. China certainly cannot accept that and therefore remained alert on the situation. In March 2014, China's Maritime Safety Administration intercepted the Philippine warships that were sailing towards Ren'ai Reef carrying construction supplies. A standoff followed. The Philippine encouraged media to cover the story, drawing international attention with the hope that the US would get involved. It later gave up the attempt.

In May 2014, China started Zhongjiannan drilling operation in Xisha area. This HYSY 981 rig project was completed inside the contiguous zone of China's Xisha Islands. Two drilling were performed 17 nautical miles from the south of Zhongjian Island of China's Xisha Islands from May 2 to August 15. The operation was harassed by hundreds of Vietnamese vessels. So the China Coast Guard flotilla chased and even collided with the Vietnamese vessels and the situation was intense at moments until the drilling was ended.

Under such situation in the area, Chinese side felt the need to update the infrastructure to safeguard sovereignty, enforce defense, and improve the living conditions there. From the end of 2013, China launched reclamation projects on the stationed Nansha islands and shoals. Since those features are away from international sealane, the reclamation project would not in any way affect freedom of navigation. Yet, the US and the Philippines reacted strongly by initiating a media hype and pointing fingers at China. In view of the concerns about China's reclamation efforts, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying made a detailed explanation at a press conference on 9 April 2015: Chinese government has been carrying out maintenance and construction work on some of the garrisoned Nansha islands and reefs with the main purpose of optimizing their functions, improving the living and working conditions of personnel stationed there, better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as well as better performing China's international responsibility and obligation in maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine science and research, meteorological observation, environmental protection, navigation safety, fishery production service and other areas. The relevant construction, which is reasonable, justified and lawful, is well within China's sovereignty. It does not impact or target any country.[26] Later on a number of construction projects that can provide service to the international community are being constructed, including lighthouses, automatic weather station, ocean surveillance center, marine scientific research facilities. 5 lighthouses that can facilitate navigating safety are constructed.

China's actions did not gain full understandings from its neighboring countries, and voices of concerns were emerging. Meanwhile, the US increased its involvement and used rhetoric like "too big and too fast" and "islands militarization" to pile pressure on China. It even sent out military fleet to sail close to Xisha and Nansha Islands, seen by China as serious provocations.

To many Chinese people, the US is behind the intense situation in the South China Sea. For a start, since the US launched its Pivot to Asia which was later changed into rebalance to the Asia Pacific, it has increasingly viewed China as its main rival and therefor the target. In 2013, the US military proposed a "two 60%" deployment target, which is: by 2020, the US would have deployed 60% of its warships and 60% of its overseas air force to the Asia-Pacific. Apart from this, the US also took every possible opportunity to highlight the potential challenges posed by China, dubbing it as "Anti Access/ Area Denial", and it was actively working on the Air-Sea Battle model targeting China. This heavy-handed military posture of rebalancing forces by the US has undoubtedly made the disputes and situation in the Nansha Islands and surrounding waters more complicated. Some Chinese scholars wrote about their concern that the imaginary threats and crises in the Asia-Pacific region, based on which the US is trying to adjust its strategies, might turn into a self- fulfilling prophecy.

Since 2014, the American statements regarding issues concerning China's neighborhood revealed that it was taking a posture of more open and direct intervention in the region and clearer favoritism for its allies.

On 5 February 2014, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel said at a congressional hearing that China's establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea was "a step in the wrong direction," and that "China's lack of clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims has created uncertainty, insecurity and instability in the region. It limits the prospect for achieving a mutually agreeable resolution or equitable joint development arrangements among the claimants." He said that "the international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its 9-dotted line claim."[27] In the same month, the US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert announced US' support for the Philippines in the event of a China-Philippines conflict,[28] in so far the toughest and most partial talk on the issue by any high-ranking US officials. At the Post Ministerial Conference of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Naypyidaw in August the same year, the US Secretary of State John Kerry called for a moratorium on land reclamation, building on disputed islands, and actions that might further escalate disputes.

It was evident that the US started to make a "cost-imposing" tactic against China, namely trying to employ all means at its disposal, political, diplomatic, media and military, to raise the cost of China's actions in the South China Sea, forcing China to back off and reining in "China's expansion".[29] In 2015, the US released four strategic security documents, entitled Forward Engaged and Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, respectively, all of which elaborated on the South China Sea issue, claiming that it would let China pay the cost.

The US policy changes from non-involvement to interference not only undermined itself as a supposedly unbiased party, but also deepened China's concern over the possible threat to Chinese important interest, and this in turn stimulated China to further strengthen its defense capabilities.

While the US was changing its policies, its military became more active, targeting at China by taking various provocations and measures of deterrence. It intensified surveillance and close-in reconnaissance at the Nansha Islands and its surrounding waters. The number of sorties flown by the US planes increased from about 260 in 2009 to over 1,200 in 2014.[30] Its muscle-showing moves also include sending navy ships to make "freedom of navigation operations" near Nansha Islands, and even within 12 nautical miles of Xisha Islands, an area not under dispute. For example, on 27 October 2015, the USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Zhubi Reef in the Nansha Islands; On 30 January 2016, the USS Curtis Wilbur passed near Zhongjian Island in China's undisputed Xisha territorial waters. Different from before, the US was very open about these actions. Admiral Harry B. Harris, commander of US Pacific Fleet, announced that the US would conduct more extensive and complicated patrols in the South China Sea at least "twice a quarter."[31]

The US defense forces started to take more activities aimed at deterring China. In July 2015, Admiral Scott Swift, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, joined the surveillance mission on board the ASW P-8A Poseidon to conduct close-in reconnaissance at the South China Sea. On November 5, the then United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter boarded the USS Roosevelt and spoke on the South China Sea issue, when USS Roosevelt passed through the area about 150-200 nautical miles south of the Nansha Islands and about 70 nautical miles north of Malaysia. On November 8 and 9, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near China's reconstructed islands in the South China Sea. On 15 April 2016, Carter, while on a diplomatic visit to the Philippines, boarded on the USS John C. Stennis during its navigation in the South China Sea. There were also some incidents where the US military vessels and aircraft entered the Chinese territorial waters and airspace, and claimed that they were careless mistakes.

The US has strengthened its alliance with countries near the South China Sea and its military networking. Since its Pivot-to-Asia policies, the US has endeavored to increase military presence in Darwin, Australia, Changi Naval Base, Singapore, as well as in the Philippines and Malaysia. It also enhanced cooperation with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam to conduct intelligence gathering and reconnaissance cooperation in the region, and expanding military support to the Philippines and Vietnam, helping them to improve reconnaissance, patrol control and anti-access capabilities. In March 2016, the US and the Philippines announced at their sixth annual Bilateral Security Dialogue that the US forces were allowed to use six Philippine military bases. In April 2016, the US military and the Philippine military conducted "shoulder-to-shoulder" exercises which had well-targeted missions, including "recapturing lost islands and protecting oil rigs", all based on scenarios of the South China Sea disputes.

Those activities by the US in the South China Sea, be it deployment of its own forces or military cooperation with other parties, have certainly further flared up tensions, and exaggerated the South China Sea's position on the international strategic chessboard. It started to look like that the competition between China and the US was becoming the main focus in the South China Sea issue.

Upon reflection, the US was involved and even took lead in almost all the world's confrontations and tensions after the Cold War, some of which has dragged on till today. This compels Chinese to wonder, what is the US' real intention on the South China Sea issue?

China increasing its capability in managing the situation while pushing for cooperation

It can be seen from the above that the situation in the South China Sea came to the state of where we are today is the result of the entangling effect of the actions and reactions along multiple lines of development. There is also the influence of the changes in the international and regional security environment. The elements that pushed the spiraling twists and turns include not only such considerations as sovereignty, resources and strategic security, but also tangible interests. There is also the problem of information incoherence and institutional memory loss. Moreover, the guessing game about each other's strategic intentions and policy objectives is playing a role as well. It has to be pointed out that the US, as a power from outside the region, has played a major role by coming into the issue and adjusting its policies towards the disputes since 2009. The question arises: what is the future of the South China Sea? The US is watching China's next step, while China has some deep doubts towards the US's intentions. There is a danger of intensifying confrontations and strategic misjudgments regarding the South China Sea issue and disputes on Nansha Islands.

China's position in the South China Sea has not been changed and is consistently maintained. That is to safeguard national territorial integrity and maintain regional peace and tranquility. For Chinese, the painful memory of history is not long gone and they have not forgotten that the country suffered the humiliation of foreign invasion and aggression. That is why the Chinese people and government are very sensitive about anything that is related to territorial integrity and would never allow the recurrence of territorial loss even if it's just an inch of land. This is something the outside world needs to be aware when looking at China and trying to understand China's behavior. Admittedly, there is no major external threat that can endanger China's survival or development in today's world. China adheres to the path of peaceful development and is dedicated to promoting world peace, development and cooperation. Its belief and commitment are firm and unchanged.

In his speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Meeting of the CICA Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 28 April 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated: "China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. We firmly stand by our sovereignty and rights and interests in the South China Sea, and remain committed to resolving disputes peacefully through friendly consultation and negotiation with countries directly concerned".[32] Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held many rounds of consultations with his counterparts from ASEAN countries. From the discussion results, one could see that China's proposition of "dual-track" approach, meaning disputes be resolved peacefully through negotiation between the parties directly concerned and China and ASEAN countries work together to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, has been well received and supported. Many ASEAN countries started to realize the importance of keeping the situation under control and return to the track of dialogue.

So, to be specific, China's policy objectives in the South China Sea could be read through the following angles.

First, China's fundamental policy objective for the South China Sea is to protect the security of its sovereignty and maritime rights. China's principle is not to make the first move, and act with restraint. However, when provoked, China would not hesitate to take countermeasures. The Chinese people would not tolerate any further infringement of sovereignty and rights concerning islands and shoals and the legitimate waters off them in the South China Sea, and therefore hold high expectations towards Chinese government to protect national interests. China will not give up its sovereignty stance and will increase its capabilities to control the situation and prevent any further loss. As long as no new major threat looms large, China will continue to uphold the policy of "shelving the disputes and seeking joint development". China's policy of solving the dispute through negotiations and peaceful means remains firm.

Second, China's policy also pay important attention to the freedom and safety of navigation. The South China Sea is an international pathway of strategic importance and has the busiest commercial shipping routes, allowing 40 percent of the world's ocean freight to pass through. The freedom and safety of navigation in the area are indispensable to all major economies. China relies on those routes for more than 70 to 80 percent of its trade and energy supplies. The pathway also serves as an important passage for Chinese navy to sail to the wider sea.

Third, the common denominator of China and its neighbors is regional peace and stability. China does not have an agenda or motive to seek hegemony in the region. The very reason that China exercises restraint and try to keep the disputes and differences under control is exactly for the sake of maintaining general peace in the neighboring environment. In this regard, China would continue making efforts in the following aspects: to provide and share more information with others for better understanding; to offer more public goods for the well-being and safety of all; to complete the "code of conduct" with ASEAN members for a rule based regional order. From a long-term perspective, as the biggest coastal country in the South China Sea, China should have the ability not only to defend itself but also to maintain peace in the South China Sea, and to gain a good position for seeking a negotiated settlement.

Fourth, China and the US should both care for maintaining the freedom and safety of navigation, and promoting stability and prosperity in the South China Sea area. The US has no territorial disputes with China in the south China Sea. Therefore, the two countries should avoid the trap of security dilemma and misunderstandings by engaging in dialogues, clarifying each other's intentions. China and the US need and should be able to work towards cooperation. As China is building its maritime capabilities, the wider seas and oceans in the world are increasingly important to its development as well as its global cooperation. China's vision will surely go beyond the South China Sea.

The future direction of trend would very much depend on the perceptions and choices of the parties involved. If they choose to cooperate, they may all win. If they choose to confront each other, they may only head for impasse or even conflict and no one can benefit totally.

References

[1] This article was published on the website of the American magazine Foreign Policy under the title on 11 July 2016. Its Chinese version was published on 12 July in the Chinese newspaper Global Times (Iss. 3947).

[2] This article's shorter English version was published in the website of National Interest in the US on 10 May 2016. The complete Chinese version was published in the China Newsweek (Issue No.755), 11 May 2016. The following is a longer version with some new information added into it.

[3] China's discovery of the Nansha Islands dates back to the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D). During the Tang and Song dynasties (7th-13th century), China's knowledge and development of the islands increased substantially. The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) exercised jurisdiction over the islands, and since then, China's official maps have all included the Nansha Islands.

[4] In 1939, Japan circled out a heptagon area (at 7°-12°N; 111°36'-117°30' E) in the Nansha Islands and the surrounding waters, which included Taiping Island, Nanzi Island and Beizi Island, collectively known as the Xinnan Islands. They then were under the control of "Kaohsiung City, and of the Office of the Governor-General."

[5] The Cairo Declaration, The Cairo Declaration, November 26, 1943, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 448-449. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122101.

[6] The Potsdam Proclamation, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/zcfg/t1367519.htm.

[7] Treaty of Peace with Japan, http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts volume%20136/volume-136-i-18-english.pdf.

[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and the Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, Central Party Literature Press, 1990. pp. 38-46.

[9] Aileen Sanpablo-Baviera ed., The South China Sea Disputes: Philippine Perspective, Philippine China Development Resource Centre & Philippine Association for Chinese Studies, 1992, p. 53.

[10] Xinhua news release, "The People's Republic of China Government Solemnly Declares Chinese Sovereignty over the Nansha Islands Inviolable", the People's Daily, May 30, 1956, front page.

[11] The Final Declarations of the Geneva Conference July 21, 1954". Vietnam War, Alpha History. https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/geneva-conference-1954/. Retrieved 14 January 2019.

[12] A. V. H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of Philippines: the Magsaysay Administration, Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1961, p.217. Xiao Xiqing, History of China-Philippines Diplomatic Relations, Chinese Taipei Academic Press, 1995, p. 217.

[13] http://www.china-nanhai.org.cn/events.html, accesssed August 20, 2016.

[14] Ibid. Accessed August 20, 2016.

[15] ASEAN, 1998 Ha Noi Plan of Action, Ha Noi, 15 December 1998.

[16] Department of Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China Foreign Affairs, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2000, p. 659.

[17] ASEAN, 2002 Joint Communique of 35th ASEAN Ministers' Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, 29-30 July 2002.

[18] Nguyen Hong Thao, "The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note," Ocean Development & International Law, 34:3-4, pp. 282-284. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/yzs_673193/dqzz_673197/ nanhai_673325/848051.shtml, accessed April 11,

[19] US Department of State Daily Briefing, May 10,1995. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/, Access date, 11 April 2016.

[20] Speech of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Vietnam, 23 July 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2010/07/145095.htm, accessed 14 April 2016; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices, Simon & Schuster, 2014, p. 79.

[21] Statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs on the "Scarborough Shoal" issue, 25 April 2012, http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/25/statement-of-the-department-of-foreign-affairs-on- "scarborough-shoal"-april-25-2012/

[22] Campbell's response,http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/conduct-06272012194950. html/. Access date 15 August 2016.

[23] Armed Clash in the South China Sea, http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south- china-sea/p27883. Access date 1 September 2016.

[24] Remarks With Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188982.htm. Access date 1 September 2016.

[25] http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/228456/the-law-of-the-sea-of-viet-nam.html, accessed 14 April 2016.

[26] China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: China's Reclamation Efforts on Part of its Nansha Islands are Legitimate and Legal, Xinhuanet, 9 April 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2015-04/09/ c_1114920500.htm, accessed 11 April 2016.

[27] Subcommittee Hearing: America's Future in Asia: From Rebalancing to Managing Sovereignty Disputes, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-america-s-future-asia- rebalancing-managing-sovereignty-disputes, accessed 14 April 2016.

[28] Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, 13 February 2014, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Greenert/Speech/140213%20National%20Defense%20College%20of%20the%20Philippines%20remarks%20only.pdf, accessed 14 April 2016.

[29] The challenge of responding to maritime coercion. Center for New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Maritime1_Cronin.pdf, accessed 14 April 2016.

[30] Opinions: The US Conducts Frequent Close-in Surveillance Missions to China's Three Major Construction Projects in the South China Sea," People's Daily, July 3, 2015. http://military. people.com.cn/n/2015/0703/c1011-27247801.html, accessed 14 April 2016.

[31] Ministry of National Defense spokesperson: US Pacific Command commander Harry Harris' Remarks on the South China Sea Revealed His Lack of Historical Knowledge, Xinhua, 28 January 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/28/c_1117929534.htm, accessed 14 April 2016.

[32] Xi Jinping, "Jointly Create a Better Future of Peace and Prosperity for Asia Through Dialogues and Consensus," 28 April 2016, http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t1359296.htm, accessed 1 May 2016.

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